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THE LEAKY LEVIATHAN:
WHY THE GOVERNMENT CONDEMNS AND CONDONES
UNLAWFUL DISCLOSURES OF INFORMATION
David E. Pozen∗
The United States government leaks like a sieve. Presidents denounce the constant flow
of classified information to the media from unauthorized, anonymous sources. National
security professionals decry the consequences. And yet the laws against leaking are
almost never enforced. Throughout U.S. history, roughly a dozen criminal cases have
been brought against suspected leakers. There is a dramatic disconnect between the way
our laws and our leaders condemn leaking in the abstract and the way they condone it
in practice.
This Article challenges the standard account of that disconnect, which emphasizes the
difficulties of apprehending and prosecuting offenders, and advances an alternative
theory of leaking. The executive branch’s “leakiness” is often taken to be a sign of
organizational failure. The Article argues it is better understood as an adaptive response
to external liabilities (such as the mistrust generated by presidential secret keeping and
media manipulation) and internal pathologies (such as overclassification and
bureaucratic fragmentation) of the modern administrative state. The leak laws are so
rarely enforced not only because it is hard to punish violators, but also because key
institutional actors share overlapping interests in maintaining a permissive culture of
classified information disclosures. Permissiveness does not entail anarchy, however, as a
nuanced system of informal social controls has come to supplement, and all but supplant,
the formal disciplinary scheme. In detailing these claims, the Article maps the rich
sociology of governmental leak regulation and explores a range of implications for
executive power, national security, democracy, and the rule of law.

INTRODUCTION

O

urs is a polity saturated with, vexed by, and dependent upon
leaks. The Bay of Pigs, the Pentagon Papers, warrantless wiretapping by the National Security Agency at home, targeted killings by
the Central Intelligence Agency abroad: the contours of these and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For helpful feedback at various stages
of this project, I am grateful to many friends and colleagues, in particular Bruce Ackerman, Matt
Adler, Steven Aftergood, Sir Daniel Bethlehem, Sam Buell, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Josh Chafetz,
James Comey, Hal Edgar, Mark Fenster, Robert Ferguson, Lou Fisher, Joey Fishkin, Tom
Glaisyer, Jack Goldsmith, Brad Greenberg, Ronnie Janoff-Bulman, Jeremy Kessler, Seth Kreimer,
Marty Lederman, Henry Monaghan, Trevor Morrison, Julian Mortenson, Robert Post, Dan
Richman, Gary Ross, Fred Schauer, Fritz Schwarz, Geof Stone, Adrian Vermeule, Steve Vladeck,
Matt Waxman, Ben Wittes, and David Zionts, as well as to workshop participants and classroom
audiences at American, Columbia, Duke, Fordham, Harvard, Penn, and Yale. My deepest debts
of gratitude are owed to Ian MacDougall and Jan Messerschmidt, for excellent research assistance; to David Super, for extraordinarily generous and trenchant comments on an early draft;
and to the journalists and officials I interviewed, for their time and insights.
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countless other government activities have emerged over the years
through anonymous disclosures of confidential information to the
press.1 Across the ideological spectrum, many Americans believe both
that leaking “is a problem of major proportions”2 and that “our particular form of government wouldn’t work without it.”3 Episodically,
leaks generate political frenzy. The country is in such a period at this
writing. Mass releases of classified defense documents and diplomatic
cables through WikiLeaks, followed by a series of news stories about
some of the government’s most closely held national security programs, have unleashed a torrent of legislative and media responses, of
recriminations and justifications. This “latest outbreak of leak panic”4
will soon fade; a new iteration will arrive in due course.
Our comprehension of leaking has not kept pace with our fascination. Even accounting for the secrecy that obscures its workings, the
ratio of heat to light in commentary on the subject is extreme. Some
valuable progress has been made. Journalists and ex-officials have
chronicled the role of leaks in their work. Students of government and
the press have limned leaks’ different forms and motivations. Legal
theorists have considered the First Amendment implications. Yet for a
variety of reasons, the literature reflects only a rudimentary understanding of leaks’ consequences, inside and outside government.5
More surprising, because the questions are more tractable, scholars
have devoted scant attention to the constitutive elements of the leak,
as a legal and bureaucratic concept, or to the policies the executive
branch has developed to enforce relevant prohibitions. We know
something about the phenomenology and constitutionality of leaks but
next to nothing about how the government deals with them.
This Article begins to reveal that world. Drawing on a range of
theoretical perspectives and original sources — interviews with journalists and executive branch officials, plus records requested through
the Freedom of Information Act6 (FOIA) — it offers the first sustained
account of the regulatory regime applicable to leaking. Superficially
straightforward, this regime turns out to be an intricate ecosystem. At
the most general level, the Article demonstrates that the story behind
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
1 I will refine this definition of leaks shortly. A wide range of practices are conventionally
lumped together under the “leaks” heading, as explained below. See infra notes 28–32, 99–112,
270–81 and accompanying text.
2 Statement on the Protection of Classified National Security Council and Intelligence Information, 18 PUB. PAPERS 22, 22 (Jan. 12, 1982).
3 BRUCE CATTON, THE WAR LORDS OF WASHINGTON 87 (1948).
4 Bill Keller, Op-Ed., The Leak Police, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com
/2012/08/06/opinion/keller-the-leak-police.html?pagewanted=all.
5 See infra section I.D, pp. 542–44 (discussing obstacles to systematic study of these
questions).
6 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
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the U.S. government’s longstanding failure to enforce the laws against
leaking is far more complicated, and far more interesting, than has
been appreciated. More specifically, the Article argues that most components of the executive branch have never prioritized criminal, civil,
or administrative enforcement against leakers; that a nuanced set of
informal social controls has come to supplement, and nearly supplant,
the formal disciplinary scheme; that much of what we call leaking occurs in a gray area between full authorization and no authorization, so
that it is neither “leaks” nor “plants” but what I will term pleaks that
dominate this discursive space; that the executive’s toleration of these
disclosures is a rational, power-enhancing strategy and not simply a
product of prosecutorial limitations, a feature, not a bug, of the system;
and that to untangle these dynamics is to illuminate important facets
of presidential power, bureaucratic governance, and the national security state in America today.
These claims require extensive elaboration. As a way into them,
consider two features that mark the United States’ legal approach to
unapproved disclosures of protected information. First, and most significantly, even though the Espionage Act of 19177 and other statutes
broadly criminalize the gathering, receipt, and dissemination of
national defense–related information and even though every modern
President has decried the practice, an enormous amount of leaking to
the press appears to go unpunished. The federal government has
brought roughly a dozen media leak prosecutions in the ninety-six
years since the Espionage Act was enacted, eight of them under the
current Administration.8 Available evidence suggests that civil and
administrative sanctions are only marginally more common.9
Let us call this the punitive/permissive divide: the statutes on the
books concerning leaks, and the political rhetoric associated with
them, are so harsh, and yet the government’s actual treatment of the
activity seems to have been so mild. There is a dramatic disconnect
between the way our laws and our leaders purport to condemn leaking
and the way they have condoned it — a rampant, pervasive culture of
it — in practice.
Second, the courts have indicated that while the government has
expansive legal authority to prosecute employees who leak, it has minimal authority to stop members of the media who receive leaks from
broadcasting what they learn, either through ex post penalties or prior
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7 Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, and 50 U.S.C. and
codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C. §§ 792–798 (2012)).
8 This is the standard narrative. Most observers now count eleven cases overall and attribute
the last eight to the Obama Administration. Arguably, the former figure ought to be slightly
higher and the latter slightly lower. See infra notes 113–14, 121 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 143–56 and accompanying text.
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restraints.10 In nearly all cases, it seems, the government would have
to prove that the actions of the reporter or publisher threatened grave,
immediate harm to national security interests. It is hard to be sure
because no such criminal case has ever proceeded that far.
Let us call this the source/distributor divide: the First Amendment
has been construed to provide so little protection for the leaker and yet
so much protection for the journalist who knowingly publishes
the fruits of the leaker’s illicit conduct and thereby enables the very
harm — revelation of sensitive information to the public and to foreign
adversaries — that the leak laws were designed to combat. In other
areas of criminal law, downstream users of illegally obtained material
are not similarly insulated from liability.11
As a descriptive or diagnostic matter, the literature has pointed to
several factors to explain the existence of these features. The leak laws
are so rarely enforced, it is said, because the Department of Justice
finds it so difficult at the investigatory stage to identify culprits and
so difficult at the adjudicatory stage to bring successful cases without
divulging additional sensitive information. Courts and prosecutors
have privileged journalists over leakers, it is said, because of the former’s special First Amendment status and the latter’s consent to
nondisclosure as a condition of employment. Throughout these discussions, the comparison is often drawn to the United Kingdom’s
notorious Official Secrets Act.12 Whatever else might be true of our
legal and political approach to leaks, virtually everyone agrees that
the United States would never abide such a sweeping criminal
prohibition.13
As a normative or justificatory matter, few have celebrated this
“disorderly situation.”14 Many believe it to be regrettable if not outra–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
10 The government does have legal authority to subpoena journalists in leak cases in an effort
to uncover their sources, and thereby to frustrate their reporting indirectly, though it has placed
strict limits on its own ability to do so. See infra notes 135–42 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2315 (2012) (criminalizing the knowing sale or receipt of stolen goods).
12 1989, c. 6 (U.K.).
13 See infra notes 497–527 and accompanying text (describing the Official Secrets Act and its
role in U.S. legal policy debates).
14 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 80 (1975); accord Geoffrey R.
Stone, Government Secrecy vs. Freedom of the Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 199 (2007)
(characterizing First Amendment doctrine on leaking as “an awkward, even incoherent, state of
affairs”).
Professor Bickel’s and Professor Stone’s observations were directed at the
source/distributor divide, but they fairly capture sentiment on the regulation of leaking more
broadly. See generally GARY ROSS, WHO WATCHES THE WATCHMEN? THE CONFLICT BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 9–20 (2011) (reviewing the “remarkable” number of articles, hearings, and reports that have critiqued U.S. leak law and policy,
id. at 14); Stephen I. Vladeck, Commentary, in ROSS, supra, at xii, xiii (stating that “prominent
scholars from across the spectrum have felled forests in the past several decades” proposing how
the laws against leaking might be improved); Note, Media Incentives and National Security Secrets, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2228, 2231–32 (2009) [hereinafter Note, Media Incentives] (discussing
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geous. National security hawks and opposition members of Congress
routinely call for legislative strengthening of the leak laws and more
vigorous executive enforcement, including against members of the media. Civil libertarians have assailed the last two Administrations’
“war” on leaking and sought federal shield legislation for journalists
and enhanced doctrinal protections for their sources. The most
thoughtful and influential defenses of the status quo — by Professors
Alexander Bickel,15 Jack Goldsmith,16 and Geoffrey Stone17 — are
self-consciously ambivalent. They do not attempt to idealize or even
rationalize the punitive/permissive and source/distributor divides, so
much as to highlight the factors confounding any effort to strike an optimal balance between national security needs and other democratic
and constitutional goods. These analyses are also spare. They rely on
discrete case studies and high-level constitutional theory to identify
relevant values, precedents, and tradeoffs; they do not make any systematic inquiry into patterns and practices of leaking or enforcement,
or into the functional and strategic dimensions of the leak-law regime.
This Article aims to show why our “disorderly situation” cannot
be understood without such inquiry and to explicate a more satisfying
logic, a richer model, that better accounts for the seemingly incoherent
law of leaks. The core claim is that the status quo, although ritualistically condemned by those in power, has served a wide variety of
governmental ends at the same time as it has efficiently kept most disclosures within tolerable bounds. The leak laws are so rarely enforced
not only because it is difficult to punish violators, but also because key
institutional players share overlapping interests in vilifying leakers
while maintaining a permissive culture of classified information
disclosures.
The executive branch is where most of the action takes place.
With respect to the punitive/permissive divide, commentators have
widely assumed the executive would prefer to bring more cases, and
then looked to constraints on realizing that preference. By concentrating on barriers to prosecution, these treatments overlook the ways in
which powerful actors benefit from leak-law violations, as well as the
ways in which leaking may be punished in the absence of a criminal
proceeding, or indeed any formal sanction. The executive’s “leakiness”
is often taken to be a sign of institutional failure. It may be better un–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
“ample evidence of political dissatisfaction with the status quo,” id. at 2232, concerning classified
information leaks).
15 BICKEL, supra note 14, ch. 3.
16 JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY
AFTER 9/11 ch. 7 (2012).
17 Stone has addressed these issues in numerous important works. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R.
STONE, TOP SECRET: WHEN OUR GOVERNMENT KEEPS US IN THE DARK chs. 1–3 (2007).
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derstood as an adaptive response to key external liabilities — such as
the mistrust generated by presidential secret keeping and media manipulation — and internal pathologies — such as overclassification
and fragmentation across a sprawling bureaucracy — of the modern
administrative state. Once these affirmative interests in leaking are
identified, the source/distributor divide also begins to look less puzzling. To criminalize leaking at the publication stage, as well as the
transmission stage, would not only raise difficult First Amendment issues but also risk compromising the government’s instrumental use of
the press.
The flood of leaks, in short, is neither legally nor technologically
determined. It would be possible to stop a much higher percentage of
disclosures. Leakiness is a product not only of external and organizational constraints but also of deliberate choices made by high-level
officials within those constraints. These choices have helped an
ever-growing executive to secure the necessary leeway and legitimacy
for governance. Curious citizens are derivative beneficiaries. Even
though particular leaks may cause real damage, an accommodating
approach to enforcement has in the aggregate supported, rather than
subverted, the government’s general policymaking capacity as well as
many different policymakers’ discrete agendas.
That, at least, is the Article’s central thesis. Part I reviews the legal
landscape and the available evidence on how leaks are used and
punished. Part II first details the shortcomings of constraint-based rationales for the government’s permissiveness, and then advances an
alternative explanatory theory grounded in the executive branch interests served by leakiness. These interests include preserving ambiguity
as to the origins of unattributed disclosures and therefore the communicative flexibility of top officials; signaling trustworthiness; facilitating
richer internal information flows; pacifying constituencies for transparency in Congress, the media, and civil society; and mitigating the
classification system’s political and deliberative costs. Part III extends
this account by investigating the informal enforcement model that the
executive appears, behind closed doors, to have applied to leaking.
Part IV returns to the source/distributor divide and to the recent uptick in prosecutions and draws out additional evaluative and descriptive implications — including the surprising insight that the U.S. and
U.K. legal regimes on leaks have, at least in their observable aspects,
substantially converged.
Before proceeding further, several notes are in order. Throughout
the pages that follow, the focus is on the U.S. federal executive branch
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and its information control practices relating to national security,18
broadly defined to include many matters of foreign policy. Some of the
Article’s arguments may well carry over to other types of leaks, to other types of institutions, to subnational levels of government, maybe
even to other mature democracies. At points, I will briefly discuss possible extrapolations. But national security leaks raise a number of distinct concerns and have always driven the legal conversation.19 Their
treatment by the world’s dominant military power will, I trust, be of
sufficient interest to many.
The heart of the Article is the positive analysis in Parts II and III
and the window it provides into the regulation of leaking. While I
hope in Part IV to draw some fruitful linkages to broader questions in
democratic, constitutional, and security theory, and while I hope more
generally to facilitate normative projects of varied stripes, the Article
is principally concerned with demonstrating how leaking works.20
The overriding aim is to provide an explanation (not a justification)
for this regulatory regime in terms of the intersecting desires, beliefs,
and constraints of Presidents, political appointees, civil servants, legislators, journalists, and the institutions they populate. Although I cannot directly establish the intentions of many of these actors or rule out
evolutionary factors — for instance, a natural tendency for the leakier
components of government to gain in relative political power and
thereby to propagate their disclosure norms — I try to the extent possible to provide microfoundations for my theory, to specify mechanisms that reduce leakiness to the individual level. I try to show further how personal incentives, bureaucratic politics, and functional
system imperatives have largely reinforced one another in this area,
how the diffusion of control over information has not crippled but empowered the national security state.
Some pieces of the analysis were aided by roughly two dozen interviews I conducted with current and former officials who have worked
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18 In this, the Article follows much of the existing literature on leaks. Cf. infra notes 276 &
338 and accompanying text (noting the potential for more congressionally oriented approaches).
As compared to prior legal studies, this study pays greater attention to the intragovernmental regulation, production, and function of leaking and less to doctrine or the demand side. While much
more could be (and has been) said about the methods and incentives of those who seek to obtain
government secrets, the world explored herein is that of officialdom, of the secret keepers and
their minders.
19 Cf. ELIE ABEL, LEAKING: WHO DOES IT? WHO BENEFITS? AT WHAT COST? 4 (1987)
(“The [U.S.] government’s problem with leaks and leakers tends to center on three related areas:
foreign policy, defense, and . . . two intelligence organizations, the Central Intelligence Agency and
the National Security Agency.”).
20 Or rather, how it has worked, given the possibility that developments in technology, terrorism, the media, and government structure are unsettling the traditional paradigm. See infra notes
323–25, 427–28, 459–61, 528–50 and accompanying text.
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on top secret issues across the executive branch,21 as well as by my
own modest experiences in government.22 Almost all the interviews
were “on background,” which is to say the interviewees asked not to be
identified, and I agreed. The unsettling brand of methodological mimesis that results — this is an Article about anonymous government
sources that itself makes use of anonymous government sources — is
not lost on me. I would have preferred to conduct these conversations
on the record. Yet like so many journalists and several scholars before
me, I quickly learned that few were willing to discuss anything interesting under those ground rules.23 Minimizing validity concerns, however, nothing expressed in an interview contradicts the publicly available evidence, including the returns from my own FOIA requests.24
The interviews provided a measure of color and corroboration. They
deepened but did not transform my understanding of this evidence.
A final caveat: while I try in this Article to shine light on an
opaque corner of the law, I certainly do not mean to suggest that I
have fully uncovered, much less “solved,” the inner workings of the
leak regime. A number of significant developments occurred after the
Article was drafted — most notably, one of the most sensational classified information leaks in history, by National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden.25 I will touch on this event in a handful of
places, including a closing discussion about whether we are at the cusp

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21 I spoke with senior and mid-level officials who were working or had worked recently in the
White House, the Intelligence Community, and departments including Defense, Justice, State,
Treasury, and Homeland Security. Most of these officials served in a legal capacity. Several were
directly involved in formal or informal leak-law enforcement. It is possible that this pool of interviewees — mainly lawyers, all willing to talk with me — suffers from selection bias, although it is
not obvious in what direction such bias would skew perceptions of leaking. I make no claim to
systematicity or comprehensiveness in the design of these interviews, which play only a supporting role in the analysis. My hope is that they add sufficient texture to merit mention, notwithstanding their evident limitations.
22 I served as a special advisor to the Legal Adviser of the Department of State from 2010 to
2012, and as a special assistant to Senator Edward M. Kennedy from 2007 to 2008.
23 Among the few scholarly studies of leaking and associated issues that draw on interviews
with U.S. government insiders, most appear to have similarly granted anonymity in full or in part.
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 253; HUGH HECLO, A GOVERNMENT OF
STRANGERS, at xi–xii (1977).
24 My primary FOIA requests, submitted to a dozen executive branch agencies in September
2012, asked broadly for records from 1970 through the present day relating to criminal referrals,
internal investigations, or administrative or civil actions for suspected media leaks. See, e.g., Letter from David Pozen, Assoc. Professor of Law, Columbia Law Sch., to Donna L. Sealing,
FOIA/Privacy Officer, Nuclear Reg. Comm’n (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://pbadupws.nrc
.gov/docs/ML1226/ML12263A214.pdf. All records received through FOIA are on file with the
author and available upon request.
25 See generally Edward Snowden, GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/edward
-snowden (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (compiling articles on Snowden).
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of a new era in enforcement.26 But a focused treatment of the (stillunfolding) Snowden affair will have to await future work. The regulatory dynamics and arrangements explored here are no doubt historically contingent and subject to change. The phenomenon of leaking,
more broadly, is so varied and complex that it defies neat characterization. I hope this Article can render it a little less mysterious and, in so
doing, point the way to some new approaches to studying and conceptualizing government secrecy.
I. WHAT WE KNOW (AND THINK WE KNOW) ABOUT LEAKS
This Part sets the stage by synthesizing relevant law, commentary,
and data on leaks. Legal scholars have largely concentrated on the
First Amendment questions raised by publication and prosecution of
leaks and on the small set of litigated cases, in particular the Pentagon
Papers case.27 The literatures on media, government, and the presidency are more helpful for understanding how leaking operates.
There is no settled definition of a leak in the academic literature or
in journalistic usage.28 Most commonly, a leak is taken to be (i) a targeted disclosure (ii) by a government insider (employee, former employee, contractor) (iii) to a member of the media (iv) of confidential
information the divulgence of which is generally proscribed by law,
policy, or convention (v) outside of any formal process (vi) with an expectation of anonymity.29 This can serve as a working definition.
Revelations made in a signed memoir, speech, or the like thus do not
count because there is no mystery as to their source. Some commentators further stipulate that the disclosure must be “unauthorized.”30
The concept of authorization is crucial in this context but also, as we
will see, deeply difficult; I bracket the issue for the time being and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26 See infra notes 528–46 and accompanying text. A number of other very recent developments are taken up in footnotes scattered throughout the Article.
27 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
28 See MARTIN LINSKY, IMPACT: HOW THE PRESS AFFECTS FEDERAL POLICYMAKING
169 (1986) (“[I]n the dialogue between reporters and officials, leaks are a complex, confusing, and
controversial subject. There are arguments about what is a leak . . . .”); Leslie H. Gelb, All About
Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1986, at B10 (“There is not even agreement on a definition.”). Several journalists I interviewed objected to the term “leak,” on the ground that it has unwarranted
pejorative connotations. I use the term here neutrally, nonjudgmentally. Given the ubiquitous
references to “leaks” in this area, it would be odd to use another label.
29 See, e.g., LINSKY, supra note 28, at 169, 171, 197 (leaks involve confidential information,
anonymous sources, and exclusive stories); LEON V. SIGAL, REPORTERS AND OFFICIALS 144
(1973) (similar).
30 See William E. Lee, Deep Background: Journalists, Sources, and the Perils of Leaking, 57
AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1461 n.35 (2008) (noting the prevalence of this approach); see also Clifton
Daniel, Leaks: A Fact of Life, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1974, at 13 (“By Washington’s definition, a
leak is an unauthorized disclosure of confidential official information, usually by an unidentified
‘source.’”).
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then return to it at length in Part II.31 Except as otherwise specified,
the Article uses the term “leaks” in the colloquial sense, encompassing
both authorized and unauthorized disclosures.
As noted above, this Article primarily explores leaks to the press by
executive branch sources of national security–related information, understood to include information pertaining to foreign affairs.32 Given
the subject matter, these disclosures will frequently, though not always,
implicate or involve classified content. Routine background briefings
with multiple reporters fall beyond the Article’s focus. So do the tips
and nudges that officials sometimes give to outside parties about
which nonconfidential, publicly available materials deserve their attention (a significant and underappreciated practice). So do disclosures to
foreign powers or their agents — espionage in the traditional sense.
And so do disclosures to members of Congress or to private parties not
in the media, except insofar as they are anticipated to generate a news
story, rendering them media leaks at one remove.
A. The Legal Framework
As a number of recent works have catalogued the statutes and case
law on leaking,33 this overview strives for parsimony. The central
statutory provision is 18 U.S.C. § 793, originally enacted as part of the
Espionage Act of 1917.34 Section 793 criminalizes a wide range of activities associated with the gathering, possession, or communication of
information relating to the “national defense” — that is, a wide range
of activities that may bear little resemblance to classic espionage —
with intent or reason to believe the information could “be used to the
injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation.”35 Violators are subject to fines, forfeiture, and imprisonment for
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31
32

See infra sections II.B.1–2, pp. 559–73.
The federal government’s uniform system for classifying national security information incorporates this understanding. See Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 6.1(cc), 3 C.F.R. 298, 324 (2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 app. at 233–45 (Supp. V 2011) (defining national security to include
“foreign relations of the United States”); see also id. § 1.4(b), (d), 3 C.F.R. at 300 (expressly allowing for classification of information pertaining to “foreign government information” and “foreign
relations or foreign activities of the United States”).
33 See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41404, CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION passim (2013); ROSS,
supra note 14, at 147–68; Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and Scapegoats: The Press
and National Security Information, 83 IND. L.J. 233, 262–98 (2008); Stephen I. Vladeck, Essay,
Inchoate Liability and the Espionage Act: The Statutory Framework and the Freedom of the
Press, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 219, 221–31 (2007). The laws themselves do not use the term
“leaks.”
34 18 U.S.C. § 793 (2012). The Espionage Act of 1917 superseded the first federal statute directed to military information, the Defense Secrets Act of 1911, ch. 226, 36 Stat. 1084 (repealed
1917).
35 18 U.S.C. § 793(a); see also id. § 793(d)–(e). The broadest provisions of the Espionage Act
have no special intent requirement for certain categories of tangible materials relating to the na-
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up to ten years.36 Courts have construed the term “national defense”
broadly, so that the statute likely embraces a great deal of sensitive information implicating foreign relations,37 and they have looked to the
executive’s own classification system (which conditions eligibility for
classification on anticipated “damage to the national security”38) to
help determine the statute’s reach.39 No court has ever accepted a defense of improper classification.40
In addition to section 793, a variety of other criminal statutes might
be applied to leakers, including41:
18 U.S.C. § 371 — prohibiting conspiracy to commit any offense
against or defraud the United States “in any manner or for any purpose.”
18 U.S.C. § 641 — prohibiting theft, conversion, or unauthorized
disposition of “property” and “thing[s] of value of the United States or
of any department or agency thereof.”
18 U.S.C. § 794 — prohibiting gathering or delivering of defense
information in aid of a foreign government.
18 U.S.C. § 797 — prohibiting publication and sale of photographs
of defense installations.
18 U.S.C. § 798 — prohibiting disclosure or publication of cryptographic and communication intelligence information.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
tional defense, just the relaxed requirement that their unlawful communication or transmission
have been “willful[].” Id.
36 Id. § 793(f), (h).
37 The leading opinion comes from an espionage case, Gorin v. United States, 312 U.S. 19, 25–
32 (1941). See also REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 10 (1982) [hereinafter WILLARD REPORT],
available at www.fas.org/sgp/library/willard.pdf (“Because the term ‘national defense’ was so
broadly defined in Gorin, it is likely to cover most information relating to ‘foreign relations’ that
is properly classified.”). But cf. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., The Espionage Statutes
and Publication of Defense Information, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 976–86 (1973) (noting ambiguities in Gorin).
38 Exec. Order No. 13,526 § 1.2(a), 3 C.F.R. 298, 299 (2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 app.
at 233–45 (Supp. V 2011); see also id. § 1.2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 298–99.
39 See, e.g., United States v. Kiriakou, No. 1:12cr127 (LMB), 2012 WL 3263854, at *6 (E.D.
Va. Aug. 8, 2012) (explaining that “courts have relied on the classified status of information to determine whether it is closely held by the government and harmful to the United States” and
adopting this approach); see also United States v. Kim, No. 1:10-cr-00225-CKK, slip op. at 6–10
(D.D.C. July 24, 2013) (holding that the government is not required to prove under 18 U.S.C.
§ 793(d) that the disclosure of specific classified information was potentially damaging to the
United States and questioning whether a contrary Fourth Circuit ruling has been followed within
that circuit). Tracking the language of the Espionage Act’s harm element, the nondisclosure
agreements signed by millions of federal employees advise that “unauthorized disclosure . . . of
classified information by [the employee] could cause irreparable injury to the United States or
could be used to advantage by a foreign nation.” STEPHEN DYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1259 (5th ed. 2011); see also id. at 1258–59.
40 See Patricia L. Bellia, Feature, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National
Security Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1523 (2012).
41 Except as otherwise indicated, all references in this list are to the 2012 version of the United
States Code.
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18 U.S.C. § 952 — prohibiting disclosure of diplomatic codes and
correspondence.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(1) — prohibiting disclosure of protected national defense and foreign relations information retrieved through unauthorized access of a computer.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 — prohibiting disclosure of confidential information acquired in the course of employment “in any manner or to any
extent not authorized by law.”
18 U.S.C. § 1924 — prohibiting unauthorized removal and retention of classified documents or materials.
18 U.S.C. § 2071 — prohibiting “willful[] and unlawful[]” concealment, removal, or destruction of government records.
42 U.S.C. § 2274 (2006) — prohibiting communication of “Restricted Data” relating to atomic energy, with intent or reason to believe
such data will be used to injure the United States.
42 U.S.C. § 2277 (2006) — prohibiting disclosure of “Restricted Data” to unauthorized parties.
50 U.S.C. §§ 421–426 (2006 & Supp. V 2011) — prohibiting disclosure of identities of covert intelligence officers, agents, informants, or
sources.
The second item on this list, the general theft and conversion statute, warrants special mention on account of its potential breadth.
While one circuit court has deemed § 641 inapplicable to disclosures of
“intangible goods,”42 several others have found that it applies equally
to intangible and tangible confidential information.43 “Why bother
with an Official Secrets Act,” a former CIA analyst asked a decade
ago, “with this thing on the books?”44
Judicial interpretations of these laws have narrowed their scope in
a few respects, but not by much. Although there are many ambiguities
in the statutes45 and the case law, it has been reasonably clear for at
least the past few decades that (i) virtually any deliberate leak of clas–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
42
43

United States v. Tobias, 836 F.2d 449, 451 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., United States v. Matzkin, 14 F.3d 1014, 1020 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Girard, 601 F.2d 69, 70–71 (2d Cir. 1979). See generally Irina Dmitrieva, Note, Stealing Information: Application of a Criminal Anti-Theft Statute to Leaks of Confidential Government Information, 55 FLA. L. REV. 1043, 1046–52 (2003). In at least one media leak case, the government
secured a guilty plea and prison sentence under § 641 without bringing any charges under the Espionage Act. See Elaine Hargrove-Simon, Balancing National Security and Civil Rights: Analyst
Sentenced for Leaking Information to London Times, SILHA CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF MEDIA
ETHICS & L. (Winter 2003), http://www.silha.umn.edu/news/winter2003.php?entry=202897 (describing the case of Jonathan Randel).
44 Steven Aftergood, Government Information as Property, SECRECY NEWS (Jan. 16, 2003),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/2003/01/011603.html (quoting Allen Thomson) (internal quotation marks omitted).
45 See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 37, passim (meticulously detailing ambiguities in the espionage statutes).
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sified information to an unauthorized recipient is likely to fall within
the reach of one or more criminal statutes;46 and (ii) the government
may prosecute most if not all employees, ex-employees, and contractors
for such leaks so long as it can prove the information was not already
in the public domain47 and the defendant knew or should have known
her actions were unlawful.48 Complementing these criminal powers,
courts have also allowed the government to enforce the terms of nondisclosure agreements through equitable and monetary remedies.49
The courts have further granted the executive near-total discretion to
revoke security clearances of, and take other disciplinary action
against, individuals suspected of leaking.50
As compared to the legal vulnerability of their government sources,
journalists and other private actors who publish leaked information
appear to occupy a privileged position. In the Pentagon Papers case,
the Supreme Court held the government had not met its “heavy burden” of justifying a prior restraint on the New York Times’s and Washington Post’s publication of excerpts of a classified study on Vietnam
War decisionmaking leaked by defense contractor Daniel Ellsberg.51
That burden, Justice Stewart famously maintained, requires the government to prove that publication “will surely result in direct, immedi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
46 See WILLARD REPORT, supra note 37, at 2 (“[I]n virtually all cases the unauthorized disclosure of classified information potentially violates one or more federal criminal statutes.” (internal
numbering omitted)); Letter from John Ashcroft, U.S. Att’y Gen., to J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of
the U.S. House of Representatives 3 (Oct. 15, 2002) [hereinafter Ashcroft Report], available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dojleaks.pdf (“I conclude that current statutes provide a legal
basis to prosecute those who engage in unauthorized disclosures [of classified information], if they
can be identified.”); see also Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information: Hearing Before
the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 106th Cong. 10 (2000) (statement of Janet Reno, U.S. Att’y
Gen.) [hereinafter Reno Testimony], available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/renoleaks.pdf
(“[W]e believe that the criminal statutes currently on the books are adequate to allow us to prosecute almost all leak cases. We have never been forced to decline a prosecution solely because the
criminal statutes were not broad enough.”).
47 But see United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 575–80 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that even
publicly available classified information can qualify as national defense information under the
Espionage Act).
48 Scholars continue to debate the best view of the First Amendment in this context, but few
dispute that the (very thin) case law permits the government at least this much. See, e.g., ELSEA,
supra note 33, at 15; STONE, supra note 17, at 11–14 (characterizing the case law similarly, with
the qualification that disclosures revealing unlawful government conduct must be seen as protected by the First Amendment). As explained above, see supra notes 34–44 and accompanying text,
while the government may have to prove at trial the possibility of injury to the United States under some Espionage Act provisions, this harm element does not always apply and, where it does,
the fact that a disclosure involved classified information ought to be highly probative given the
criteria for classification.
49 See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 514–16 (1980) (per curiam); United States v.
Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1316–18 (4th Cir. 1972).
50 Cf. Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527–33 (1988) (establishing the
nonreviewability of security clearance determinations in the absence of specific statutory warrant).
51 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
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ate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people.”52 At least
five Justices suggested that ex post prosecutions might be held to a less
stringent First Amendment standard than prior restraints,53 and by its
plain terms the Espionage Act seems to extend to journalists and publishers.54 More recent Supreme Court decisions, however, give reason
to believe the government’s burden would be nearly as heavy in a
criminal proceeding against a member of the press, at least in the absence of a concerted effort to exfiltrate the information.55 Hence the
source/distributor divide.
Of greater practical significance for national security journalists,
the Supreme Court has declined to recognize a First Amendment– or
common law–based reporter’s privilege against compelled disclosure of
confidential source information.56 While some lower courts have nevertheless recognized a qualified privilege,57 Judge Posner’s 2003 opinion for the Seventh Circuit in McKevitt v. Pallasch58 appears to have
anticipated a swing in the doctrinal pendulum back toward the more
restrictive view.59 And while the vast majority of U.S. states have enacted statutes recognizing some form of reporter’s privilege, and Congress has considered many proposals,60 no such “shield law” currently
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
52 Id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart staked out the median, and thus effectively controlling, position in his concurring opinion.
53 See id.; id. at 733–40 (White, J., concurring); id. at 741–48 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at
752 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 757–58 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (disputing the Court’s prior restraint holding).
54 See Papandrea, supra note 33, at 264; see also Criminal Liability for Newspaper Publication
of Naval Secrets, 1 Op. O.L.C. 93 (Supp. 1942) (advising that the Espionage Act could be applied
to a reporter, and possibly also to his managing editor and publisher, for their roles in acquiring
and publishing wartime naval information); Government’s Consolidated Responses to Defendants’ Pretrial Motion at 15, United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006) (No.
1:05cr225) (“There plainly is no exemption in [18 U.S.C. § 793] for the press . . . .”).
55 Particularly important statements on press immunity include Landmark Communications,
Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), and Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001). See also Stone,
supra note 14, at 200 nn.50–51 (citing additional cases). Stone concludes that “as a practical matter, the standard used in Pentagon Papers is essentially the same as the standard the Court would
use in a criminal prosecution of the press for publishing information about the activities of government.” STONE, supra note 17, at 24.
56 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679–708 (1972).
57 See RonNell Andersen Jones, Avalanche or Undue Alarm? An Empirical Study of Subpoenas Received by the News Media, 93 MINN. L. REV. 585, 587–93 (2008) (summarizing the case
law). These courts creatively seized on Justice Powell’s Branzburg concurrence as if it were the
controlling opinion, when in fact Justice Powell joined the Court’s opinion in full — making five
votes for the “no privilege” position. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
58 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
59 See, e.g., United States v. Sterling, 724 F.3d 482, 492–505 (4th Cir. 2013) (declining to recognize a First Amendment– or common law–based reporter’s privilege protecting confidential
sources in a criminal proceeding); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145–
50 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (affirming a civil contempt order issued against reporters for failure to comply
with subpoenas requesting source identities).
60 See Jones, supra note 57, at 594–615, 652 n.280.
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exists at the federal level. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has taken
the position that the reporter’s privilege does not apply in criminal
cases, absent a showing that the subpoena was issued in bad faith or
for the purpose of harassment.61 Over the past several decades, it appears that roughly two dozen journalists have served some, usually
quite brief, time in jail for refusing to disclose their sources.62
The federal whistleblower statutes might be expected to comprise
the last major piece of the legal framework, except that in the national
security context they play a marginal role. Several laws protect executive branch employees who disclose information regarding alleged
abuses to designated agency officials or congressional committees under specified procedures.63 But these laws offer significantly less succor when it comes to classified information, are widely seen as confusing and user-unfriendly, and under no circumstances permit disclosures
directly to the press.64 These laws also do not ensure against revocation of one’s security clearance,65 which in the national security and
foreign policy fields generally means loss of one’s job. And though the
point is contestable, the laws are fairly read to provide “absolutely zero
protection” for those who publicly reveal classified information, even
as a last resort, and even when the information reveals illegal government conduct.66 The vast majority of leakers have no interest in reporting wrongdoing in any event.67 Consequently, the whistleblower
statutes tend to be ignored in the debate over classified information
leaking, apart from occasional calls to revise them. It is telling that in
Jack Goldsmith’s recent book-length study of mechanisms that publicize and constrain the executive’s national security activities, these
laws are never once mentioned.68
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
61 See id. at 597; Brief for the United States (Public Version) at 13–14, 23–37, Sterling, 724
F.3d 482 (No. 11-5028).
62 See William H. Freivogel, Publishing National Security Secrets: The Case for “Benign Indeterminacy,” 3 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 95, 96–97 (2009).
63 E.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
64 See generally Papandrea, supra note 33, at 245–48; Stephen I. Vladeck, The Espionage Act
and National Security Whistleblowing After Garcetti, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1531, 1536–37, 1542–46
(2008). In an interview, secrecy expert Steven Aftergood stated that most classified information
leakers are either uninterested in availing themselves of the prescribed whistleblower channels or
do not trust that they will prove safe or effective. Interview with Steven Aftergood, Dir., Project
on Gov’t Secrecy, Fed’n of Am. Scientists, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 10, 2012).
65 See Papandrea, supra note 33, at 248.
66 Vladeck, supra note 64, at 1534.
67 See infra section I.B, pp. 528–34.
68 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 16. The one allusion to these laws in Goldsmith’s book highlights their practical irrelevance. See id. at 239 (observing that after 9/11, “CIA whistle-blowers
leaked information to the press rather than follow internal whistle-blower procedures”).
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B. Leaking Practices
It is a commonplace that leaks course through the nation’s capital.
Classified information disclosures to the media are thought to occur
“so regularly in Washington” as to constitute “a routine method
of communication about government.”69 According to one executive
branch study, they are a “daily occurrence.”70 What little empirical evidence there is in the public record tends to bear out these claims.
Most arresting, in a survey of current and former senior government officials conducted by the Harvard Kennedy School’s Institute of
Politics in the mid-1980s, forty-two percent of respondents indicated
that they had, at least once, “fe[lt] it appropriate to leak information to
the press.”71 The survey designers concluded this figure was likely
understated.72 “[E]verything we have found,” the lead researcher reflected, “argues that leaks . . . are a routine and generally accepted part
of the policymaking process.”73 Nonsurvey data point toward the
same conclusion. Using an exceedingly restrictive definition of leaks,
Leon Sigal found that between 1949 and 1969, 2.3% of the front-page
stories in the New York Times and Washington Post about national or
foreign news relied primarily on leaks for the information reported.74
Looking at classified information disclosures specifically, a study
by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence counted 147 separate
instances in the nation’s eight leading newspapers in the first six
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
69
70
71

Lee, supra note 30, at 1467.
WILLARD REPORT, supra note 37, at 6.
LINSKY, supra note 28, at 238; see also id. at 172 (interpreting affirmative responses to this
question as confessions of leaking). This survey, which attained a response rate of fifty percent,
was given to hundreds of executive officials at the level of assistant secretary and above and to a
few members of Congress. Id. at 228–30. The survey did not ask any questions about classified
information disclosures specifically. This appears to be the only study to have polled current or
former U.S. officials about their views on leaking.
72 Id. at 172, 197.
73 Id. at 197.
74 SIGAL, supra note 29, at 120–22; cf. Project for Excellence in Journalism & Rick Edmonds,
Content Analysis, STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA, http://stateofthemedia.org/2005/newspapers
-intro/content-analysis (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (finding that thirteen percent of all front-page
newspaper stories, and twenty percent of the largest newspapers’ front-page stories, contained
anonymous sources in 2004). Sigal looked at two weeks’ worth of stories in the Times and the
Post from each of the years 1949, 1954, 1959, 1964, and 1969. A story was placed in the leak category only if its unattributed information appeared solely in that newspaper and “independent
evidence from subsequent news articles, historical studies or memoirs, or officials’ and reporters’
recollections indicate[d] that it was a leak.” SIGAL, supra note 29, at 121. While Sigal’s method
is admirably thorough, his data cover a small and not necessarily representative set of news items,
and his strategy for identifying leaks — consulting subsequent articles, memoirs, recollections,
and the like in some unspecified way — is too demanding and too arbitrary to replicate for a larger sample. In the view of the national security journalists with whom I spoke, any effort to systematically isolate “leak-based stories” through objective, observable criteria is destined to fail.

2013]

THE LEAKY LEVIATHAN

529

months of 1986.75 The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission claimed in its 2005 public report to have identified “[h]undreds
of serious press leaks” of classified information over the past decade.76
Goldsmith similarly appears to have tallied “hundreds of stories” in the
Times and the Post following 9/11 that “self-reported disclosure of classified information,” and “many more” that contained “classified tidbits”
without advertising as much.77
A number of commentators have speculated that the volume of
classified information leaks has been increasing in recent years,78
whether because of the growing size of the classification system, rising
levels of partisanship, diminishing trust in government, or new technologies that make it easier to produce, reproduce, store, and spread
materials. I share the intuition that there has been significant growth
in the raw amount of leaks, or at least in the amount of publicization
and republicization of leaks across various media outlets. But it is
worth recalling that over sixty years ago President Truman asserted,
based on a Yale University study commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), that “95 percent of our secret information ha[d]
been revealed by newspapers and slick magazines.”79
Journalists and government insiders have consistently attested that
leaking is far more common among those in leadership positions. The
ship of state, one often hears, is the only known vessel that leaks from
the top80 — starting, that is, from the White House itself.81 This topdown dynamic is traceable to differences in professional norms, cultures, and incentives as between political appointees and career civil
servants and — perhaps an even more pronounced gulf — as between
high-level and mid- to low-level employees. The latter group has
limited contact with reporters or access to “the kind of information
that makes a front-page splash.”82 Senior officials routinely encounter
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
75 See Mark Lawrence, Executive Branch Leads the Leakers, WASH. POST, July 28, 1987, at
A13. This study, which found that Congress was responsible for nine percent of the leaks, id.,
remains unpublished.
76 COMM’N ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. REGARDING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 381 (2005)
[hereinafter WMD REPORT].
77 GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 68–69.
78 See, e.g., id. at 68–74.
79 The President’s News Conference, 247 PUB. PAPERS 254, 255 (Oct. 4, 1951).
80 See Lili Levi, Dangerous Liaisons: Seduction and Betrayal in Confidential Press-Source
Relations, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 609, 624 n.47 (1991) (noting the popularity of this metaphor).
81 See MORTON H. HALPERIN ET AL., BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
183 (2d ed. 2006) (“Leaks come from many different sources, but it is the judgment of most reporters that the greatest single source of leaks is the White House.”).
82 ABEL, supra note 19, at 17; see also STEPHEN HESS, THE GOVERNMENT/PRESS CONNECTION 75 (1984) (“The bureaucrats’ world faces inward. They know best how to maneuver
within their own agencies; journalists . . . are outside their ken and represent risk beyond possible
gain.”).
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both. Civil servants generally operate in a work environment that
prizes discipline and vilifies leaking as disloyalty.83 For many senior
officials, leaks are seen as “at worst an annoyance.”84 Most bureaucrats have little to gain in their careers from leaking, and much to lose.
Senior officials, especially those appointees who cycle in and out
of government, are better positioned to reap benefits from media
relationships and from changes in administration policy or public perception. “[T]he fine art of leaking,” accordingly, “is most often practiced at the level of the cabinet and subcabinet or among the president’s closest advisers in the White House.”85 Many in the executive
have plausibly claimed that members of Congress are a significant secondary source of leaks,86 although reliable data on congressional leaking are even harder to come by,87 and such claims may warrant skepticism inasmuch as they deflect attention from the executive’s own
disclosure habits.
Less senior government officials have been known to leak as well,
occasionally to spectacular effect. Several observers have opined that
as the Reagan and Bush II Administrations wore on, their controversial policy initiatives inspired a growing number of mid-level employees to turn to the press.88 Yet it is rare to hear of any such employee
becoming a repeat player in the “game of leaks,”89 as so many senior
officials seem to be. And one will never find such an employee publicly proclaiming, as U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.
once did, that leaking is his or her professional “prerogative,” “one of
my weapons for doing this job.”90
In part because of their association with opportunistic powerplayers rather than disempowered dissidents, leaks are sometimes
thought to typify and foster the occasionally adversarial yet fundamen–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
83
84

See LINSKY, supra note 28, at 171, 201.
Id. at 172; see also Lee, supra note 30, at 1463 (quoting a sworn statement by a former
Washington Post national security correspondent that “the vast majority of high-level government
officials become confidential sources” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85 ABEL, supra note 19, at 17.
86 See, e.g., HESS, supra note 82, at 76 (“According to a wise departmental press officer, ‘we
just assume that anything given to the Hill will be leaked . . . .’”).
87 The most careful (yet still anecdote-driven) study I have seen suggests that Congress has
shared classified information with the media on a number of occasions, though far less often than
the executive has. See Kathleen Clark, Congress’s Right to Counsel in Intelligence Oversight,
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 915, 940–51. Just as politically appointed executive officials are significantly
more likely to leak than lower-level civil servants, Clark finds that members of Congress are significantly more likely to reveal classified information than their staffers. Id. at 950–51; accord
Robert Garcia, Leak City, AM. POL., Aug. 1987, at 23, 24.
88 See, e.g., ABEL, supra note 19, at 42, 67 (Reagan); Seth F. Kreimer, The Freedom of
Information Act and the Ecology of Transparency, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1011, 1037–45 (2008)
(Bush II).
89 Papandrea, supra note 33, at 248; see also id. at 248–62.
90 SIGAL, supra note 29, at 137 (internal quotation mark omitted).
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tally symbiotic relationship between the government and the mainstream press. Max Frankel’s affidavit for the New York Times in the
Pentagon Papers case remains the canonical statement of this view.
Frankel described the “informal but customary traffic in secret information”91 that characterized the interactions of “a small and specialized corps of reporters and a few hundred American officials.”92 Within this community, Frankel explained, high-level leaks of classified
information are “the coin of [the] business.”93 The media outlets that
participate in these “cooperative, competitive, antagonistic and arcane”94 rituals have varied over time, with the Times and the Post long
occupying a central position.95 Their power to dictate outcomes is
substantial. In many instances, media outlets have delayed publication
or withheld certain especially sensitive details in light of the
national security concerns raised by forewarned officials.96 These acts
of restraint underwrite the industry’s claim to being a careful steward
of the public interest — the notion that as a counterweight to the venality and extremism of its government secret keepers, the United
States has been blessed with a responsible press. And yet it is clear
that, as a group, journalists and editors do not believe that seeking, receiving, or broadcasting classified information is intrinsically harmful
or unethical,97 while as individuals they face potential professional
harm from being “scooped” by competitors, versus gain from the “exclusives” and the frisson that leak stories tend to generate.98 Both
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
91 Affidavit of Max Frankel at para. 17, United States v. N.Y. Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (No. 71 Civ. 2662), 1971 WL 224067 [hereinafter Frankel Affidavit].
92 Id. at para. 3.
93 Id. at para. 16.
94 Id. at para. 3.
95 Cf. HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 185 (“The feeling is that ‘everyone’ in Washington
reads the New York Times and the Washington Post.”). I have not seen any scholarly discussion of
the changing composition of media leak recipients. Virtually all pre-WikiLeaks studies of leaks
centered on print publications, though one assumes that broadcast media gained market share in
the leak-revelation industry over the course of the twentieth century.
96 See, e.g., SUNSHINE IN GOV’T INITIATIVE, LEAKS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 4–8
(2007), available at http://www.sunshineingovernment.org/members/leaks/Overview.pdf (reviewing
examples).
97 See LINSKY, supra note 28, at 171 (observing that for “nearly all journalists, most leaks do
not carry . . . negative moral baggage”); Lee, supra note 30, at 1464 (“Journalists generally do not
believe that seeking or receiving classified information is illegal or unethical.”); cf. BICKEL, supra
note 14, at 81 (arguing that the Pentagon Papers ruling vindicated a conception of the First
Amendment in which “the presumptive duty of the press is to publish, not to guard security or to
be concerned with the morals of its sources”).
98 See DAVID WISE, THE POLITICS OF LYING 282 (1973) (“Normally the leaker can count
on competitive pressures within the news media to insure publication of the story.”); Richard
Halloran, A Primer on the Fine Art of Leaking Information, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1983, at A16
(“For its part, the press rarely turns away leaks that have been checked for accuracy . . . . A published leak often leads to a counter-leak. It also makes reporters look good in the eyes of editors,
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their incentives and their worldview cut strongly in favor of publicizing credible disclosures.
Media leaks come in many different shapes and sizes. In his 1984
book, The Government/Press Connection, Stephen Hess sketched a typology that has been widely followed. In motivational terms, Hess explained, the main variants include: the ego leak, meant to satisfy the
leaker’s “sense of self-importance”; the goodwill leak, meant to curry
favor with a reporter; the policy leak, meant to help, hurt, or alter a
plan or policy; the animus leak, meant to settle grudges or embarrass
others; the trial-balloon leak, meant to test the response of key constituencies, members of Congress, or the general public; and the whistleblower leak, meant to reveal a perceived abuse and, unique among the
list, “usually employed by career personnel.”99 As Hess observed, these
categories are not mutually exclusive.100 A leaker may have multiple
motivations or goals, some of them unconscious. Although Hess
speculated that ego is the most common cause of leaking,101 policy
leaks — an especially capacious category he did not parse — play a
larger role in the accounts of ex-officials and in the academic
literature.102
Significant subtypes of the policy leak might include the internecine leak, through which competing agencies or factions within the executive branch strive to strengthen their relative positions, and the
counter-leak, intended to neutralize or dispute prior disclosures. Hess
also overlooked the important, if less titillating, category of the inadvertent or lazy leak, effectuated through accident or ignorance with no
particular instrumental aim in mind. Such leaks plainly occur.103
Equally important are the many stories that look like they may contain leaks but are in fact based on public materials or sources outside
the U.S. government. Angry officials not infrequently suspect a delib–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
competitors and customers.”). For a thorough treatment, see generally Note, Media Incentives,
supra note 14.
99 HESS, supra note 82, at 77; see also id. at 77–78. Additional typologies, largely complementary to Hess’s, can be found in HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 184–201; Randy Borum et
al., Psychology of “Leaking” Sensitive Information: Implications for Homeland Security, 1
HOMELAND SECURITY REV. 97, 101–07 (2006); and Richard B. Kielbowicz, The Role of News
Leaks in Governance and the Law of Journalists’ Confidentiality, 1795–2005, 43 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 425, 469–76 (2006).
100 HESS, supra note 82, at 78.
101 Id. at 77.
102 Policy leaks also play a larger role in senior officials’ self-reporting. In response to a question on why it would be appropriate to leak, the most common reasons given in the Kennedy
School survey were to “counter false or misleading information,” LINSKY, supra note 28, at 239,
to “gain attention for an issue or policy option,” and to “consolidate support from the public or a
constituency outside government,” id. at 238.
103 See id. at 170–71, 192; ROSS, supra note 14, at 74–75; Mark Fenster, The Implausibility of
Secrecy, 65 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming Feb. 2014) (manuscript at 19–21), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2220376.
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erate betrayal when there has been only clever journalistic sleuthing.104 Sometimes referred to these days as “diffuse sourcing”105 or
“mosaic making,”106 it is an old insight that in some cases “there is no
one leaker, and no one leak, but a composite that looks like a leak but
is really just good investigative reporting.”107
Less has been written about the other dimensions on which leaks
may differ. At least one Espionage Act case suggests that the government may have a substantially higher burden when prosecuting leakers of intangible information as opposed to documents, disks, files, and
the like.108 This distinction finds some support in the statutory language, though one suspects that it was bolstered, on functional or fairness grounds, by the comparatively greater “difficulty in determining
orally transmitted information’s classification status.”109 An additional
distinction (really, a spectrum) worthy of note relates to the quantum
and scope of material disclosed and the difference between what we
might call specific leaks, which convey a limited amount of content
about a discrete matter, and general leaks, which disclose vast swaths of
information more or less indiscriminately. The three most famous leaks
in modern U.S. history were tangible, general leaks: Daniel Ellsberg’s
disclosure to the Times of the 7000-page Pentagon Papers study; Chelsea (formerly Bradley) Manning’s disclosure to WikiLeaks of, inter
alia, 250,000 diplomatic cables; and Edward Snowden’s disclosure to
the Guardian and the Post of untold numbers of National Security
Agency (NSA) files.110
Tangibility and generality both ought to correlate positively with
the average leaker’s heterodoxy and negatively with her seniority.
High-level officials do not need to turn over official documents to get
heard; in the absence of any tangible disclosure, journalists and editors
are much more likely to find their statements to be credible and news–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
104
105

See ABEL, supra note 19, at 5–6; HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 203.
See Jack Goldsmith, Leak Investigations in the Digital Era, LAWFARE (June 11, 2012, 9:29
AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/06/leak-investigations-in-the-digital-era-2/.
106 See generally David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628 (2005).
107 Leaks of Classified National Defense Information — Stealth Aircraft: Hearing Before the
Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 96th Cong. 13 (1980) [hereinafter
Hearing on Leaks of Classified Information] (prepared statement of Admiral Daniel J. Murphy,
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Review).
108 United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602, 626 (E.D. Va. 2006) (discussing 18 U.S.C.
§ 793(d), (e) (2012)).
109 Id. at 624.
110 Ellsberg’s leak appears to have been substantially more discriminate than Manning’s.
Among other reasons, Ellsberg withheld four volumes of the Pentagon Papers containing diplomatic materials out of concern that their revelation would cause significant harm. See SANFORD
J. UNGAR, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS 83–84 (1972). It is not yet clear how Snowden’s disclosure stacks up against those of his predecessors, on these or other dimensions.

534

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 127:512

worthy. And as the discussion here suggests, high-level officials do not
tend to see themselves as whistleblowers on a mission to expose abuse
or as dissidents on a large scale.111 I am unaware of any senior U.S.
policymaker who has ever been accused of unlawfully revealing thousands of pages or their equivalent. General leaks are the province of
the radically disaffected and the subversive. Top government brass,
socialized into and successful in the Washington power culture, are unlikely to be either.
One final distinction: although legal scholars generally have not
done so, some journalists have distinguished between leaks and
plants.112 Plants are taken to be “authorized” disclosures designed to
advance administration interests and goals. Leaks are “unauthorized”
disclosures. This distinction is fundamental, if elusive at the margins,
and the lack of critical attention it has received represents a major
hole in the legal literature. Part II will consider it in detail.
C. Enforcement Practices
Excluding cases of true espionage, all those thousands upon thousands of national security–related leaks to the media have yielded a total of roughly a dozen criminal prosecutions in U.S. history. The
common wisdom is that there have been eleven such cases, including
Edward Snowden’s and Donald Sachtleben’s.113 Depending on how
one counts and on some unknown facts, the correct figure may be
double that.114 (More on the composition of this group in Part III.)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
111 Many lower-level officials who make unauthorized disclosures outside the national security
context are likewise not out to reveal malfeasance or subvert the system, but rather to influence
agency policymaking. For a detailed account of this phenomenon, see Amanda C. Leiter, Soft
Whistleblowing, 48 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
112 See ABEL, supra note 19, at 2; HESS, supra note 82, at 75. An exception in the legal literature is Levi, supra note 80, at 628–31.
113 For the standard pre-Snowden list, see Charlie Savage, Nine Leak-Related Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2012, at A14. For the initial report of Snowden’s indictment, see Peter Finn &
Sari Horwitz, U.S. Files Charges Against Snowden, WASH. POST, June 22, 2013, at A1. For an
initial report on Sachtleben’s plea deal, see Sari Horwitz, Former FBI Agent Will Plead Guilty in
Leak Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2013, at A1.
114 Arguably missing cases include the 2005–2006 aborted prosecutions of lobbyists Steven
Rosen and Keith Weissman for conspiring to transmit classified foreign policy information to
journalists, among others, see Lee, supra note 30, at 1512–20; the 2002 prosecution of Jonathan
Randel for leaking sensitive but unclassified Drug Enforcement Agency information to the
London Times, see Hargrove-Simon, supra note 43; the 1957 court martial of Col. John C.
Nickerson Jr. for leaking classified information concerning an Army ballistic missile project to a
syndicated columnist, among others, see The Nation Can Relax, TIME, July 8, 1957, at 11; and
the 1945–1946 pursuit of six people associated with the left-wing magazine Amerasia, see
HARVEY KLEHR & RONALD RADOSH, THE AMERASIA SPY CASE 56–135 (1996). Recent
reports indicate that a grand jury is investigating WikiLeaks’s founder Julian Assange, see, e.g.,
Billy Kenber, Civil Liberties Groups Predict Assange Will Also Be Prosecuted, WASH. POST, July
31, 2013, at A1, and that retired general James E. Cartwright is the “target” of a separate criminal
probe, see, e.g., Greg Miller & Sari Horwitz, Four-Star General Is Targeted in Leak Probe, WASH.
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Only one Espionage Act case in recent memory has been brought
against someone other than the initial source,115 and only a miniscule
number of leak investigations appear to have yielded prosecutions for
derivative offenses, such as perjury or destruction of evidence.116 Although it has contemplated doing so several times, the government has
never once, over the past half century, proceeded against a member of
the media for publishing or possessing leaked information.117
For a crime that Presidents describe as a major threat to national
security and good government, the degree of “underenforcement”118 is
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
POST, June 28, 2013, at A1; see also Steven Aftergood, Prosecutors Rebut Defendant’s Challenge
to Espionage Act Statute, SECRECY NEWS (Apr. 8, 2013), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2013/04/793
_rebuttal/ (describing another ongoing Espionage Act prosecution that does not involve disclosure
to the media). At this writing, it is unclear whether Assange or Cartwright will be charged, or
whether Assange has already been indicted under seal.
The standard list of eleven cases could be challenged from the other direction as well. If the
inquiry is confined to leaks directed primarily at the media, the Defense Department official who
passed information to Rosen and Weissman, Lawrence Franklin, should not be counted. I assume
that the Rosen and Weissman cases have been omitted from the standard list because the defendants were not government actors. The Randel case may be excluded because no charges were
brought under the Espionage Act. The Nickerson and Amerasia cases may go overlooked because of their age or because Nickerson’s leaked information seems never to have been published.
(That the Espionage Act charges were eventually dropped or that Nickerson faced a court martial
should not matter; Thomas Drake’s comparable plea deal and Chelsea Manning’s court martial
are on everyone’s lists.) It is certainly possible that the U.S. government has brought additional
cases fairly classed as “media leak prosecutions” beyond this group. However, given the fervent
journalistic and scholarly attention devoted to these matters, it seems unlikely that the number of
missing cases is substantial.
115 See United States v. Rosen, 445 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2006) (prosecution of two
lobbyists).
116 The best-known example is I. Lewis (“Scooter”) Libby’s 2007 conviction for committing
perjury, obstructing justice, and making false statements in connection with Special Prosecutor
Patrick Fitzgerald’s investigation into the disclosure of a CIA operative’s identity. See Lee, supra
note 30, at 1457–59. Fitzgerald’s actions are instructive and will be discussed further below: his
brief tenure as Special Prosecutor gave a glimpse of what energetic enforcement would look like.
See infra notes 138–39, 286 and accompanying text. Suspected grand jury leaks have generated
some additional criminal penalties in recent years. See, e.g., John Herzfeld, Grand Juror Sentenced to Prison for Leaks to Insider-Trading Ring, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 2098 (2006).
117 In an exhaustive study published in 2011, Gary Ross stated that the U.S. government had
“considered” prosecuting a member of the media for publishing leaked information “on at least
four occasions.” ROSS, supra note 14, at 17. If Julian Assange is deemed a member of the media,
that number may now be at least one higher. See supra note 114 (noting reports that Assange is
the subject of an ongoing grand jury investigation); see also D.D. GUTTENPLAN, AMERICAN
RADICAL 202–06 (2009) (explaining that several journalists were arrested and charged for leakrelated activity, though not specifically for publishing leaked information, in the 1940s Amerasia
case); KLEHR & RADOSH, supra note 114, at 56–135 (same).
118 See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006).
In saying that the leak laws are underenforced, I mean only to suggest that observable enforcement levels are very low in numeric terms and in comparison to what the political rhetoric
on leaking would suggest. I do not mean to suggest that enforcement levels are low relative to
any congressionally intended or otherwise normatively superior standard. Many of the crimes
typically identified as “underenforced” are personal or recreational in nature (drug use, gambling);
linked to sex (prostitution, sodomy); or associated with traditionally disadvantaged communi-
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stunning. Even if we were to limit the denominator to classified information leaks that the Intelligence Community (IC) is known to
have referred to DOJ or that government officials have otherwise documented publicly — which may be a small fraction of the universe of
potentially prosecutable offenses — the historic indictment rate for
leak-law violators would be below 0.3%.119 The actual rate is probably far closer to zero. We have, in other words, de minimis criminal
enforcement of the laws against leaking. In formal terms this legal regime looks forbidding, draconian. In practical terms, as a frustrated
intelligence professional once put it, the system amounts to “permissive
neglect.”120 Hence the punitive/permissive divide.
The Obama Administration has thus far brought eight criminal
cases against media leakers,121 a significant increase over the enforcement levels of its predecessors. Emphasizing the departure from past
practice, critics have decried the Administration’s “war” on leakers122
(or, more sharply, its “war on whistleblowers,”123 though none of the
indictees availed himself of the statutorily prescribed whistleblowing
process). Some of the cases reportedly developed out of investigations
begun in the prior Administration.124 Yet even if all eight are fairly
attributed to President Obama’s DOJ, it is important to keep statistical as well as historical perspective. Against a backdrop of “routine
daily” classified information leaks,125 a suite of eight prosecutions looks
more like a special operation than a war.
I do not mean to minimize the significance of this enforcement uptick, to which Part IV will return. The uptick is of profound concern
to many and threatens longstanding governmental conventions. I
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ties, classes, or racial groups. See id. at 1722, 1727, 1733. Leaking is an outlier for having none of
these attributes.
119 See ROSS, supra note 14, at 9–10, 17 (estimating the indictment rate from roughly 1981 to
2011).
120 James B. Bruce, The Consequences of Permissive Neglect, 47 STUD. INTELLIGENCE 39
(2003); see also SUBCOMM. ON SECRECY & DISCLOSURE, S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 95TH CONG., NATIONAL SECURITY SECRETS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 3 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter SSCI REPORT] (“There has been a major failure on the
part of the Government to take action in leak cases.”).
121 This figure includes the Snowden and Sachtleben cases. It does not include the reported
grand jury investigation of WikiLeaks or the reported target letter sent to James Cartwright. See
supra note 114.
122 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, A High-Tech War on Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at SR5.
123 See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Secrecy Creep, SALON (Aug. 14, 2012, 9:17 AM), http://www
.salon.com/2012/08/14/secrecy_creep (“That the Obama administration has waged an unprecedented war on whistleblowers is by now well-known and well-documented . . . .”).
124 Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Administration Took Accidental Path to Setting Record for
Leak Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at A14.
125 WILLARD REPORT, supra note 37, at 6; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text (noting the belief that classified information leaks have become even more common since 1982, when
the Willard Report was issued).
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mean to call attention to the conventions themselves. Lost in the uproar over the recent prosecutions is just how remarkable it is for the
executive branch to have a historic norm of “neglecting” major, politically resilient, judicially legitimated national security authorities.
Through occasional public statements, DOJ officials have outlined
the procedures the Department uses for identifying and responding to
potentially unlawful leaks. Within DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has traditionally played a lead role and continues to
conduct leak investigations. The National Security Division (NSD),
created by statute in 2006,126 now oversees these efforts and generally
shares authority over cases with the FBI and the Criminal Division.127
The primary mechanism for triggering legal scrutiny is the referral
process. Agencies that believe they have been the “victim” of an unlawful leak may submit a crime report to DOJ, which then determines
whether to open an investigation.128 The “overwhelming majority” of
such reports, Attorney General Janet Reno stated in 2000, are submitted by the CIA and the NSA.129 The FBI also has the authority, seemingly very rarely used,130 to pursue leakers on its own initiative.131
Although the government has declined to release comprehensive data
on leak referrals, officials have said that DOJ received “roughly 50”
per year in the late 1990s132 and an average of 37 per year from 2005
to 2009.133 Of these referred cases, DOJ appears to open an investiga-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
126 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§ 506(b), 120 Stat. 192, 248–50 (2006) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 509A (2006)).
127 See Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 45 (2009) [hereinafter Mueller Response] (written response of Robert S.
Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation); see also Shane & Savage, supra note
124 (stating that among the recent leak prosecutions, “[t]wo were handled by the Justice Department’s criminal division, while two others were developed by the national security division”). For
a sketch of the DOJ process prior to the NSD’s creation, see Reno Testimony, supra note 46, at
3–10.
128 For a valuable summary of reporting practices and procedures, including a link to the DOJ
media leak questionnaire used to screen referrals, see Steven Aftergood, “Crimes Reports” and the
Leak Referral Process, SECRECY NEWS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/12
/crimes_reports.html.
129 Reno Testimony, supra note 46, at 4; see also Josh Gerstein, Leak Probes Stymied, FBI
Memos Show, N.Y. SUN (Jan. 10, 2007), available at http://www.nysun.com/national/leak-probes
-stymied-fbi-memos-show/46407 (reporting that, according to an unnamed former DOJ official,
“the vast majority of leak probes originate at the CIA”).
130 See, e.g., Reno Testimony, supra note 46, at 3–10 (describing at length “the process by which
[leak] investigations are opened and pursued,” id. at 3, before the Senate oversight body most likely to favor vigorous enforcement, without once mentioning this mechanism).
131 See Mueller Response, supra note 127, at 45.
132 Reno Testimony, supra note 46, at 4.
133 See Mueller Response, supra note 127, at 47.
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tion into approximately fifteen percent on average, with substantial
variation year to year.134
Constraining its ability to investigate and prosecute leak cases,
DOJ’s internal guidelines impose special procedures on the issuance of
subpoenas to journalists. First announced in August 1970135 and codified in 1973,136 the guidelines prohibit use of such subpoenas except as
a last resort and with the express authorization of the Attorney General.137 All evidence suggests that this policy substantially depresses
the number of subpoenas issued, and that the lack of access to journalists’ records and testimony makes it substantially more difficult to
identify and build cases against leakers. The significance of the policy
was made vivid in the mid-2000s when Special Prosecutor Patrick
Fitzgerald — whose writ to investigate the leak of Valerie Plame’s CIA
affiliation effectively loosened the guidelines by delegating him “all the
authority of the Attorney General” in the matter138 — subpoenaed
New York Times reporter Judith Miller and Time reporter Matthew
Cooper, among other journalists, leading to Miller’s spending eightyfive days in jail.139
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
134 The exact figure was fourteen percent from 2005 to 2009, see id., and Gary Ross appears to
estimate a global average of thirteen percent based on a handful of additional public statements,
see ROSS, supra note 14, at 10, 17 (citing approximately 200 criminal leak investigations and 1500
referrals over the past three decades). In 2000, Attorney General Reno suggested that DOJ had
investigated a significantly higher proportion of referrals in the immediately preceding years, although she did not provide any hard data. See Reno Testimony, supra note 46, at 4.
135 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
GUIDELINES FOR SUBPOENAS TO THE NEWS MEDIA (1970), reprinted in Robert G. Dixon,
Jr., Newsmen’s Privilege by Federal Legislation: Within Congressional Power?, 1 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 39, app. at 51–52 (1974); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 n.41 (1972)
(discussing the introduction of the 1970 guidelines).
136 Policy Regarding Issuance of Subpoenas to, and Interrogation, Indictment, or Arrest of,
Members of News Media, 38 Fed. Reg. 29,588 (Oct. 26, 1973) (codified at 28 C.F.R. § 50.10
(2012)).
137 28 C.F.R. § 50.10(b), (e)–(f). In response to mounting criticism of its pursuit of leak investigations, see, e.g., Mark Sherman, Gov’t Obtains Wide AP Phone Records in Probe, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (May 13, 2013, 10:53 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/govt-obtains-wide-ap-phone
-records-probe (describing the backlash caused by a subpoena of two months of phone records
from Associated Press reporters), DOJ announced in July 2013 that it would revise the guidelines
by, among other things, giving greater notice to members of the media when prosecutors seek access to their records and creating additional layers of internal oversight, see DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT ON REVIEW OF NEWS MEDIA POLICIES 2–4 (2013), available at http://www.justice
.gov/ag/news-media.pdf.
138 Katy J. Harriger, Feature, Executive Power and Prosecution: Lessons from the Libby Trial
and the U.S. Attorney Firings, 38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 491, 496 (2008) (quoting Letter from
James B. Comey, Acting Attorney Gen., to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, U.S. Attorney (Dec. 30, 2003),
available at http://www.justice.gov/archive/osc/documents/ag_letter_december_30_2003.pdf) (internal quotation mark omitted).
139 See supra note 116. See generally Don Van Natta Jr. et al., The Miller Case: A Notebook, a
Cause, a Jail Cell and a Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at A1.
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The policy is justified as serving First Amendment values.140 In
light of DOJ’s unflinching position that in criminal cases journalists have no constitutional or common law privilege to withhold confidential source information, the existence and durability of these
guidelines might seem remarkable. For in functional terms, they
amount to codification of a qualified reporter’s privilege.141 DOJ thus
adamantly opposes recognition by Congress or the courts of a doctrine
it scrupulously respects by internal rule — an unusually stringent form
of (and a fascinating case study in) departmentalist constitutional
construction.142
Apart from criminal prosecutions, DOJ also has the option to pursue civil actions for injunctive relief or money damages against those
who violate their nondisclosure agreements or profit from their disclosures of confidential information.143 In theory, these suits might be
brought against media leakers. In practice, however, injunctive relief
is unavailable because leakers do not give advance notice of their intentions, and money damages may be unavailable because leakers do
not tend to benefit, in a material sense, from the media’s publication of
their divulgences. The government’s civil authorities matter greatly in
the area of post-employment, overt expression. They have directly
constrained the speech of a number of former officials who wished to
publish memoirs or exposés, and they have indirectly chilled the
speech of many more. Their impact on the netherworld of anonymous
leaks has been relatively negligible.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
140 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (pmbl.) (emphasizing “freedom of the press,” “the news gathering function,” and “a reporter’s responsibility to cover as broadly as possible controversial public issues”);
Mueller Response, supra note 127, at 46 (defending the guidelines as “appropriately balanc[ing]
the importance of First Amendment freedoms”).
141 Former New York Times senior counsel (and current Supreme Court correspondent) Adam
Liptak highlighted this point in a celebratory 1999 essay. See Adam Liptak, The Hidden Federal
Shield Law: On the Justice Department’s Regulations Governing Subpoenas to the Press, 1999
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 227, 236 (characterizing the guidelines as “a shadow federal shield law” that
is “sensible, rigorous, and predictable”).
142 On the various models of departmentalism, see generally David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections
as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2047, 2063–64 (2010). The structure of the
journalist subpoena guidelines is not unique. Whether to avert undesirable judicial rulings and
congressional remedies, to preserve popular support, or to serve constitutional conviction, a number of other DOJ policies have constrained prosecutors beyond what the Constitution has been
read to require: for instance, the Petite Policy, which discourages federal prosecutions when a
state action has already been brought, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’
MANUAL § 9-2.031 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room
/usam/title9/title9.htm; the policy requiring presentation of exculpatory evidence to the grand jury,
id. § 9-11.233; and the limitations imposed by the Levi Guidelines on the FBI’s ability to monitor
and infiltrate political and religious groups, FBI Statutory Charter: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 20–26 (1978). This suite of self-binding rules awaits a synthetic
scholarly treatment.
143 See Reno Testimony, supra note 46, at 14.
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Administrative remedies offer a more robust alternative to criminal
punishment. All agencies have undoubted authority to conduct their
own investigations into suspected leaks and to impose a wide range of
sanctions, including removal, suspension without pay, and denial of
access to classified information.144 In fact, the controlling executive
order requires sanctions for every knowing, willful, or negligent disclosure of properly classified information to unauthorized persons.145
These sanctions will not always be available: former officials and those
about to leave government may evade the reach of this regime. But in
view of the difficulty of bringing criminal cases, many have championed administrative remedies as an efficient means to discipline and
discourage leakers.146
It is very hard to know how these remedies have been utilized. So
far as I am aware, the government has never released any data on
them, and no one has attempted a tabulation. Anecdotal accounts indicate that a number of individuals have been reprimanded over the
years for leaking confidential information to the media. It is undoubtedly the case that additional sanctions, as well as investigations that
damaged careers without leading to formal punishment, have occurred
outside the public record. Administrative actions, unlike prosecutions,
do not readily generate publicity. Still, given the potential deterrence
value of that publicity for government enforcers, the media’s interest
in protecting their sources against reprisal, and the disciplined individual’s interest in claiming whistleblower status, it is noteworthy how
rarely accounts of such cases have surfaced: two General Services Administration employees fired in the mid-1970s but later reinstated,147 a
State Department speechwriter and an Assistant Under Secretary of
Defense removed in 1986,148 a CIA intelligence officer dismissed in
2006 ostensibly for leaking but perhaps for other reasons.149 Years go
by without a reported incident.
A long line of government studies has noted lax enforcement in this
area.150 Attorney General John Ashcroft acknowledged in 2002 that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
144 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 5.5, 3 C.F.R. 298, 321 (2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435
app. at 233–45 (Supp. V 2011) (authorizing agency-level sanctions for violations of the classification rules).
145 Id. § 5.5(b)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 321.
146 See, e.g., WILLARD REPORT, supra note 37, at 4–5, 11; Reno Testimony, supra note 46, at
13–14.
147 CLARK R. MOLLENHOFF, THE PRESIDENT WHO FAILED 141 (1980).
148 ABEL, supra note 19, at 26, 42; James Kelly, Shifting the Attack on Leaks, TIME, May 19,
1986, at 91.
149 R. Jeffrey Smith & Dafna Linzer, Dismissed CIA Officer Denies Leak Role, WASH. POST,
Apr. 25, 2006, at A1.
150 There is some evidence that administrative enforcement may be trending upward, at least
within the IC. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. OF THE INTELLIGENCE CMTY., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE PERIOD OF
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“[w]ith respect to administrative actions to address unauthorized disclosures of classified information, information security programs across
Government are fragmentary,”151 and that “[i]n most of the few cases
in which a person who engaged in an unauthorized disclosure of classified information has been identified, the sanctions applied have been
relatively inconsequential.”152 A Government Accountability Office
audit found that, among the sixty-eight leak investigations conducted
by the Defense Department from 1975 to 1982 that had been brought
to its attention, “[i]n no case was there any indication that an individual was removed from a position of trust.”153 A quarter-century earlier,
a Defense Department committee remarked that “disciplinary action
has not been adequate in the field of security information, even after
making due allowance for the difficulties generally encountered in
identifying those responsible for violations.”154 Although not focused
on the national security field, Hugh Heclo’s 1977 study of domestic
policy agencies found that senior officials seldom confronted suspected
leakers.155 They were much more likely to respond by exercising selfhelp — cultivating their own media and congressional contacts rather
than trying to stanch the flow of disclosures. Less systematically, but
tellingly, a recent FOIA request revealed that in the late 1990s, DOJ’s
Office of Professional Responsibility determined that an Assistant Director at the FBI and an Assistant U.S. Attorney who had been detailed to a management role had committed “intentional professional
misconduct” by leaking classified information to the press, assertedly
to correct what they saw as misconceptions in the public record. Se-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
8 NOVEMBER 2011 TO 30 JUNE 2012, at 10 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icig/sar
-0612.pdf (reporting that the Investigations Division recently “reviewed hundreds of closed [leak]
cases from across the IC” and that, “[g]oing forward, the division will engage in gap mitigation for
those cases where an agency does not have the authority to investigate . . . or where DOJ declined
criminal prosecution”).
151 Ashcroft Report, supra note 46, at 3; accord SSCI REPORT, supra note 120, at 24 (“[T]here is
no effective administrative system currently operating in the executive branch for investigating
and penalizing unauthorized disclosures . . . .”).
152 Ashcroft Report, supra note 46, at 4.
153 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-83-15, REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE INVESTIGATION OF LEAK OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE WASHINGTON
POST 5 (1982), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/210/205900.pdf.
154 DEP’T OF DEF. COMM. ON CLASSIFIED INFO., REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BY THE COMMITTEE ON CLASSIFIED INFORMATION 9 (1956) [hereinafter COOLIDGE
REPORT], available at http://bkofsecrets.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/coolidge_committee.pdf.
155 HECLO, supra note 23, at 227–28. Senior officials declined to confront leaking civil servants, Heclo found, out of fear of limiting access to outside channels, provoking backlash, and
distracting from their policy agenda, as well as a belief that “there are few effective sanctions to
prevent recurrences.” Id. at 227.
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nior department leadership overruled that determination and declined
to impose sanctions.156
The results of my own FOIA requests and interviews, discussed in
Parts II and III, corroborate but also complicate the notion that administrative punishments for media leakers are rare. It appears that
numerous agencies that work on national security– and foreign policy–
related issues hardly ever impose such punishments, or even conduct
leak investigations. Administrative discipline in these agencies is nearly as uncommon as its criminal counterpart. Informal sanctions, however, pick up some of the slack.
D. Consequences
Presidents since at least Woodrow Wilson have complained “bitterly” about the leakers within their midst.157 Degrees of vehemence
have varied (Reagan was on the high end, Carter on the low end), but
there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of their dismay. Some leaks
highlight unflattering or disturbing conduct, some prompt congressional scrutiny or media investigations, some reveal vulnerabilities or
degrade a strategic advantage. And every leak not to the President’s
liking has the potential to undermine his or her control of the political
agenda. As one diligent student of the subject has noted, “[Theodore]
Roosevelt and all subsequent Presidents discovered that leaks not authorized by the White House subverted their efforts to engineer public
consent.”158 This destabilizing power of leaks has significant implications for the executive branch’s internal governance, a theme to which
this Article will return continuously.
Almost all commentary on classified information leaks has not pursued the insiders’ point of view, but rather some form of external critique centered on national security interests or values associated with
the First Amendment. Government officials routinely claim substantial adverse policy consequences while minimizing democratic benefits.
Journalists and civil libertarians question these claims and celebrate
leaks as a source of accountability and transparency, a check on executive power, and a corrective to overclassification. For every governmental assertion of leaks “that have collectively cost the American
people hundreds of millions of dollars, and . . . done grave harm to na–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
156 Josh Gerstein, Judge: Justice Department Can Keep Secret Names of Lawyers Warned over
Leaks, POLITICO (Jan. 20, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/joshgerstein/0111
/Judge_Justice_Department_can_keep_secret_names_of_lawyers_targeted_in_leak_probe.html.
157 HESS, supra note 82, at 91; accord GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 83–84; Lee, supra note
30, at 1468–69; Papandrea, supra note 33, at 255–56; Halloran, supra note 98. For a somewhat
dated compilation of colorful presidential complaints, see Joel Garreau, Up to Their Keisters in
Leaks, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1983, at B5.
158 Kielbowicz, supra note 99, at 444.
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tional security,”159 one finds the rebuttal that “there has not been a single instance in the history of the United States in which the press’s
publication of a ‘legitimate but newsworthy’ government secret has
gravely harmed the national interest”160 — indeed, that there have
been few destructive leaks anywhere in the world.161
Government insiders occupy an epistemically privileged position in
this debate. Their superior access to classified information enhances
their capacity to assess harms from leaks while excusing them from offering detailed defenses of their claims.162 And yet, there is the stickiness of “permissive neglect”163 to contend with: is it really plausible
that the executive would adhere, across decades, to such a tragic enforcement model? There is also no shortage of former insiders who
take the opposition line. In a largely ignored passage from The Imperial Presidency, Arthur Schlesinger asked, “[a]fter all the years of the
American obsession with secrecy, could anyone name a case where a
leak did serious damage to the national security? . . . Conceivably the
nation might have been better off had there been more rather than
fewer leaks.”164
Conceivably, but in the final analysis, it is hard to draw any strong
conclusions about the balance of consequences. The problem is not
just that no one has attempted to measure the costs and benefits of
leaking in a systematic way. It is that any such effort would likely
prove futile, given the great variability of the phenomenon, the many
unobservables involved, the incommensurateness of the values implicated, the complicated relationships with other forms of secrecy and
transparency, and the contingent nature of disclosure’s effects (first-,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
159 WMD REPORT, supra note 76, at 381. For examples of similar governmental assertions and
detailed discussions of potential national security harms from leaks, see ROSS, supra note 14, at
79–121; and Bruce, supra note 120, at 40–43. See generally GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, NECESSARY SECRETS (2010).
160 Geoffrey R. Stone, The Lessons of History, A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP., Sept. 2006, at
1, 3. For comparable claims, see Freivogel, supra note 62, at 98 (“[T]here is scant evidence that
national security has been harmed in any significant way by the disclosure of government secrets.”); and Jeffrey T. Richelson, Intelligence Secrets and Unauthorized Disclosures: Confronting
Some Fundamental Issues, 25 INT’L J. INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 639, 652–
58 (2012).
161 See, e.g., Sandra Coliver, Commentary on the Johannesburg Principles on National Security,
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, in SECRECY AND LIBERTY 11, 66 (Sandra
Coliver et al. eds., 1999) (“[T]here have been few instances anywhere in the world in recent
memory where information disclosed by a government servant damaged a vital state interest.”).
162 Thus, immediately after asserting that leaks have “done grave harm to national security,”
the WMD Commission Report pretermits further analysis or debate: “We cannot, however, discuss
[these leaks] in an unclassified format.” WMD REPORT, supra note 76, at 381.
163 See generally sources cited supra note 120.
164 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 362 (1973). “Espionage,”
Schlesinger granted, “was a different matter.” Id.
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second-, and third-order).165 The Defense Department came close to
admitting as much in 1956, when a high-level panel charged with
studying the issue conceded that “[t]he seriousness of unauthorized disclosures, both in number and nature, cannot be determined.”166 Furthermore, even if we could reliably measure the consequences of the
leaks that have occurred, it is impossible to know what outcomes
would have followed from a system of slightly more, vastly more, or
even paltrier enforcement. The debate over leaks’ impact on national
security and democracy is destined to remain empirically impoverished
to some significant degree. In many respects, the debate has barely
advanced since 1956.
Yet, even if questions about leaking’s ultimate societal consequences have therefore proven intractable, and the associated debates become hoary, there is significant scope to advance our understanding of
how permissive neglect actually works — what this regulatory regime
looks like to participants, what mechanisms and customs it employs,
why it takes the form that it does, how it has persisted for so long. A
whole suite of analytic challenges has gone all but ignored. Macrolevel positive and normative evaluation may be unusually vexed in the
area of leaks, but mid-level theory remains viable.
“No answer is what the wrong question begets . . . .”167
II. ORDER IN “DISORDER”168: THE LOGIC OF LEAKINESS
Why does the executive branch tolerate so much leaking? The
dearth of punishment is striking in itself, and it seems especially curious in light of the perpetual presidential hand-wringing. The standard
explanation for the negligible enforcement rate — never developed at
any length and never seriously challenged — emphasizes how difficult
it is to identify and prosecute leakers. While there is surely some truth
to this constraint-based account, its explanatory power fades upon inspection. An objective observer reviewing the full record could only
conclude that elimination of leaks has not been a priority for many of
the key actors in the U.S. government. The constraint-based view has
distorted the debate on leaking, impoverished critical analysis. It fails
to explain the persistent lack of formal discipline outside of the crimi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
165 This contingency is the central theme of Mark Fenster, Disclosure’s Effects: WikiLeaks and
Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753 (2012).
166 COOLIDGE REPORT, supra note 154, at 6; see also LINSKY, supra note 28, at 187 (“Despite
the prevalence of leaks, the impact on policy is hard to discern and thereby even harder to
predict.”).
167 ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 103 (Yale Univ. Press 2d
ed. 1986) (1962).
168 The allusion is to Bickel’s famous, and now conventional, observation that our legal regime
for dealing with leaks is a “disorderly situation.” BICKEL, supra note 14, at 80.
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nal realm. And it overlooks the numerous reasons why executive
branch principals may prefer to avoid ramping up enforcement levels,
even if they had ready means to do so.
Occasionally one finds the further claim that the “political will” to
bring more cases has been lacking.169 But that formulation just begs
the question. What theory and evidence support an inference of insufficient political will? And how exactly does this lack of will manifest?
Neither issue has received scrutiny. Leak prosecutions may generate
political costs for an administration if they inspire media criticism.
However, leaks themselves can be quite politically costly, as can the
perceived failure to act against dangerous disclosures. And it is not
clear that most media outlets would reflexively oppose greater enforcement against government insiders who supply some journalists
with juicy information, yet who also jeopardize the industry’s legal
and moral standing. The media would be on especially weak ground
opposing greater administrative enforcement.170 The puzzle of permissive neglect remains.
This Part deconstructs and then reconstructs the logic of leakiness.
Section A details weaknesses in the constraint-based account. A great
deal of enforcement capacity exists that is not being used; the inference
arises that the U.S. government’s leakiness has a significant intentional component. Following this inference, section B identifies a range of
executive interests served by leaks. These interests are substantially
promoted by strategic behavior. Taken together, they are critical to
maintaining and making sense of the negligible enforcement rate.
Their imprint does not explain everything: the goal of this Part is not
so much to supplant as to supplement the familiar rationales for why
leakers go unpunished. Moreover, it is impossible to estimate with any
precision the frequency with which leaking has served (or disserved)
relevant parties’ interests. We would need to know far more than we
do about the nature of their utility functions and about which sorts of
secrets have been disclosed and which have not. At a minimum, however, this Part establishes the counterintuitive proposition that the optimal level of unauthorized classified information disclosures to the
press, from virtually everyone in government’s perspective, is substantially higher than zero.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
169 See, e.g., WMD REPORT, supra note 76, at 382. I assume that many people who have reflected on the negligible enforcement rate have similarly concluded that lack of “political will”
must play a role. I have not, however, seen any scholarly attempts to unpack this idea.
170 For decades, there has been “widespread agreement among both government officials and
civil liberties advocates that government officials who publicly disclose information learned
through their official duties . . . may be administratively disciplined, including being fired from
their jobs, for leaking such information.” Paul Hoffman & Kate Martin, Safeguarding Liberty:
National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information: United States of America,
in SECRECY AND LIBERTY, supra note 161, at 477, 495.
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Looking backward, this reconceptualization provides a more compelling account of the failure to enforce prohibitions against leaking.
Looking forward, it generates a prediction, falsifiable in principle, that
we will continue to see low levels of criminal leak-law enforcement in
this country and perhaps all other advanced democracies with institutionally “thick”171 executives, notwithstanding the advent of new technologies that make it easier to smoke out perpetrators. In place of the
unexamined intuitions that predominate in this area (“The leakers
cannot be caught!” “The political will is not there!”), I offer what sociologists might call a middle-range theory,172 which draws on insights
from a variety of literatures as well as various forms of empirical evidence. The theory provides a framework for understanding, in narrative and functional terms, both the persistence and the dynamics of
permissive neglect.
How can I derive any explanatory significance from “executive” interests, when the executive branch contains many different components with interests, incentives, and cultures that are not always
aligned? And how can I even talk about executive “interests” in leakiness, when every President condemns leaks and numerous officials are
apt to resent any given disclosure?
These questions are common to many studies of executive behavior.
Part of the answer is that leaking is a heterogeneous activity that occurs in a repeat-play environment. Participants in such iterated practices may deeply dislike specific instantiations and yet respect the basic
structure of the practice. There is no need to posit disingenuousness or
self-delusion on the part of leaks’ internal critics. Even if certain senators rail against any given failure to achieve cloture, incumbents may
by and large advance their electoral fortunes by adhering to the filibuster.173 Even if certain components of the government rail against
various Supreme Court decisions,174 powerful political actors may
benefit in the aggregate from the maintenance of judicial review.175
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
171 See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE 31, 55–56
(1993) (describing “thickening” as the proliferation of organized interests and institutional actors
that surround, support, and hem in the presidency).
172 See ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 39–40 (enlarged
ed. 1968) (defining middle-range theories as attentive to, yet abstracted from, specific observed
patterns of social behavior and noting that “[t]he seminal ideas in such theories are characteristically simple,” id. at 40).
173 See GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER 263 (2006) (arguing that contemporary filibuster reform efforts “run up against individual senators’ personal power goals”).
174 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), springs unbidden to mind. See id. (holding that
the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus extends to alien detainees at Guantanamo Bay).
175 See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Parchment and Politics: The Positive Puzzle of Constitutional
Commitment, 124 HARV. L. REV. 657, 733–45 (2011); Matthew C. Stephenson, “When the Devil
Turns . . . ”: The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial Review, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 59
(2003).
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Judicial review appears to be an episodically painful, but globally beneficial, institutional design mechanism for Presidents and other highlevel officials. The claim here is that leakiness works the same way.
Another part of the answer is that social practices, particularly diffuse ones generated by custom, may reflect or further certain values
and commitments even if individuals involved never consciously decide to prioritize those values and commitments. In an institutional
context as intricate as the one applicable to leaking, structural features
and competing agendas greatly constrain agency. A President who set
out to plug every leak would quickly find she has few decent options.
To ascribe strategic logic to the “leak-law regime,” it is unnecessary either to restrict the analysis to individual ambitions or to conceptualize
the executive branch as some kind of organic entity. To the contrary,
to make sense of this regime it is critical to appreciate the internal conflict and complexity that mark the modern administrative state.
And part of the answer is that the President and his team have
been the primary architects and beneficiaries of the executive’s enforcement model, which allows us to home in on their incentives and
behaviors. For analytic crispness and expositional clarity, section B
concentrates initially on the White House’s interests in leaks. Building
on that baseline identification of the executive branch with the White
House, it then moves outward to consider other actors within and beyond the executive. Institutional players are disaggregated, and the
executive’s pluralism is incorporated into the model, albeit incompletely. Any effort to account for every complication and contingency in an
ecosystem this large would quickly become unwieldy. Particularly in
light of the overlapping interests in leaking that unite the key actors in
this story, as well as the President’s control over the classification system and the rise in presidential administration generally,176 I believe
that framing the analysis around the White House is not only the most
fruitful but also the most methodologically sound approach.177
The focus in this Part will thus be on the factors that help account
for, and render rational, the lack of visible enforcement.178 The next
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
176
177

See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001).
Cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND 114 (2010)
(taking a President-focused approach to a rational choice analysis of constraints on executive
power). Like Professors Posner and Vermeule’s, this analysis has a rational choice cast, although
I also try to go further in providing “thick” description of internal executive practices and in attending to noninstrumental sources of constraint.
178 I do not pay special attention in this Part to prosecutors, and it may be that no prosecutor
has internalized the interests described herein. Regardless of what motivates their behavior in
this area, it is not prosecutors but rather top officials at DOJ, other agencies, and the White
House who have, across decades, maintained the conditions that make it very difficult for leak
cases to be brought. The point is not critical, but it also seems implausible to think that prosecutors are wholly insensitive to an administration’s basic political and policy objectives or to the
habits of its highest-ranking members.
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Part will look more closely at social and ethical dimensions of this
regulatory regime and at modes of enforcement outside observers do
not see.
A. The Inadequacy of the Constraint-Based Narrative
1. Catching Culprits. —
“It turns out you never can find the leaker.”
— President George W. Bush, 2006179
“We have already alluded to the difficulty frequently encountered
in identifying the source of ‘leaks.’ We are not convinced that this difficulty is insurmountable . . . .”
— Defense Department Committee on Classified Information,
1956180
The most common explanation given for the lack of enforcement
points to the difficulty of identifying the leaker.181 There is undoubtedly some force to these claims. In many cases, investigators will find
it a challenge to trace the origins of a disclosure, given the secrecy that
leakers may employ and the large number of individuals who may be
“read in” to any given classified program. Journalists’ tendency to
gather and aggregate information from multiple sources further complicates the investigative task.182
For a variety of reasons, however, this explanation is unsatisfying.
First, in the mine-run of leak cases, at least one person other than the
source knows the source’s identity: the journalist who broke the story.183 And, at least as a legal matter, the government has the power to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
179
180
181

The President’s News Conference, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2203, 2211 (Dec. 20, 2006).
COOLIDGE REPORT, supra note 154, at 15.
See, e.g., Reno Testimony, supra note 46, at 9–10 (“[T]he sad fact is that in the vast majority
of leak cases . . . we simply have not been able to identify the people responsible.”); Espionage Act
and the Legal and Constitutional Issues Raised by WikiLeaks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 61 (2010) (prepared statement of Gabriel Schoenfeld, Senior Fellow,
Hudson Institute) [hereinafter Schoenfeld Testimony] (“The prosecution of leakers is rare because
they are exceptionally difficult to catch.”). See generally ROSS, supra note 14, at 21–24 (explaining the basis for and prominence of this view); RAHUL SAGAR, SECRETS AND LEAKS 156–57
(2013) (observing that it is “de rigueur to conclude that ‘it is generally fruitless to try to discover
the source of a leak’” (quoting GEORGE C. EDWARDS & STEPHEN J. WAYNE, PRESIDENTIAL
LEADERSHIP 158 (1997))).
182 See sources cited supra notes 104–07 and accompanying text (discussing “diffuse sourcing”
and related practices). When the disclosures that inform a revelatory story are sufficiently diffuse,
and the clues amassed by the reporter sufficiently diverse or redundant, it may be difficult to pinpoint any particular “leaker” as the key source who compromised the secret.
183 Cf. WMD REPORT, supra note 76, at 383 (“During our work, we were repeatedly told that
the greatest barrier to prosecuting leaks was in identifying the ‘leaker.’ And many people with
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subpoena journalists who will not voluntarily reveal their sources.184
Uncooperative journalists and news outlets can be pressured in subtler
ways, too, as through denial of access to senior officials. Members of
the media may fight such measures in court and in the editorial pages,
but it is notable how much ground the executive cedes upfront. Notwithstanding occasional complaints about “irresponsible” stories, the
reporters who repeatedly publish leaks are not so much shunned as
courted. Bob Woodward’s many revelations have hardly led to his
marginalization.185 And while DOJ appears to have become slightly
more aggressive in recent years, it remains very unusual for prosecutors to subpoena journalists186 or to request information about their
sources.187 The immediate cause of this restraint is DOJ’s policy on
issuing subpoenas to members of the news media — the entire point of
which is to make these subpoenas as rare as possible (and thereby, presumably, to safeguard not just First Amendment values but DOJ’s
standing with the courts and the press).188 Leak investigations are so
difficult, in part, because the government has made them so difficult
by abjuring its most potent investigative tool.
Second, the government has refrained from using other significant
investigative tools. Periodically, task forces have recommended that
the White House take concerted steps to facilitate leak investigations,
such as regularizing the use of polygraphs and requiring government
employees who speak with the press to provide advance notice, fol-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
whom we spoke also said that the best (if not only) way to identify leakers was through the reporters to whom classified information was leaked.”).
184 See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text.
185 See FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR., SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 252) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (“Bob Woodward’s series of
best-selling books about presidential administrations from [Nixon] through Obama could not have
been written, and would not have sold in box-car numbers, without massive leaks from highranking officials.” (alteration in original)).
186 See GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 222 (“[W]hat is remarkable about the last decade is not
the slight increase in attempts to use subpoenas against journalists but rather the relatively sparse
use of subpoenas given the number and type of leaks.”); Gerstein, supra note 129 (describing FBI
records released through FOIA that suggest “many investigations into leaks of top-secret data are
abandoned without pursuing some obvious, if intrusive, investigative techniques, such as seeking
testimony or phone records from members of the press”). For data on federal subpoenas through
2008, including but not limited to leak cases, see Jones, supra note 57, at 637–42. In 2007, DOJ’s
Criminal Division reported nineteen incidents between 1991 and 2006 in which DOJ had sought
source-related information, although Professor RonNell Jones finds this figure may have been understated. Id. at 612–13, 642.
187 According to experienced journalists in the field, prosecutors virtually never ask about the
identity of sources in the absence of a subpoena. E.g., Telephone Interview with Barton Gellman,
Reporter, Wash. Post (May 8, 2013).
188 See supra notes 135–42 and accompanying text (describing DOJ’s journalist subpoena
guidelines).
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lowed by summaries of what was discussed.189 President Reagan went
further than any other President in trying to implement these policies.
No recognized constitutional obstacle stood in his way. Yet after journalists protested, senior officials rebelled from within; Secretary of
State George Shultz held a press conference to announce that no one at
the State Department would submit to a polygraph.190 The attempted
crackdown on leakers lasted all of three weeks before being summarily
scrapped.191 Administrations and agencies have experimented to varying degrees with a number of other initiatives over the years, but
Reagan’s plan remains the closest the executive has come, at least in
the pre-WikiLeaks era,192 to establishing a comprehensive program for
monitoring prospective leakers, ferreting out culprits, or constraining
media contacts.
To be sure, this restraint does not necessarily reflect any conscious
appreciation for the upside of leaks, so much as a fear of undermining
morale or generating mistrust. But notice how the grounds of argument have shifted — these considerations speak less to the legal and
practical barriers to identifying leakers than to the political costs of seriously trying. Forces within government sharply limit any President’s
ability to invigorate apprehension efforts or otherwise deviate from the
norm of broad-based leakiness. The likelihood of catching culprits is
endogenous to the system. To say simply “you never can find the leaker”193 obscures these internal drivers of nonenforcement.
Third, even with these self-imposed limitations, DOJ has had some
success finding leakers. We do not have much data, but we know that
from 2005 to 2009, the FBI opened investigations into twenty-six leak
cases referred by the IC and identified suspects in fourteen of them.194
There is presumably some selection bias here, if the FBI generally declines to open investigations it expects to be fruitless. Nonetheless, an
identification rate of more than fifty percent over a five-year period
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
189 See, e.g., WILLARD REPORT, supra note 37, at 4–5, 21–23; Steven Aftergood, In 1962, JFK
Was Urged to Take “Drastic Action” Against Leakers, SECRECY NEWS (Sept. 24, 2012),
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/09/pfiab_drastic.html (summarizing the recommendations of
a 1962 study by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board).
190 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive Theory from Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive, by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S.
Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 609 (2010).
191 See ABEL, supra note 19, at 41–42; HESS, supra note 82, at 90–91; David Hoffman, Reagan
Shelves Requirement for Polygraph Tests, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1984, at A1.
192 Although it is too early to draw any firm conclusions, certain developments suggest the
Obama Administration may be trending in the Reagan direction. See, e.g., Memorandum from
the White House to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies (Nov. 21, 2012), available
at http://www.fas.org/sgp/obama/nitp.pdf (describing the establishment of a National Insider
Threat Policy, which will require agencies to “monitor employee use of classified networks”).
193 The President’s News Conference, supra note 179, at 2211.
194 Mueller Response, supra note 127, at 47.
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suggests that many leakers can be discovered without extraordinary
measures. Furthermore, in a significant portion of the investigations
that failed to yield a suspect, other components of the executive branch
appear to have borne some fault. Through a 2006 FOIA request,
journalist Josh Gerstein obtained FBI records showing that the Bureau had abandoned numerous criminal investigations into classified
information leaks because the “victim agency” had failed to cooperate
with its work.195
Finally, if it is true, as virtually every informed observer has indicated, that leaks are predominantly the province of top government officials with good media contacts,196 then it should be all the easier
to identify suspects. These top officials might be difficult to prosecute
for political or other reasons. But as a purely evidentiary or investigatory matter, their special status ought to be a boon, not a burden, to
enforcers. One former Defense Department official reflected in an interview: “It’s actually not so hard to catch the leaker in many cases. . . . Read a book like Confront and Conceal” — journalist David
Sanger’s classified-information-strewn account of President Obama’s
counterterrorism policies — “and it’s often pretty damn clear what the
universe of people is who might have done it.”197 Confront and Conceal describes not only specific classified programs to which a limited
number of persons had access, but also specific meetings involving a
sliver of officialdom.198 “Compared to other crimes, you often have
way more to go on in leak cases.”199
2. Bringing Cases. — After the difficulty of identifying suspects,
the next most common explanation given for the negligible enforcement rate centers on the national security concerns raised by public
trials. To persuade a jury under the awkwardly worded Espionage
Act, criminal cases may require the government to disclose classified
information. They may also provide forums for defendants to seek to
do the same, as well as focal points that draw attention to the initial
leak and confirm its significance.200 An enforcement tool meant to
vindicate national security interests, accordingly, may independently compromise them. This explanation surely has some force to it as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
195 Gerstein, supra note 129. This failure of interagency cooperation may be compatible with
the claim that nonenforcement is driven by the national security risks of bringing criminal trials,
see infra section II.A.2, pp. 551–54, but it undercuts the notion that leak suspects are intrinsically
difficult to find.
196 See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
197 Telephone Interview with former Department of Defense official (Aug. 29, 2012).
198 See, e.g., DAVID E. SANGER, CONFRONT AND CONCEAL, at x–xiii, 190–93, 200–03 (2012)
(describing meetings about the “Olympic Games” cyber operation against Iran).
199 Telephone Interview with former Department of Defense official, supra note 197.
200 For a representative statement of these concerns, see WILLARD REPORT, supra note 37,
at 11.
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well — indeed, more force than the identification rationale — but it is
also far from satisfying.
For starters, it minimizes the Classified Information Procedures
Act201 (CIPA). CIPA was enacted in 1980 to facilitate the use of classified information in criminal cases. Congress was keen to address the
problem of “graymail,” whereby (in simplest form) defendants pressured prosecutors to limit or abandon cases by threatening to reveal
damaging material at trial.202 CIPA contains numerous mechanisms to
guard against such dilemmas: notification requirements prohibiting
unilateral defense disclosures of classified information; protective
orders prohibiting cleared counsel from sharing classified information
with their clients; redactions, summaries, admissions, and substitutions; in camera and ex parte hearings.203 CIPA may be cumbersome
to use and suboptimal from a national security standpoint; no statute
concerned with protecting defendants’ due process rights could be
otherwise. In the recent high-profile case of Thomas Drake, CIPA did
not prevent a discovery ruling that, according to the judge, the government deemed insufficient to avoid public references at trial to sensitive NSA activities.204 Yet a number of studies have extolled the statute’s track record in national security cases.205 If anything, the
literature on CIPA tends to underscore how harsh it has proven for defendants, who complain they are rarely given access to the government’s classified evidence or permitted to submit their own classified
evidence.206
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
201
202

18 U.S.C. app. 3 (2012).
See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, in PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 82 (2008).
203 In addition to these measures, CIPA leaves in place other tools judges might use to safeguard sensitive information. See EDWARD C. LIU & TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41742, PROTECTING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND THE RIGHTS OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS: THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION PROCEDURES ACT 10–11 (2012). A detailed
analysis of CIPA’s procedures is well beyond the scope of this Article. For an overview, see 2
DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 121–204 (2d ed. 2012).
204 See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 25–26, United States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909
(D. Md. 2011) (No. 10-cr-00181-RDB) (“When we had the hearings under [CIPA], . . . and certain
rulings were made, some in favor of the government, some not, . . . the government made its determination that the disclosure of remaining classified information would harm national security
and ergo the dismissal of the indictment.”).
205 See, e.g., SERRIN TURNER & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN TERRORISM TRIALS 22–25 (2005); ZABEL & BENJAMIN,
supra note 202, at 87–90.
206 See Melanie Reid, Secrets Behind Secrets: Disclosure of Classified Information Before and
During Trial and Why CIPA Should Be Revamped, 35 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 272, 292–97 & 292
n.91 (2011); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Secret Evidence Is Slowly Eroding the Adversary System: CIPA
and FISA in the Courts, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1063, 1070–76 (2006).
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Whatever CIPA’s drawbacks, its history and design put the burden
on those who would argue it is inadequate in leak cases, an argument
that has not been elaborated. CIPA was crafted with national security
leaks specifically in mind.207 That its enactment did not correspond
with any discernible rise in enforcement levels strongly suggests that
the primary causes of permissive neglect lie outside of the trial process.
For over two decades, the government barely gave judges a chance to
apply CIPA safely and effectively in leak cases. The first time the
government did so, in 1985, it secured a jury verdict of guilty on all
counts.208
Jury verdicts in CIPA cases are not the only path to punishment.
Vigorous investigations of suspected leakers can generate second-order
criminal offenses, like materially false statements and obstructions of
justice, which may be tried without use of classified information. In
some instances, these investigations may turn up evidence that the
leaker profited from her unauthorized disclosure, rendering her susceptible to a civil damages action. Furthermore, plea agreements offer the
government a means to convict leakers without assuming the risks attendant to trial. Pleas have been used in a number of cases involving
the unlawful transmission of classified information.209 Even when
these agreements result in punishments milder than what prosecutors
might have preferred, as in the Drake case,210 the very act of seeking
criminal penalties can still have significant retributive and deterrent
effects. Accused leakers are liable to incur a wide range of psychic
and professional costs, along with steep legal fees, from their time
spent under investigation and indictment. In functional terms, then,
even the “failed” Drake prosecution can be seen as a successful intervention against leaking.211 This is not to say that it would ever be appropriate for prosecutors to bring cases they do not believe they can
win, for harassment value. It is to say that in light of CIPA, there is
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
207 See generally Espionage Laws and Leaks: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H.
Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 96th Cong. (1979); S. REP. NO. 96-823, at 1–2 (1980).
208 See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1062 (4th Cir. 1988); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A
Critical Review of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 287 (1986)
(discussing the use of CIPA in Morison’s trial).
209 See ELSEA, supra note 33, at 5–7, 14, 17, 24 n.157.
210 See Scott Shane, No Jail Time in Trial over N.S.A. Leak, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2011, at A13.
211 See Dan Froomkin, The Big Chill: How Obama Is Operating in Unprecedented Secrecy —
While Attacking the Secret-Tellers, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 17, 2012, 12:05 PM), http://www
.huffingtonpost.com/dan-froomkin/obama-white-house-leaks_b_1973649.html (“In every significant sense, the government won [the Drake case], because it demonstrated the price of nonconformity.” (quoting Steven Aftergood) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Scott Shane, U.S.
Pressing Its Crackdown Against Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2011, at A1 (reporting that, according to leak defendant Stephen Kim’s sister, the charges brought against Kim “sent [their] parents
into deep sadness and anxiety, put more strains on Stephen’s marriage than a couple can bear,
and ruined all he has worked for over his life”).
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no a priori reason to assume prosecutors cannot win most leak cases,
and that in situations where the judge’s pretrial rulings raise national
security concerns or otherwise augur poorly, plea agreements provide a
backstop.
Many of these concerns, moreover, relate to prosecutions brought
under the Espionage Act. There are a number of other criminal laws
potentially applicable to leak cases, as outlined in Part I.212 Some of
these statutes — notably including the general theft and conversion
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641 — do not have a comparable scienter requirement. Nor do they have the same moral valence. The title of the Espionage Act, one former DOJ official who worked on leak cases suggested, can be a disadvantage for the prosecution inasmuch as it
primes the jury to expect a traitorous offense.213 While the government has enlisted several of these other statutes on occasion, it has declined to use them as aggressively as it might and continues to lead
with the Espionage Act. Drake, for example, was never charged under
§ 641.214
3. Additional Evidence. — In case the preceding discussion still
leaves room to wonder whether investigative and prosecutorial constraints are sufficient to explain decades of minimal enforcement, additional evidence of the comparative and negative variety — relating to
practices the executive has used in analogous areas, but not the leak
area, and to potential remedial steps it has forgone — should erase any
doubt.
First, as a Senate study once observed, the executive branch takes
classic spy situations “much more seriously than leaks.”215 The majority of Espionage Act prosecutions have, appropriately enough, involved
espionage, incidents in which an official passed confidential information to a foreign power.216 Spy situations are apt to present even
greater investigative challenges than media leak cases, given that in
the latter, news stories tend to reveal on their face the existence of a
government source. While the practice of prioritizing espionage cases
may be explicable on any number of grounds,217 it undercuts the notion that the leak laws cannot accommodate aggressive enforcement
within standard resource constraints.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
212
213
214

See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
Telephone Interview with former DOJ official (Aug. 28, 2012).
See Indictment, United States v. Drake, No. 10-cr-00181-RDB, 2010 WL 1513342 (D. Md.
Apr. 14, 2011); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that the Fourth Circuit,
in which Drake’s case was brought, construes § 641 as covering disclosures of intangible as well
as tangible classified information).
215 SSCI REPORT, supra note 120, at 8.
216 See Papandrea, supra note 33, at 296.
217 To take just two, espionage cases may generally be easier to bring because they are more
conducive to being charged as conspiracies or less likely to elicit a skeptical reaction from juries.
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Second, the executive appears to take violations of other criminal
laws focused on government actors much more seriously than it takes
leaks. “Public corruption,” DOJ announced recently, “is among the
FBI’s top priorities and is the number one priority of the Criminal Investigative Division.”218 In fiscal year 2009 alone, DOJ’s Public Corruption Unit managed approximately 2500 corruption investigations
involving public officials, coordinated more than 1000 additional investigations, and helped obtain over 850 convictions of federal officials.219 Intrusive techniques, such as undercover operations and electronic surveillance, are a staple of the unit’s investigative work.220
These raw data tell us nothing about the prevalence of the underlying
criminal conduct, of course, or about the relative difficulty of identifying and prosecuting corrupt individuals versus leakers. But they are
illustrative nonetheless of what a vigorous enforcement regime against
federal employees is capable of.
Third, the majority of classified information leaks are not referred
for possible criminal action. DOJ officials have indicated that the department receives roughly forty referrals per year, mainly from the
CIA and NSA.221 Taken together with the facts that (i) virtually all
classified information leaks (as well as many leaks of unclassified information) potentially fall within the terms of one or more criminal
statutes,222 and that (ii) several studies have suggested such leaks occur
almost daily,223 this figure implies that agencies have been reporting
only a small fraction of leak-law violations. The only study ever to
consider this ratio found similarly.224 The referral process, in other
words, exercises major drag on the system. It filters out most leak cases before they ever reach a prosecutor.225
My FOIA requests and interviews flesh out this observation, which
Part III will explore further.226 They suggest that over the past several
decades, agencies that generate veritable mountains of information re–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
218 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TODAY’S FBI: FACTS AND FIGURES, 2010–2011, at
28 (2012).
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 See supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text.
222 See supra notes 34–48 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 69–77 and accompanying text.
224 See SSCI REPORT, supra note 120, at 7 (stating that of the thirty recent classified information leaks brought to the committee’s attention, only three were referred to DOJ).
225 DOJ does have the authority to investigate possible leak-law violations in the absence
of a referral, but, as noted above, such sua sponte investigations appear to be extremely rare. See
supra note 130 and accompanying text. The failure of the victim agency to refer the matter
presumably sends a strong signal to prosecutors that the agency would not welcome their
intervention.
226 See infra notes 358–68 and accompanying text (situating the referral process within a
“vetogates” model).
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lating to the national defense — including cabinet-level departments
like Energy, State, Treasury, and Homeland Security, as well as independent agencies like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission — have collectively referred a handful of leak cases to DOJ.227 The only meaningful users of the referral process are certain elements of the IC, the
heads of which are required by executive order to report possible violations of federal law to the Attorney General.228 Even though its text
speaks of the “national defense,” the Espionage Act has been reduced
by executive branch practice to an intelligence statute.
This point bears emphasis. The vast majority of entities within the
U.S. government that work on national security–related issues have effectively opted out of the criminal enforcement regime for leaks. Such
widespread disregard of the referral process is all the more striking
when one considers that individuals and agencies can refer cases to
DOJ with no desire that they be pursued, simply to demonstrate concern or to gain bureaucratic cover. Perhaps some busy officials worry
that referrals will only create more work for them, without in all likelihood yielding a conviction. Yet while this pattern is not strictly irreconcilable with the notion that the difficulties of investigating and
prosecuting leaks have driven the lack of enforcement, it strongly suggests a more fundamental dynamic at work.
Fourth, to the extent that any perceived flaws in the Espionage Act
or CIPA are seen to constrain prosecutions, no administration has
made a concerted effort to address them. Specific executive branch
components have episodically endorsed proposals to strengthen the
Espionage Act, as by removing the scienter requirement.229 But the
White House has never made such reforms a legislative priority. To
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
227 I say “suggest” because the information generated thus far by my FOIA requests, see supra
note 24 (describing the requests and supplying the URL for one that has been posted online), is
highly imperfect. Specifically, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Offices of Inspector
General of the Departments of Energy and State found no records relating to criminal referrals of
media leaks; the Office of Inspector General of the Treasury Department likewise found no referral records, although one internal case is not yet closed; and the Office of Inspector General of the
Department of Homeland Security provided records that, while not entirely clear, appear to suggest a maximum of five such referrals. The National Reconnaissance Office located approximately 100 pages of responsive material of any kind, but withheld it all under FOIA exemptions (b)(1)
and (b)(3), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (3) (2012). My other FOIA submissions are regrettably still pending, even in the case of the FBI, which granted my request for “expedited processing” under 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E). Interviewees from State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and DOJ confirmed
that criminal leak referrals from the former three are rare to nonexistent, although they did not
know specifics.
228 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 204–05 (1982), amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470, 3
C.F.R. 218, 227 (2009), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 app. at 57–66 (2006 & Supp. V
2011). But cf. supra note 195 and accompanying text (noting evidence of IC elements submitting
crime reports and then declining to facilitate DOJ’s investigations).
229 See SSCI REPORT, supra note 120, at 17–22; ROSS, supra note 14, at 154–58; WISE, supra
note 98, at 153–56.

2013]

THE LEAKY LEVIATHAN

557

the contrary, President Clinton, immediately before leaving office, vetoed a bill supported by the CIA that would have criminalized the
knowing and willful disclosure of “any classified information,” without
regard to the leaker’s intent or the subject matter of the information.230 Clinton’s veto message explained that the legislation “might
discourage Government officials from engaging even in appropriate
public discussion, press briefings, or other legitimate official activities”
and “create an undue chilling effect.”231 The following year, Congress
directed the Attorney General to conduct a study of the leak laws and
to issue a report containing recommendations for legislative and administrative reforms.232 Attorney General Ashcroft’s 2002 report recommended a slew of administrative measures but notably declined to
discuss possible legislative revisions, stating that the benefit from any
such reform “is unclear.”233 FBI Director Robert Mueller took a similar position in a 2010 written response to a Senator’s question.234 Most
recently, the Obama Administration opposed certain Senators’ efforts
to insert broad anti-leak provisions into the 2013 Intelligence Authorization Act.235
Fifth, consecutive administrations have likewise declined to relax
DOJ’s stringent policy on the issuance of subpoenas to journalists. As
explained above, this policy is not statutorily grounded (though it may
correspond with congressional preferences) or constitutionally mandated under existing doctrine (though it may promote constitutional values), and it poses a significant obstacle to bringing leak cases.236 Although the White House generally refrains from interfering with
DOJ’s specific prosecution decisions, it regularly seeks changes to
high-level, self-imposed agency rules such as these. There is no evidence, however, that any President or Attorney General has considered
loosening the journalist subpoena policy. I expected that the prosecutors and White House officials I interviewed would express some frustration or at least ambivalence on this score. None did. The policy is
“respected more than resented,” one former DOJ official said.237
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
230 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, H.R. 4392 EAS, 106th Cong. § 303
(2000).
231 President’s Message on Returning Without Approval to the House of Representatives Intelligence Authorization Legislation for Fiscal Year 2001, 3 PUB. PAPERS 2466, 2467 (Nov. 4, 2000).
For more on this episode, see Dmitrieva, supra note 43, at 1060–63.
232 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, § 310, 115 Stat.
1394, 1400–01 (2001).
233 Ashcroft Report, supra note 46, at 3.
234 Mueller Response, supra note 127, at 47.
235 See Administration Opposes Leaks Provisions of Intelligence Bill, CQ NEWS, Nov. 29,
2012, available at 2012 WLNR 27128218.
236 See supra notes 135–42 and accompanying text.
237 Telephone Interview with former DOJ official, supra note 213.
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Finally, and critically, while the points made in this section have
focused on criminal enforcement, my research confirms and extends
prior findings that administrative enforcement is also extremely rare.238
(Civil remedies, which tend to be poorly suited to media leaks, are
even rarer.239) Just as most agencies outside the IC decline to use the
criminal referral process, the returns from my FOIA requests suggest
that many decline to invest any significant energy into internal investigations or penalties. FOIA officers at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Departments of Energy, State, and the Treasury collectively identified zero records relating to administrative sanctions for
suspected media leakers.240 This passivity is particularly notable because administrative remedies not only are easier to obtain than criminal convictions, but also typically generate far less publicity and criticism.241 To the extent that concerns about negative media coverage or
the security risks associated with jury trials have been driving down
prosecution rates, one might expect policymakers to shift enforcement
into the lower-cost, lower-salience administrative realm. No evidence
indicates that they have taken anything other than occasional, ad hoc
steps to do so.
* * *
In sum, on a range of levels, the executive’s actions are hard to
square with the commonly voiced notion that investigative and adjudicative difficulties are the critical barriers to cracking down on leaks.
At a minimum, the idea that the leak laws are inherently or peculiarly
incapable of implementation is untenable. Energetic enforcement just
comes at a cost — political, practical, personal — that relevant
decisionmakers have been unwilling to accept. But how can that be
so, if leakers are catchable and leaks are “a problem of major propor–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
238 See supra notes 144–56 and accompanying text (reviewing evidence of lax administrative
enforcement).
239 See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.
240 The Department of Homeland Security, by contrast, identified a number of leak cases that
had been brought to the attention of its Office of Inspector General, although its records do not
make clear how many, if any, of these led to administrative sanctions. The fact that FOIA offices
in other agencies identified no responsive records does not necessarily demonstrate an absence of
sanctions, but I take it to suggest that administrative discipline for media leaks is — at most —
highly unusual within those agencies. Cf. supra notes 24 & 227 (describing my FOIA requests and
the partial nature of the responses).
241 See supra note 170 and accompanying text (noting widespread acceptance of administrative
penalties for leakers). Relative to criminal prosecutions, administrative penalties are therefore
also much less likely to generate perverse consequences from the government’s perspective, such
as the so-called Streisand Effect, whereby an attempt to suppress a disclosed item of information
only draws more attention to it. See generally What Is the Streisand Effect?, THE ECONOMIST
(Apr. 15, 2013, 11:50 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/04/economist
-explains-what-streisand-effect.
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tions”?242 To understand how, it is necessary to turn to the other side
of the ledger and consider the potential benefits that a strategy of minimal legal enforcement can yield for executive branch principals and
the executive as an institution.
B. Leaking’s Systemic Rewards
1. Plants Need to Be Watered — with Leaks. — Perhaps the most
basic benefit of a permissive approach to leaks is that it helps preserve
a robust ability to use the media to convey anonymous statements that
serve administration ends — that is, to plant.243 The efficacy of these
“authorized” unofficial disclosures is linked to the frequency of “unauthorized” disclosures. (Although both types of disclosure involve leaking as colloquially understood, this section and the next one follow
those who have written about plants in associating leaks with lack of
approval.) In a few pages, I will return to the authorized/unauthorized
divide and show why a binary formulation is too simple. But for the
moment, it will suffice to think of plants as unattributed disclosures
made or directed by the President and his immediate advisers.244
Planting is a critical policymaking and communications tool for this
group. In pioneering the bully-pulpit presidency, Theodore Roosevelt
is believed to have been the first occupant of the White House to develop a systematic practice of revealing confidential material, “on
background,” to select journalists.245 This practice is now one of the
White House’s most important means of disseminating information,
framing its activities, gauging popular and congressional reactions, and
controlling the political agenda — perhaps the most important means
when it comes to sensitive national security and foreign policy subjects. Plants are valuable for many reasons. Depending on the context, they may allow the White House to circumvent or cajole the career bureaucracy, to communicate more efficiently with foreign
governments, to send signals and warnings to adversaries without
formally engaging them, to float trial balloons, to respond rapidly to
breaking developments, to preserve plausible deniability if an initiative
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
242 Statement on the Protection of Classified National Security Council and Intelligence Information, supra note 2.
243 See supra note 112 and accompanying text (summarizing the leak/plant distinction).
244 This group might be broken out further. The President’s national security operational team,
for example, may tend to treat classified information more circumspectly than her political aides.
The White House, too, is a “they” and not an “it,” though the degree of polycentrism is limited.
245 See Kielbowicz, supra note 99, at 444–46; Papandrea, supra note 33, at 249–55. The unsystematic practice of planting information has much older roots. See, e.g., DANIEL N. HOFFMAN,
GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 184–210 (1981) (describing the
John Adams Administration’s decision in 1798 to release the “XYZ papers” to Congress, with the
expectation that they would subsequently reach the public and enhance popular support for war
against France).
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is poorly received or an assertion turns out to be false, and generally to
impart information about executive branch policies without officially
acknowledging those policies and thereby inviting unwanted forms of
accountability or constraint.246
Consider the recent news stories about the CIA’s drone program
targeting suspected al Qaeda militants in Yemen.247 The very existence of this program is classified. Relying on information provided by
unnamed U.S. officials, the stories explain the basic purpose and nature of the program, and several report that all operations have been
conducted with the consent of the Yemeni government. Let us assume
that the President or his delegees authorized these communications
with the press, whether proactively or in response to prior disclosures
or discoveries by others. By revealing this information, the Administration keeps the American people minimally informed of its pursuits,
characterizes them in a manner designed to build support, and signals
its respect for international law and national sovereignty (the detail
about the host state’s consent). At the same time, by revealing this information through a plant, the Administration manages to avoid engaging in any unstructured public conversation about issues that might
implicate intelligence sources and methods, or violating any pledges it
might have made to Yemeni leaders not to officially reveal their role in
the drone strikes, lest this cause them political trouble at home.248 The
lack of official acknowledgement also limits the ability of domestic
watchdog groups to leverage the decision for additional details about
internal procedures, legal standards, collateral damage estimates, and
the like: the program is, after all, still classified. Recognizing that “[a]s
a practical matter, foreign governments can often ignore unofficial disclosures” whereas they cannot “so easily cast a blind eye on official
disclosures,” FOIA doctrine enables this strategy by providing that only the latter forfeit the government’s option to refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records pertaining to a policy.249
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
246 For a somewhat more cynical catalogue of the purposes of planting, see Levi, supra note 80,
at 629, which includes “lying to the press or the public” as among plants’ ends.
247 See, e.g., Adam Entous et al., U.S. Relaxes Drone Rules, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2012, at A1;
Greg Miller, U.S. Drone Campaign in Yemen Expanded, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2012, at A8; cf.
Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 283,
367 (2011) (“[O]ur knowledge of the CIA’s targeted killings programs . . . derives very largely from
self-serving leaks to journalists.”).
248 Cf. Declaration of John Bennett, Dir., Nat’l Clandestine Serv., CIA, passim, N.Y. Times Co.
v. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 11-cv-9336-CM) (explaining the
CIA’s concern not to reveal sources and methods and asserting that “in many foreign countries,
cooperation with the CIA is not a popular concept,” id. at para. 45).
249 Wilson v. CIA, 586 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2009). A deeply pragmatic concern for the nuances of foreign affairs thus drives FOIA doctrine to be highly formalistic. The reported CIA drone
program in Yemen also implicates the covert action statute, which provides that for such actions
“it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowl-
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There are countless variations on the Yemen story, but the basic
insights generalize. Plants enhance the administration’s capacity to
play “two-level games”250: sending interconnected messages about its
activities to various domestic and international audiences without incurring the full diplomatic, legal, or political risks that official
acknowledgement may entail.251 Every policy area generates some
materials that are confidential and others that are public. In national
security and foreign affairs, however, the classification system leaves
the public side of this balance grossly underdeveloped — not just from
the perspective of popular accountability but also from the perspective
of a White House that wants to explain, justify, spin, and claim credit
for its activities. As Max Frankel observed four decades ago, “practically everything that our Government does, plans, thinks, hears and
contemplates in the realms of foreign policy is stamped and treated as
secret.”252 The regular declassification process is relatively cumbersome, contentious, and irreversible. Planting offers a low-cost workaround.253 It is easy to be cynical about the practice. From a transparency standpoint, planting is highly problematic.254 But as a device for
communicating about strategically and politically fraught matters,
planting has clear instrumental value. Democratic value too; without it, public knowledge about these subjects might be even more
impoverished.
The merits of planting aside, the key descriptive observation for
present purposes is that it is a cherished presidential prerogative.
When President Obama’s former Chief of Staff William Daley raised
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
edged publicly.” 50 U.S.C. § 413b(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Plants may preserve legal wiggle
room to claim the government’s role has not reached this threshold.
250 For the classic account of two-level games from the international relations literature, see
Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L
ORG. 427 (1988). For a helpful summary of reasons why the government may prefer to communicate with foreign actors by relaying messages anonymously through the media, see
Kielbowicz, supra note 99, at 482–83.
251 Cf. HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 184 (stating that concerns about “multiple audiences” can generate “leaking,” as the speaker may, inter alia, “desire to make clear to a domestic
American audience or to the bureaucracy what the position is without making a formal statement
to a foreign government”).
252 Frankel Affidavit, supra note 91, at para. 5.
253 See MARC AMBINDER & D.B. GRADY, DEEP STATE 60 (2013) (“Because so many matters
of the state have been stamped Secret, the practice of illegally leaking to the press is not only considered acceptable, but oftentimes necessary for governance.”); Steven Aftergood, Some Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Info Are Routine, SECRECY NEWS (June 11, 2012),
http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2012/06/routine_leaks.html (stating that certain officials routinely
disclose classified information “not to subvert policy but to explain it, to defend it and to execute
it”); cf. infra notes 273–74 and accompanying text (discussing the use of ad hoc, or “instant,” declassification in connection with planting and pleaking).
254 And it will only become more problematic if executive branch components like the CIA that
refuse to officially acknowledge their activities, as a categorical matter, continue to assume greater
paramilitary obligations.
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hackles for acknowledging, “I’m all for leaking when it’s organized,”255
he was simply giving candid expression to a deeply rooted belief.
Daley evoked a long line of predecessors, such as the top aide to President Carter who remarked on his affection for the “conscious planned
leak,”256 or the aide to President Johnson who observed that, “[o]f
course, the people at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue are not really worried
about all leaks — only those that originate outside the White
House.”257 Planting is not an incidental practice of a few craven officials. It is programmatic, a mode of governance. “With every rollout
of everything significant we do” in the national security field, one
White House official remarked in an interview, “there is a structured
layout of how we will do the leaking” (that is, the planting).258 All recent administrations appear to have done the same.259 In the jaundiced but not unfounded view of some veteran reporters, “[t]he guiding
principle, then and now, is that when it suits an administration’s purpose to leak secret information to the press, it simply ignores or temporarily overrides a document’s classification.”260
There is a catch, however: vigorous enforcement of the leak laws
would cripple the administration’s ability to plant on national security
and foreign policy subjects. For a strategy of planting to work, it is
critical that relevant audiences not immediately assume that every unattributed disclosure they encounter reflects a concerted White House
effort to manipulate the information environment. The practice of
planting requires some amount of constructive ambiguity as to its
prevalence and operation.
Imagine a world in which the laws against leaking were vigorously
enforced — yielding, say, a dozen criminal cases each year rather than
a dozen throughout U.S. history. Presidentially approved sources
would remain untouched. Prosecutors would never charge them, if
such a prosecution would even be constitutional.261 Yet others who
secretly divulge classified information would become much more vulnerable. Fewer officials would run the risk. Those who keep tabs on
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
255 Roger Simon, Exclusive: Bill Daley, Unplugged, POLITICO (Oct. 28, 2011, 4:37 AM), http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/67043.html.
256 ABEL, supra note 19, at 62 (quoting Stuart Eizenstat) (internal quotation marks omitted).
257 SIGAL, supra note 29, at 145 (internal quotation marks omitted).
258 Telephone Interview with White House official (Aug. 20, 2012). The official added: “The
people in this building want to leak when they want to leak — when it helps the President.” Id.
259 See, e.g., Hearing on Leaks of Classified Information, supra note 107, at 146–47 (testimony
of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt) (explaining that during the 1970s, while the witness was a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, highly classified intelligence information was “very frequently” disclosed
to the press through “authorized leak[s] from the White House, designed to have some policy impact or political impact,” id. at 147).
260 ABEL, supra note 19, at 34.
261 See generally Ashcroft Report, supra note 46, at 2 (discussing the President’s constitutional
authority to control the protection and dissemination of national security secrets).
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the U.S. government would become conditioned to expect that lessthan-fully authorized disclosures are the exception, not the rule, and
that when such disclosures do occur they are reasonably likely to generate an observable sanction, such as a prosecution, or at least the
opening of an investigation. They would come to assume that most if
not all of the unattributed items they read about in the newspaper are
really plants.
No special insight is needed to draw the connection between evidence of a crackdown on leaks and the likely pedigree of the classified
information that filters out. A government that aspires to be leakproof, commentators have long claimed, is a government that aspires
“to control its preferred [disclosures] and thus the press and other outside critics.”262 “[A]llowing the Executive Branch to leak at will information that glorifies the President and his policies, while aggressively suppressing all information that does the opposite, is the classic
recipe for propagandizing without limit.”263 For any President, to be
seen as implementing an effective program against leaking is to invite
charges of hypocrisy and abuse, and to lose some of the protections
that anonymous sourcing provides.
Members of the media, for their part, would become more vulnerable to the critique that they are pawns of the President, if she were
thought to exercise greater control over the composition of unattributed disclosures. To protect themselves against that critique, national
security journalists would have to take steps to distance themselves
from the White House, as by challenging more of its claims, highlighting more dissenting views, or insisting on identifying anonymous Oval
Office sources as “White House officials” (much less common these
days than hazier formulations such as “administration officials”). A
preview of this dynamic was evident when President Reagan attempted to limit agency contacts with the press — a clear sign, reporters
complained, that Reagan was trying “to make sure that whatever information gets out makes the administration look good.”264
In our current system, authorized disclosures often serve reporters’
ends as much as unauthorized disclosures do. But that mutuality of
interests is fragile. Journalists who are seen to traffic too frequently or
credulously in White House plants face reputational harm, the charge

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
262 HECLO, supra note 23, at 231; see also Daniel, supra note 30, at 13 (noting the popular view
that, without leaks, “the country would get only Government-controlled news”).
263 Greenwald, supra note 123.
264 Michael Getler, Restrictions Protested by Reporters, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1982, at A7 (quoting the executive director of the Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press); see also supra
notes 189–91 and accompanying text (discussing this episode).
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that they are administration shills.265 Leakiness insulates most journalists from such accusations by disaggregating the government and
disassociating the use of anonymous sources from the President’s
agenda.
This analysis solves a puzzle presented by the CIA example above.
Recall that the lack of official acknowledgement is considered a key
foreign policy advantage of planting information about the drone
program.266 Yet if everyone knows these news stories are the product
of White House plants, aren’t they the equivalent of an official
acknowledgement? Why does it matter that the disclosures were made
“on background” as opposed to in a press release, speech, or the like?
Are Yemenis really that dense? Part of the answer is that everyone
does not know these disclosures came from the White House. This
Article just stipulated that. The hypothesis is believable, but given the
leakiness of the U.S. system, we have no solid basis for prediction.
Leakiness preserves the President’s plausible deniability as to his role
in the disclosure, if not in the underlying policy as well. It is loosely
analogous to what a game theorist would call a mixed-strategy
equilibrium: an approach that generates sufficient randomness (or
apparent randomness) across government sources as to degrade the
ability of outsiders to predict the nature and origin of any given
disclosure.267
Through several mechanisms, then, invigorating enforcement of the
leak laws threatens to reduce the acoustic separation between perceived “official” and “unofficial” disclosures, and thereby reduce the
President’s ability to enlist the media in any number of complex policy
games. There are differing degrees of invigoration, of course, and the
causal pathways are complicated and messy at the margins. Some
jaded audiences may already assume (incorrectly) that the White
House dictates all national security– and foreign policy–related disclosures. Some may pay no attention. A major crackdown on leakers
would be more avulsive than a minor crackdown. But the existence of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
265 Last decade’s contretemps over Judith Miller is a case in point. See Lili Levi, Social Media
and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1561 n.169 (2012) (explaining that “Miller, a Pulitzer-winning
former New York Times reporter, was subject to extensive criticism for articles uncritically reporting her White House sources’ false claims about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq”). Although
none of the journalists I interviewed suggested as much, I imagine that some reporters develop
elaborate informal barter systems with their government sources, procuring a few real leaks now
and again in exchange for passing off other pieces of spin as if they were leaks.
266 See supra p. 560.
267 See generally Mark Walker & John Wooders, Mixed Strategy Equilibrium, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS ONLINE (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume
eds., 2d ed. 2008). Mixed-strategy equilibrium theory may explain, for example, why professional
tennis players vary the direction of their serves. See Mark Walker & John Wooders, Minimax
Play at Wimbledon, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 1521 (2001).
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a basic positive relationship between the government’s perceived leakiness and the President’s communicative flexibility seems clear enough.
President Obama is currently learning this lesson — and validating
the theory. By increasing criminal enforcement against suspected
leakers, his DOJ has “exposed the White House to accusations . . . that
it clamps down on whistleblowing when the disclosures undermine its
agenda but eagerly volunteers anonymous ‘senior administration officials’ for interviews when politically expedient.”268 Critics in the media, civil society, and Congress now scrutinize every such unattributed
disclosure for signs of hypocrisy, national security harm, or other
grounds for delegitimation. It took only a handful of prosecutions to
erode the Administration’s credibility in the eyes of important constituencies and, with it, the capacity to shape the policy narrative.
In sum, the relationship between permissive neglect and presidential information management is much more complicated, and more interesting, than standard critiques of the former suggest. Leaking
seems on the surface like the enemy of planting: almost by definition,
disclosures unapproved by the President threaten to jeopardize his
control over what information emerges and how. And without doubt,
certain specific leaks can work at cross-purposes with certain other
plants. Yet for the reasons just provided, it is a fallacy of composition
to conclude that leakiness, as an aggregate phenomenon, therefore undermines planting. If there is tension at the retail level, at the wholesale level planting depends upon leaking to give it political and epistemological breathing room; leaking, in turn, depends upon planting to
give it legal breathing room. The two are fundamentally symbiotic.
Plants need to be watered with leaks.
2. Plants, Leaks, and Pleaks. —
“[S]omeone at my level never leaks.”
— President Carter’s national security
Brzezinski269

adviser

Zbigniew

An appreciation for presidential planting thus helps us start to sort
through the puzzle of permissive neglect. However, notwithstanding
the binary way in which some thoughtful journalists have parsed unattributed disclosures into leaks and plants (most journalists and almost
all legal scholars have not done this much),270 the distinction is far
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
268 Uri Friedman, Good Leak, Bad Leak, FOREIGN POL’Y (June 8, 2012), http://www
.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/07/good_leak_bad_leak.
269 LINSKY, supra note 28, at 201 (internal quotation marks omitted).
270 It is notable that journalists today seem even less likely to promote the leak/plant distinction
than their predecessors were a generation ago. Several journalists I interviewed seemed to take
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from clean. Intragovernmental divisions, deficits in hierarchical supervision, and other complicating factors need to be brought into the
analysis. This complexity further illuminates the rationality of minimal enforcement.
In distinguishing leaks from plants, the key concept is authorization. But what does it mean for a disclosure of classified information,
or merely confidential information for that matter, to be authorized?271
The Espionage Act is silent on the question. In legal terms, there is
only one administrative process in place to regulate the disclosure of
classified information, and that is the declassification regime set forth
in executive order.272 Although the order does not explicitly prohibit
declassifying information immediately in advance or by means of
unattributed disclosures to the press, it does not clearly countenance
such an ad hoc approach either.273 Nor does it clarify the White
House’s role. The practice of publicizing information while maintaining its classification is disfavored but is not ruled out.274 The executive order resolves very little, in fact, about how specific declassifica–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
offense at the mere mention of the term “plant.” One hypothesis is that, in media circles, accusations of doing the government’s bidding have grown increasingly damaging relative to accusations
of jeopardizing important policy interests, and reporters have consequently sought to disassociate
their work from labels like “planting” that highlight its benefits for officialdom.
271 Two prior commentators have perceptively identified some of the complexity in this question, though neither engages it in depth. See Fenster, supra note 103, at 15–16 (noting that
“‘[u]nauthorized’ in this context can mean quite different things, depending on the leaker’s identity and purpose”); Levi, supra note 80, at 630 (stating that “in view of the complexity of government today, leaks may be authorized at many different levels, leading to major definitional problems” regarding what constitutes a leak or a plant).
272 The governing executive order includes a definition of “[u]nauthorized disclosure,” but it is
almost entirely circular. See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 6.1(rr), 3 C.F.R. 298, 325 (2010), reprinted
in 50 U.S.C. § 435 app. at 233–45 (Supp. V 2011) (defining “[u]nauthorized disclosure” as “a communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient,” without
further defining “unauthorized” or “unauthorized recipient”).
273 The executive order provides that “[i]nformation shall be declassified as soon as it no longer
meets the standards for classification,” id. § 3.1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 305, and that in “some exceptional
cases, . . . the need to protect such information may be outweighed by the public interest in disclosure,” id. § 3.1(d), 3 C.F.R. at 306. However, in restricting declassification authority to the small
set of officials responsible for the original classification and in referring exceptional cases to “the
agency head or the senior agency official,” id. § 3.1(b)(4), 3 C.F.R. at 305, the order appears to assume that declassification will be handled primarily if not entirely by individual agencies, rather
than by the White House or an interagency collective. The order sets forth hardly any procedures
for discrete disclosure determinations, in contrast to its lengthy protocols on “automatic declassification,” id. § 3.3, 3 C.F.R. at 307, “systematic declassification review,” id. § 3.4, 3 C.F.R. at 310,
and “mandatory declassification review,” id. § 3.5, 3 C.F.R. at 311. As far as I can tell, no scholarship has considered the law governing ad hoc declassifications — a strange lacuna in the secrecy
literature. Cf. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21900, THE PROTECTION
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 11–14 (2013) (noting the executive
order’s ambiguity on “instant declassification,” id. at 11, and stating that as “a practical matter, . . . there is little to stop agency heads and other high-ranking officials from releasing classified
information . . . when it is seen as suiting government needs,” id. at 13).
274 See Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.7(c)–(d), 3 C.F.R. at 302–03.
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tion decisions are to be made or disputes concerning them resolved. At
the highest levels of government, disclosure authority is barely specified. The practices of top officials do not track these or any other codified rules.
In terms of presidential management of the secrecy system, the critical variable is presumably whether the President or his delegees approved the release of information to the media. And yet there are no
general procedures in place to govern or convey such approval, or to
define relevant delegees and their authority relations vis-à-vis each
other. In many cases, the President’s wishes may be ambiguous even
to those in the White House, whether because of silence, mixed signals,
mixed precedent, or disagreement among top aides. In some cases,
senior agency officials may disclose classified information in a manner
permitted by the terms of the executive order but against the wishes of
other agencies or White House overseers. For fear of dirty hands,
some officials may enable disclosures by their subordinates without
giving any instructions whatever.275
It is, in short, no simple task to apply the concept of authorization
to this domain. As a matter of presidential control, if not formal law,
we can begin to make headway by envisioning a spectrum reflecting
the degree to which the President has expressly or impliedly blessed a
disclosure. This spectrum runs from the quintessential plant (the President herself strategically sharing a secret or instructing an aide to do
so) to the quintessential leak (a low-level employee stealing highly classified documents she was never meant to see and passing them to a
journalist). Most unattributed disclosures to the press reside somewhere well between these poles. A senior official is authorized by the
leadership of her agency to speak with a reporter about a certain subject, or her habit of doing so is tolerated, though her specific comments
are not vetted with interagency counterparts or otherwise preapproved. A White House aide reveals something he has been working
on in the course of a conversation with a journalist, without having
cleared his remarks with colleagues or superiors. Let us call these disclosures pleaks to capture their quasi-authorized character.
We can go a little further in elaborating this conception of authority. Still on a presidentialist model,276 the authority to reveal confiden–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
275 For a comic treatment of such stratagems, in the British context, see Yes, Prime Minister:
Official Secrets (BBC television broadcast Dec. 10, 1987) (transcript available at http://www.yes
-minister.com/ypm2x01-2x05.srt), which discusses “unofficially official, but officially unofficial”
disclosures that the Prime Minister publicly disapproves but privately approves. Thanks to
Gerald Magliocca for pointing me to this episode.
276 It would be conceptually coherent to speak of congressional planting and pleaking, too. My
focus on presidential authorization in defining these terms follows from my descriptive interest in
leaks’ treatment by the executive branch. I do not mean to imply that national security secrets
are solely a presidential prerogative, that congressional disclosures come with a comparative legit-
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tial information might be assessed on several dimensions: (1) the
speaker’s positional distance from the President, as determined by hierarchical rank and practical proximity; (2) the speaker’s substantive
distance from the President, as determined by the expected correspondence between her disclosure decision and the President’s desires
(from “the President is dying to have this fact aired” to “the President
sees the disclosure as grievously undermining his agenda”); and (3) the
speaker’s situational claim to communicative license, or the expected
probability that the President, if he were to want the information
made public, would approve of it being divulged in such a manner
by such an official. Although it is impossible to draw clean cutoffs
between plants and pleaks or between pleaks and leaks, these criteria provide some additional conceptual guidance and a basis for comparison. Chelsea Manning’s traffic with WikiLeaks and Edward
Snowden’s traffic with the Guardian are near zero on all dimensions — clear leaks.277 Everything the President intentionally discloses
is necessarily a plant. In between is a vast, liminal space in which authorization may be contested and pleaking may occur. Agencies’
communications with the media frequently inhabit this space. Many
of the internecine disclosures through which senior agency officials
pursue rival policy goals, for instance, are deficient on one or more axes but nonetheless tolerated and even relied upon by the White
House.278
Take the Secretary of State. She may not have express or implied
approval from anyone in the White House to reveal certain things, and
may well have interests and incentives that are misaligned with those
of the President and other cabinet secretaries. Nevertheless, she is a
leading administration policymaker in her own right, with strong ties
to the President, original classification authority, a highly developed
understanding of which information is more or less sensitive in which
contexts, and a plausible warrant to control many disclosure decisions
in the area of foreign policy. She also has formal declassification authority for information originally classified by the State Department.279
A significant percentage of the Secretary’s statements to the media will
hew closely to or at least support the White House line. Even the most
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
imacy deficit, or that presidential authorization provides an appropriate normative standard for
assessing all disclosures.
277 General leaks almost always will be. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (defining
general leaks).
278 The ubiquity of such disclosures is taken for granted by Washington observers. See, e.g.,
STANSFIELD TURNER, SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY 149 (1985) (“The Pentagon leaks, primarily to sell its programs to the Congress and the public. The State Department leaks when it is being forced into a policy move that its people dislike. The CIA leaks when some of its people want
to influence policy but know that’s a role they’re not allowed to play openly.”).
279 Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 3.1(b), 3 C.F.R. at 305.
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provocative, legally problematic disclosures she might make are typically a long way from the pure-leak end of the spectrum. The same
goes for the disclosures of her top aides and former aides. The heads
of executive branch agencies and their immediate advisers and assistant secretaries are widely thought to be inveterate leakers. They may
be better understood as a community of pleakers.
Top White House aides, in contrast, are more likely to be planters.
No independent bureaucracy claims their duty or allegiance. Their
job descriptions demand a higher degree of loyalty to the President,
their political fates are tied more closely to his, and their perches near
the Oval Office generate richer information about his views as well as
more robust feedback mechanisms to clarify which sorts of disclosures
he favors and disfavors.
Consider in this light Zbigniew Brzezinski’s remark, “someone at
my level never leaks”280 (or the analogous saying among top British officials, “I brief, you leak”281). Brzezinski’s meaning was ambiguous.
He might have been making an implausible statement about the conceptual impossibility of top White House officials’ acting without legal
authority or about the superior ethics of these individuals. Or he
might have been making a cynical statement about the prospects for
legal enforcement, implying that someone of his rank faces no realistic
risk of being disciplined for speaking out of turn. The analysis here
offers a more defensible, and I suspect more faithful, interpretation:
Brzezinski was suggesting that the secretive press dealings of someone
who works as closely with the President as he did are vastly more likely than those of a lower-level employee to rate high on axes (1), (2), and
(3) and therefore to merit recognition as plants. Brzezinski’s disclosures were the functional equivalent of presidential disclosures.
The likelihood that many classified information disclosures are
part-plant, part-leak provides additional grounds to favor a strategy of
lenient criminal and administrative enforcement. The reason is not
just that pleakers tend to be powerful people, and powerful people are
difficult to punish. If that (conclusory) claim were dispositive, then in
investigating the sanction rate we might simply note that high-level
individuals appear to spill secrets more often than those below
them;282 any inquiry into how they do this would be explanatorily otiose. Yet the ambiguous bureaucratic character of their behavior matters greatly too. Pleakers like the Secretary of State’s top aides are not
rogue actors out to cause mischief or expose wrongdoing. To the con–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
280
281

LINSKY, supra note 28, at 201 (internal quotation marks omitted).
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT COMMITTEE, LEAKS AND WHISTLEBLOWING IN
WHITEHALL, 2008–09, H.C. 83-I, at 13 (U.K.) [hereinafter LEAKS IN WHITEHALL] (internal
quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/leaks.pdf.
282 See supra notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
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trary, they are institutional insiders with thick connections to executive
branch leadership and well-developed senses of what lines can and
cannot be crossed. In many cases, their anonymous disclosures reflect
a complex mix of motives, including the best interests of their agency
and the nation, if not also a plausible grant of apparent authority.
They are not the President’s proxies but they are not entirely unfaithful agents either.
We can now refine one of the claims advanced above. The previous section argued that notwithstanding the harms from specific leaks,
a general practice of leakiness benefits the White House by facilitating
plants. This tradeoff starts to look less stark when we realize that
what we were calling “leaks” are not randomly distributed across the
bureaucracy or unmoored from presidential will — that pleaks predominate over true leaks. Whatever the precise allocation of plants,
pleaks, and leaks (and however one defines these categories), the outsized role played by the government’s upper echelons helps explain
why most reporters believe there are substantially more unattributed
disclosures “for” the President than “against” him.283 Journalists, too,
may benefit from a pleak-heavy system, if the resulting diversity of
sources insulates them from charges of excessive attachment to the
White House, while the seniority of sources insulates them from charges of recklessness in their research methods and publication decisions.
An energetic program of enforcement threatens to withdraw these
benefits and cause significant independent harms. Many unlawful disclosures of information plainly do occur.284 But among the unattributed disclosures that look illegal on their face, some significant fraction
may turn out to be lawful, or at least effectively insulated from legal
penalty, because they are traceable to the President or consistent with
the executive order on classification.285 Empower investigators to look
too hard into too many of these cases, and any number of uncomfortable results may follow: the Special Prosecutor probe that brought
down Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff is the natural experiment
that shows why aggressive enforcement is so unpalatable, the excep–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
283
284

HESS, supra note 82, at 94.
See, e.g., Mueller Response, supra note 127, at 47 (explaining that the “majority of the [leak
cases referred to DOJ] are meritorious in the sense that they are based on an unauthorized dissemination of classified information”).
285 Cf. WILLARD REPORT, supra note 37, at 4 (“Sometimes a time-consuming investigation is
undertaken, only to reveal that the source of the leak was a White House or Cabinet official who
was authorized to disclose the information.”). If the President or the executive order on classification permitted a certain disclosure, one assumes that the disclosure would never be prosecuted
under the Espionage Act and that, if it were, the judge would find § 793’s scienter requirement or
distributional element (that the information was passed to a “person not entitled to receive it,” 18
U.S.C. § 793(d), (e) (2012)) not to have been met.
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tion that proves the rule.286 Formal leak investigations risk exposing
top officials’ efforts to manipulate the secrecy rules and marginalize
opponents, among other machinations. Criminal cases against quasiauthorized sources risk provoking unfavorable judicial and legislative
responses, constraining future flexibility. And all public sanctions risk
exacerbating internal conflict as well as underscoring it. Prosecuting
or firing an assistant secretary who discloses information with the acquiescence of her agency head may be seen as tantamount to challenging that agency head, and indeed the agency itself.
Investigators, furthermore, will rarely be able to tell upfront the
extent to which any given disclosure was authorized. Plants and
pleaks may be camouflaged as leaks. Journalists at the top of their
profession say they often do not know, and could not realistically ascertain, the precise level or type of authorization their sources have received.287 The distinctions among leaks, pleaks, and plants become
messier still in cases that involve multiple disclosures. News stories
not infrequently combine elements of leak and plant. Journalists may
acquire some initial piece of classified information through a leak or
pleak or an off-the-record hint, supplement it with information from
public and foreign sources (or vice versa), and then tell the White
House that a story will be forthcoming, at which point the administration decides to cooperate in a bid to contextualize the initial disclosure
and minimize its damage.288 It appears that something along these
lines may have happened with David Sanger’s stunning story in the
New York Times in June 2012 about the U.S. government’s partial responsibility for the Stuxnet virus that targeted Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities.289
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
286
287

See supra notes 116, 138–39 and accompanying text (discussing this investigation).
Telephone Interview with Barton Gellman, supra note 187; Telephone Interview with Charlie
Savage, Reporter, N.Y. Times (Aug. 3, 2012); Telephone Interview with Scott Shane, Reporter,
N.Y. Times (Aug. 8, 2012); see also Levi, supra note 80, at 630 (“[I]n many instances . . . neither
the press recipient of the information, nor the reading public, will know whether or not the disclosure is authorized.”).
288 See David Ignatius, What’s Behind a Leak, WASH. POST, June 24, 2012, at A23 (“[G]ood
reporters start by assembling stories in bits and pieces. When they have enough, they go to highlevel sources in the White House or elsewhere and say: I’ve got the story and I’m planning to run
it, whether you cooperate or not.”).
289 David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES,
June 1, 2012, at A1; cf. Scott Shane, Inquiry of Leaks Is Casting Chill over Coverage, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2012, at A1 (“The Stuxnet computer worm that destroyed some Iranian nuclear centrifuges . . . first came to light not from press leaks but from computer security companies that saw
its consequences in several countries.”). Sanger’s account of how he elicited information from top
National Security Council sources for a prior story on the Iranian nuclear program is telling: “The
issue was too classified to discuss, I was told. Well, I said, it wouldn’t be in a few hours, after
we wrote a story describing the Iranian letter and the secret facility.” SANGER, supra note 198,
at 181.
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The inverse can happen, too. Top White House aides may plant
information in the hope of generating a particular sort of story, only to
have the recipient leverage their disclosures to ferret out other information that the White House does not want revealed. Journalists are
hardly passive conduits. To say they receive plants is not to suggest
they themselves are potted plants.
These hybrid cases complicate prosecution as well as investigation.
Any decent defense lawyer would emphasize the appearance of additional classified information disclosures in the news story at issue. To
untangle the illicit from the licit disclosures is to invite critical scrutiny
of the administration’s tactics, and may bring high-ranking officials into the case.
All this conceptual, legal, and observational uncertainty regarding
authorization thus further explains why strict enforcement would be so
problematic for Presidents and agency leadership alike.290 The rare
undeniable leak like Chelsea Manning’s can be investigated and punished with only modest externalities for the executive’s broader functioning. Any thoroughgoing effort to separate out the unauthorized
from the authorized disclosures, however, would run up against an
elaborate web of bureaucratic customs and conventions on which the
executive has come to rely — the government by plant, pleak, and leak
bequeathed by the New Deal.291 Because “leaking” is such an ambiguous practice and leak investigations are so difficult to cabin once set
in motion, all components of the executive branch that strategically reveal protected information through the press have a shared interest in
keeping enforcement levels low.292
The individual incentives of top officials reinforce these structural
dynamics. Because pleaking is so common across this group, a large
number of policymakers will, at any given time, have reason to worry
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
290 The complexity of the concept of authorization, as it pertains to disclosures of protected
government information, also helps explain the stickiness of the awkward, overinclusive wording
of the Espionage Act — wording that invites noncompliance. Most everyone agrees that “authorized” leaks do not merit criminal punishment. And yet for all the reasons just given, it would be
exceedingly difficult to spell out, in statute or regulation, exactly who has the power to authorize
which disclosures in which ways. The resulting system would be cumbersome and inflexible, and
it would force executive branch principals to manage and take responsibility for the processes of
planting and pleaking to a degree many of them would not want. While the Espionage Act’s
breadth might seem on its face like the enemy of government-media intercourse, in practice it
generates an open-ended delegation to the executive to develop its own standards for acceptable
conduct.
291 Cf. Levi, supra note 80, at 622 (describing Washington insiders as “hav[ing] the sense of participating in a ‘government by leak’”).
292 If certain specific factions or components within government were systematically more likely to lose out from leakiness, a natural coalition for invigorating enforcement might develop. It is
unclear a priori what that coalition would look like, however. The evidence marshaled in this
Article suggests that, with the possible exception of the IC, the national security agencies and cabinet departments prefer to maintain the status quo.
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that vigorous enforcement would ultimately redound to their detriment
by exposing their prior actions or limiting their future capacity to use
the media. Those who participate in the game of leaks do not want
judgmental, non-game-playing prosecutors figuratively patrolling their
hallways. As long as these pleakers continue to engage the press in a
zone of ambiguous bureaucratic and legal authorization, they will remain the natural allies of leakers in their unwillingness to tolerate
highly constrictive institutional responses.
3. External Signaling and Executive Self-Binding. — How does
the executive gain and retain power over time? As it increasingly
comes to be seen as the most dangerous branch, how does it convince
Congress and the electorate to keep delegating authority, notwithstanding the deep antimonarchical strain in American thought?
Executive power scholars Jack Goldsmith, Trevor Morrison, Richard
Pildes, Eric Posner, and Adrian Vermeule have recently drawn attention to one key instrument. With different accents, their work has
stressed the paradoxical utility of mechanisms that are seen to
reduce presidential discretion: for instance, arrangements that cede
authority to relatively independent actors such as inspectors general or
DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC).293 Professors Posner and
Vermeule refer to this strategy, whereby Presidents adopt ongoing
limits on their power and “commit themselves to a course of action
that would impose higher costs on ill-motivated actors,” as “executive
self-binding.”294
Although these self-binding mechanisms may sap presidential power in the short term, they ultimately serve to enhance it by sustaining
the institution’s credibility and legitimacy and thereby securing popular approval of further grants of discretionary authority. Or so the
theory goes. Credibility and legitimacy on this account are social facts,
not abstract ideals. They involve generalized judgments about trustworthiness, akin to the “diffuse support” the Supreme Court enjoys
from the American public above and beyond the popularity of any
particular ruling.295 Presidents must demonstrate that they are acting
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
293 See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 108 (arguing that “the institution of inspector general has empowered the presidency by constraining it”); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 177,
at 137–50 (theorizing “executive self-binding” and listing mechanisms such as independent commissions, bipartisan appointments, and commitments to multilateralism); Trevor W. Morrison,
Libya, “Hostilities,” the Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 63–64 (2011) (discussing OLC’s role and reputation); Richard
H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1387–88, 1407–08 (2012) (book review)
(crediting Posner and Vermeule’s general theory of executive self-binding though critiquing their
application of it). As Professor Pildes notes, this line of argument reinforces a broader body of
work on the significance of presidential credibility. Pildes, supra, at 1387 & n.21 (discussing
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS (1990)).
294 POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 177, at 137 (emphasis omitted).
295 See Pildes, supra note 293, at 1387–88.
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in rational, restrained, law-respecting ways if they wish to win such
support. This is nowhere truer than in the secretive realms of national
security and foreign policy, where congressional and judicial checks
are least robust and the executive’s activities least visible to the average citizen.296 In these areas especially, credibility and legitimacy need
to be signaled as much as earned.
Leakiness offers a signaling mechanism of just this sort.297 Political
scientists have argued that by lowering monitoring costs, the provision
of transparency by government agents can promote broader delegations of responsibility and resources.298 If members of the public believe leaking is pervasive, then they should expect to learn about most
of the nefarious or unlawful things the executive branch might be doing, along with any associated internal disagreements, whether or not
the President wants them to. Perhaps there will be a time lag, but
even the executive’s deepest secrets will tend to come to light. Members of the public should further expect that officials will internalize
this prospect and therefore be reticent to do such troubling things in
the first place.299 Indeed, compared to the other self-binding mechanisms that scholars have highlighted, leakiness may be especially efficacious precisely because it is not seen as strategic, or even consciously
intended. Leaks are often taken to be unique sources of insight into
the inner workings of power.
This special authenticity that many assign to leaks, and the special
credulity that attaches, can be seen in historian Bruce Catton’s early
treatment of the subject:
[I]t is through the leak that the people are kept in touch with their government. . . . It is the leak which enables them to know whether the fine

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
296 See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 177, at 146 (“Because the information gap between
voters and legislators, on the one hand, and the executive, on the other, is especially wide in foreign affairs, there is . . . wide scope for suspicion and conspiracy theories.”).
297 Some social scientists reserve the term signaling for “purposive communication” or define it
with reference to unintuitive formal criteria. Diego Gambetta, Signaling, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF ANALYTICAL SOCIOLOGY 168, 170 (Peter Hedström & Peter Bearman eds.,
2009). This Article uses the term more loosely, to refer to situations where the display of otherwise unobservable attributes of an institution “rais[es] the probability the receiver assigns to a certain state of affairs” (for example, that the executive is acting responsibly), id., whether or not various actors within the institution intended that result.
298 See, e.g., John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, in DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND REPRESENTATION 131 (Adam
Przeworski et al. eds., 1999) (advancing this claim in the context of a formal model); James E. Alt
& Robert C. Lowry, Transparency and Accountability: Empirical Results for US States, 22 J.
THEORETICAL POL. 379 (2010) (finding empirical evidence that “increased transparency dampens the negative effect of tax increases” on retention of governors and “leads to greater fiscal
scale,” id. at 379).
299 Cf. SAGAR, supra note 181, at 5 (stating that the “possibility of unauthorized disclosures
provides the most effective and credible guarantee that those who have the formal authority over
state secrecy cannot systemically use it to their own advantage”).

2013]

THE LEAKY LEVIATHAN

575

boasts and pretensions of an appointed person are really justified. It is the
leak — telling them what may happen, what is being planned, what the
carefully hidden facts actually are — which makes it possible for them to
react while there is still time . . . .300

The bloated official secrecy system sends an opposite signal: that
the government has something to hide. When the American people
learn the executive branch classified more than ninety-five million
items last fiscal year,301 without learning anything about the content of
those items, the effect is not likely to inspire trust. Concealment on
such a scale inspires, instead, the belief that national security policy is
a realm of nonaccountability. Leaks are holes in the wall that encircles
this realm, rays of sunlight from a shadow world, “the authentic voice
of the government.”302 Permissive neglect is the means to generalize
that perception of authentic access and counter the enormous credibility gap that ninety-five million secret documents threaten to open up.
A leaky government is, over time, a trustworthy government.
For Presidents and all those around them who are charged with
tending to executive prerogatives, or who depend upon a well-funded,
politically secure national security state, theories of self-binding thus
reinforce the importance of minimizing public sanctions for leaking
and maintaining a substantial ratio of perceived unauthorized to authorized disclosures. They align the executive’s crude institutional interest in maintaining power with the more elevated normative ideal no
doubt held by some officials that “press coverage of secret executive
branch action serves a vital function in American democracy.”303 If
their sociological premises are correct, these theories suggest that any
enforcement regime that is seen as harsh on leakers — whistleblowers,
they will be called — or that has the effect of exposing the administration’s media machinations, represents a profound threat to executive
power.
The main difficulty here is that leakiness might also be taken as a
sign of administrative fecklessness, and some leaks do in fact reveal
abuse, illegality, or internal dissent — think of the Taguba Report on
detainee torture in George W. Bush’s second term — and thereby hurt

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
300
301

CATTON, supra note 3, at 87.
INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1 (2013),
available at http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2012-annual-cost-report.pdf. The vast majority
of these classification decisions are “derivative” rather than “original” in nature, id., but this is
small comfort to anyone concerned about overclassification. Cf. Peter Galison, Removing
Knowledge, 31 CRITICAL INQUIRY 229, 230 (2004) (stating that “[s]ome suspect as many as a
trillion pages are classified” in the United States, the equivalent of “200 Libraries of Congress”).
302 ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., CAVEAT 17 (1984).
303 GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 222.
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the executive’s credibility in quite a direct sense.304 However, even
these revelations may reassure various constituencies that their views
are being represented by some in government. And no effective selfbinding strategy is without such costs. A mechanism that never made
the President look bad would quickly lose its capacity to signal credibility; the whole point is that the power-enhancing second- and thirdorder effects of these arrangements ultimately come to swamp the
power-reducing first-order effects. No pain, no gain. From a presidential power perspective, the question is how the immediate adverse
consequences of certain specific leaks compare to the subtler, longerterm benefits of leakiness. It is hard to see how this comparison could
be made with any precision.305 But in light of the immense credibility
costs that official secrecy imposes and the immense political costs that
leakiness would impose on a mendacious chief executive (costs that
explain why policies seen as targeting leakers spawn such distrust),
there is a solid theoretical basis to believe the benefits win out.
There is an additional, more speculative sense in which leakiness
may preserve the credibility of government, as well as the professional
integrity of its employees: if it reduces the incidence of official lying. A
leaky government keeps fewer programmatic secrets. Although Americans still do not know the specifics of the CIA’s drone operations in
places like Yemen, thanks to anonymous U.S. sources they know quite
a lot about the Yemen program’s basic structure and orientation.
Government officials may refuse to confirm or deny this information in
formal settings. But because of all the disclosures that have occurred,
it would be pointless to dissemble about the program’s existence, and
no one feels pressure to do so. Leakiness, in this context, not only
pushes out specific revelations to the media but also creates an envi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
304 See Vladeck, supra note 14, at xiv (suggesting that “the upsurge in unauthorized disclosures
in the latter years of the Bush administration” damaged the President’s credibility). Another
difficulty concerns intentionality. As compared to some of the other self-binding mechanisms
identified in the literature, it is less clear whether policymakers intentionally adopted leakiness for
this strategic end. One possibility is that leakiness-as-self-binding is an emergent phenomenon, in
the sense that it arises from interactions among the executive’s components even though none of
these components may have sought it as such. See generally Timothy O’Connor & Hong Yu
Wong, Emergent Properties, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/properties-emergent/ (discussing theories of emergence). Leakiness’s credibility-enhancing effects, on this account, would be a feature of the administrative state
supervenient on, and irreducible to, the individuals and entities that comprise the system.
It seems just as plausible, however, that numerous Presidents and top officials have come
to appreciate the link between leaks and credibility and have consciously incorporated this insight into their permissive institutional designs, even if they have not expressly acknowledged as
much.
305 Perhaps tests could be run for correlations between the incidence of leaks and public perceptions of government. The threshold constraint on this sort of empirical work is the tremendous difficulty of specifying and identifying the “leaks” that have occurred, not to mention the
tremendous complexity of the factors that influence perceptions of government over time.
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ronment in which official lying becomes an untenable and unnecessary
strategy.306 The prospect of exposure through leaks and counter-leaks
deters false disclosures more generally. A pervasive culture of leaking
may substitute, to some extent, for a pervasive culture of lying. The
executive benefits from this tradeoff both because it likely better supports public trust in government and because it prevents most officials
from feeling pressure to violate an injunction (“thou shall not lie”) that,
unlike the leak laws, continues to exert a strong moral pull on public
servants.307
4. Manufactured Scarcity and Intragovernmental Communication. — Even if it manages to secure the public trust, how does the executive manage to secure effective communication across hundreds of
offices and hundreds of thousands of employees? Leakiness plays a
relatively straightforward role in advancing this interest. Leaks,
pleaks, and plants (henceforth, as in Part I, “leaks” for simplicity’s
sake) facilitate richer information flows throughout the bureaucracy
and constitute an important means by which the executive branch
speaks to itself. In a phrase, they are discursive as much as subversive
disclosures.
The general point is not new. Colloquially, it is reflected in statements such as Secretary of State Alexander Haig’s quip that the
Reagan Administration had converted the Times and the Post into
“White House bulletin boards.”308 In the academic literature, the
idea of leaks as tools for internal communication is touched upon in
numerous works309 and was developed thoroughly in an article by
Richard Kielbowicz.310 The best-known variant involves the use of
the press to gain the attention of an otherwise inaccessible White
House. A New York Times essay from the 1980s conveys a sense of the
timeless drama associated with these rituals:
A White House assistant, frustrated because he can’t get his views before
the President, judiciously plants a story likely to catch the President’s eye.
A Presidential aide, afraid to confront the President directly with bad
news, gets his message across through the press. A Cabinet officer, unable
to get past the White House palace guard, leaks a memo that will land on

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
306 The dissonance between the unofficial publicity and the official posture of nonacknowledgement may raise distinct credibility concerns, though it is also unstable over time. See
generally Kreimer, supra note 88, at 1027–61 (explaining social, political, and legal dynamics that
have worked to unravel government secrets once they have been publicly identified).
307 See, e.g., HESS, supra note 82, at 24 (stating that “[f]or all press secretaries” in the executive
branch, “the crux of ethical conduct is lying”).
308 HAIG, supra note 302, at 18.
309 See, e.g., Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Commentary, Curtiss-Wright Comes
Home: Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 400
(1986) (“[L]eak and counterleak by government employees have become an integral part of the
way people with power talk to one another.”).
310 Kielbowicz, supra note 99.
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the President’s desk in the morning newspaper. In recent weeks, top officials have engaged in that form of communication in a vivid, classic campaign to persuade President Reagan to adopt drastic revisions in the 1984
budget.311

As Professor Kielbowicz explains at length, leaks are used to push
information not only upward to agency heads and the White House
but also downward to those who are meant to implement a policy and
horizontally across agencies and branches.312 Through trial balloons,
internecine leaks, counter-leaks, and other such strategies,313 policies
are developed, debated, and disseminated. Presidents use leaks (again,
defined to include plants and pleaks) to signal disapproval, promote a
new policy direction, and strengthen the position of a particular interagency faction. Agencies use leaks to highlight helpful facts, undercut
rivals, and build support for their initiatives. Just as they give confidential material to their media contacts, government sources often receive valuable information in turn; “[i]t is shocking,” a former DOJ official reflected, “how much reporters will say about what others have
told them.”314 Underneath the surface of the stories we read in the
newspapers citing anonymous U.S. officials, lies an elaborate
intragovernmental communicative economy.315
What is less appreciated is the role played by lax enforcement of
the leak laws. Most obviously, lax enforcement allows leaks to be used
more freely. A larger volume of administrative samizdat circulates.
Less obviously, the backdrop of formal illegality remains relevant, because in depressing the overall amount of leaking it enhances the significance of the disclosures that occur. The Espionage Act casts a
shadow even though it is rarely enforced. The government official
who discusses classified information with a reporter still assumes some
modest amount of legal and professional risk for her actions. That she
is willing to do so communicates to her listeners that she or her agency
feels she has something notable to say.316 Even if these practices generate ambiguity as to the precise identity of any given source, the paradox here is that leaking must remain illicit or else the speakers’
statements would not necessarily reach their intended audiences or
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
311 Halloran, supra note 98; see also HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 184 (“Leaking is a
time-honored means of getting information to the president outside formal channels.”).
312 Kielbowicz, supra note 99, at 476–83.
313 See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (cataloguing types of leaks).
314 Email from former DOJ official to author (Feb. 2, 2013).
315 To “newspapers” in this sentence we might now add online outfits such as Politico. Television and radio, however, still lag behind as vehicles for intragovernmental communication. The
relative permanence of the written word, as much as the authoritativeness of the Times and the
Post, makes print media a better “bulletin board.”
316 At least, it communicates as much in cases where there is no suspected speaker who is widely known to have an exceptionally high risk tolerance or discount rate.
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convey the intensity of their preferences, and so would fail to deliver
the communicative benefits the executive branch has come to expect
from them. On this account, the laws against leaking can be seen as a
form of manufactured scarcity which, by raising the cost of leaks, also
raises their potential salience and signaling power when they occur.
The illegality of leaking enhances its functionality.317
In this way, a policy of permissive neglect toward leaking may be
efficiency-enhancing relative to the baseline of colossal official secrecy.318 Overclassification threatens to stifle important decisional inputs
and cause policy sclerosis. Permissive neglect enables and refines a deliberative workaround for the increasingly plural executive and its
many principals. These discursive disclosures have the added effect of
informing the American people about the activities of government,
yielding external democratic rewards as well as internal instrumental
ones.
It might nevertheless be argued that, on balance, any deliberative
benefits the executive branch realizes from leaks are wiped out by
their deliberative costs, as when they transmit distorted information319
or bias public opinion in ways that constrain options. I believe this is
a very difficult case to make, given the importance of good information to central administrators and the educative value that even
hostile leaks may have.320 It is unclear how much turns on the argument in any event. Regardless of whether leaks deserve to be seen as
a desirable tool of intragovernmental communication from a god’s-eye
view, they have clearly become a significant tool in practice. For the
many actors within the executive branch who are accustomed to utilizing them as such, this tradition furnishes additional grounds to resist
any crackdown.
5. Pacifying and Coopting Powerful Groups. — We are not quite
done with the political economy of leakiness. For leaking does more
than enhance secret keepers’ ability to send messages and signals
throughout the bureaucracy and to outside audiences. It also mediates
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
317 Leaks are like street drugs to this extent. Harsh statutory prohibitions increase their cost,
even in zones of underenforcement. Risk-taking personalities are least deterred. Whatever deleterious side effects they might have, the prohibitions depress supply and so inflate the market value of the trafficking that occurs.
318 To be clear, this is a second-best claim. Whether leakiness would be similarly efficiencyenhancing in a world without overclassification is much harder to say. See ADRIAN VERMEULE,
THE SYSTEM OF THE CONSTITUTION 34, 68, 83–84 (2011).
319 See HESS, supra note 82, at 93 (questioning leaks’ deliberative utility because of the potential for messages to “get garbled in transmission”).
320 Cf. HECLO, supra note 23, at 231 (discussing benefits that oppositional leaks by civil servants can generate for agency management). As we have already seen, moreover, many so-called
“leaks” are not at all hostile to the agendas of high-level officials. See supra sections II.B.1–2, pp.
559–73.
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the executive’s relationships with a host of powerful groups in ways
that further entrench the low enforcement rate.
The media elite. — First, and most directly, leakiness has served
the individual and institutional interests of select members of
the mainstream media. New York Times editor Max Frankel spoke
truer than he may have intended when he characterized classified
information leaks as “the coin of our business.”321 A regime with fewer
leaks and greater frontal openness might support the Times’s watchdog function as well, if not better. But it would not give Times reporters the same privileged role as information brokers or sell as many
papers.
The laws against leaking prop up this dynamic. Notwithstanding
their complaints about overclassification, FOIA stonewalling, and the
like, those media outlets that tend to receive significant leaks have a
strong incentive to maintain broad official secrecy. Publicizing leaks is
how they scoop their competitors. If the cost of leaking were lowered
through decriminalization, the incidence of disclosure would rise and
the value of the information would fall. Manufactured scarcity increases the returns to leaking for publishers just as it does for government actors.
These returns are not distributed evenly across the media industry.
The special access that major outlets have to senior officials, together
with speakers’ desire to be heard, has historically led to a concentration of leaks in papers like the Times and the Post322 and thus to a reproduction of media hierarchy. It is not a stretch to think that leaks
have helped consolidate the very notion of a mainstream press. To
traffic in confidential government information is to be a Washington
player; the flow of that information influences not only the substantive
content but also the institutional structure of the public sphere.
At the same time, by channeling so many leaks (defined, again, to
include pleaks and plants) to the media elite, government sources have
generally enhanced the administration’s ability to influence the coverage that ensues. While reporters and editors at the Times, the Post,
and their ilk amass soft power, their commitment to responsible journalism, their interest in avoiding onerous regulation, their desire to
remain in the loop for future disclosures, and their repeat interactions
with top officials all combine to give those officials leverage and to
moderate the reporting. The natural tendency of leaks to cluster in a
few major outlets has in turn helped to keep most news coverage within bounds the executive’s leadership finds acceptable.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
321
322

Frankel Affidavit, supra note 91, at para. 16.
See supra notes 92–95, 308 and accompanying text.
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This mutually beneficial arrangement is now under threat from
changes to the media marketplace and the development of technologies
that lower the cost of copying, disseminating, and mining information.323 It is an open question whether leaking will continue to
provide similar benefits for executive policymakers and the establishment press in the years ahead, whether the portrait sketched by Max
Frankel will retain its descriptive power.324 Recent efforts by “old media” luminaries to impugn the motives of WikiLeaks and distance
themselves from its model325 reflect, among other things, how much
they stand to lose from any significant reconfiguration of traditional
disclosure and enforcement practices.
Classification’s critics. — Second, leakiness staves off fundamental
reform by pacifying key constituencies for transparency. On account
of leaks, neither Congress nor the executive has been compelled to
tackle the problems posed by official secrecy in a meaningful, forwardlooking way, as by invigorating moribund judicial review of national
security secrets or streamlining a classification system that everyone
agrees is obscenely bloated. Legislators, judges, journalists, and
watchdog groups feel sufficiently served by the amount of information
that percolates out.
Generally speaking, there are two stable equilibria in the U.S. market for transparency: broad formal classification with broad informal
disclosure, or narrow formal classification with narrow informal disclosure. Whether or not leakiness is desirable for all concerned in
an ideal world (a deeply contestable proposition), it is an appealing
second-best solution for many given the fact of overclassification.
Leakiness protects the classification system at a political level even as
it undermines the system at a practical level.
Although this particular dynamic may go overlooked, commentators have long appreciated that “[l]eaking has a symbiotic relationship
with secrecy.”326 Surely we would have less leaking of classified information if we had less classified information. Not only would there
be fewer documents to pilfer, but people might treat the secrecy rules
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
323
324

For a lucid account of these developments, see GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 73–82.
It is similarly an open question whether, in light of upheavals in journalism and technology,
the government’s enforcement model will remain so permissive for long. See infra notes 528–46
and accompanying text (considering this question and noting reasons to expect more continuity
than discontinuity in the foreseeable future).
325 See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the Soul of
the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 333–36, 356–57, 370–93 (2011)
(describing the old media’s vilification of WikiLeaks and linking this response to anxiety about
economic and technological change); see also id. at 379–80 & nn.344–48 (citing leading contemporary sources examining threats to the newspaper industry more generally).
326 SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 217
(1983).
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with more respect. As Morton Halperin has observed, “[w]hen there is
vast overclassification it is . . . difficult to persuade government officials that they are doing harm by providing information which is classified to the press and the public.”327
Unwinding overclassification is exceedingly difficult to do, however. Years of reform efforts have barely made a dent,328 and it is not
clear they ever will. Large numbers of concerned citizens face a collective action problem in organizing effectively against the concentrated
interests of those individuals and institutions within government for
whom classified information is a valuable source of professional benefits. Furthermore, the marginal transaction costs of running a more
selective classification system may be extremely high, while the policy
costs of erroneous declassifications may be greater than those incurred
under existing levels of leaking. For reasons both public-oriented and
self-interested, the prospect of seriously addressing overclassification is
a most unwelcome one for powerful actors within the executive
branch. Leakiness may hurt them on occasion, but it spares them this
potentially greater pain.329
Congressional overseers. — Third, leakiness allows congressional
committees to economize on oversight as well as on transparencyseeking legislation. The political rewards of national security policies
that are seen as successful accrue disproportionately to the executive.330 As compared to a more proactive, “police patrol” model of
oversight — much of the content of which would be nonpublic and
virtually all the good results from which would be imputed to the
President — a more reactive, “fire alarm” model that relies on leaks
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
327 MORTON H. HALPERIN, CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR DISCLOSING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE PRESS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2012), available at http://www

.right2info.org/resources/publications/Halperin_CriminalPenaltiesforDisclosingClassifiedInformation
tothePressintheUnitedStates.pdf.
328 See Steven Aftergood, Policy Essay, Reducing Government Secrecy: Finding What Works,
27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 399, 400–01 (2009) (describing “[t]he persistent failure to achieve significant reforms over half a century,” id. at 401, in which “[e]ntire shelves of commission reports,
congressional hearings, and independent critiques” have targeted overclassification, id. at 400).
329 The leak laws could pose a limited threat to the classification system if alleged violators
were allowed to raise a defense of improper classification, bringing judges into the business of
evaluating classification determinations. However, no court has recognized such a defense. See
Bellia, supra note 40, at 1523. This outcome is unsurprising. Even after Congress amended
FOIA’s national security exemption in 1974 to require de novo review of disclosure denials, 5
U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2012), and to cover only those records that “are in fact properly classified,”
id. § 552(b)(1)(B), courts persisted in declining to consider the substantive propriety of classification decisions, see Pozen, supra note 106, at 636–38.
330 Cf. Amy Zegart & Julie Quinn, Policemen, Firefighters, and Spooks: How Oversight Varies
Across Policy Domains, in EYES ON SPIES 55, 55–84 (Amy B. Zegart ed., 2011) (explaining how
an asymmetry of payoffs and incentives promotes lax congressional oversight of intelligence
agencies).
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has many benefits for members of Congress.331 Without lifting a finger, they receive a steady stream of reports about the executive’s activities and the public’s response to those activities, as mediated through
the press. Through their own overt and covert uses of the media, they
may additionally influence the coverage of those activities. So long as
the ratio of agency leaks and pleaks to White House plants is not too
small — which motivated partisans can help ensure by drawing attention to the latter, as they are energetically doing at this writing332 —
leakiness allows Congress to exploit the diversity of viewpoints within
the executive to acquire better, broader, cheaper information.
Congress’s longstanding failure to confront the executive secrecy
system must be understood in light of these institutional and memberlevel interests in leakiness. With some notable exceptions such as the
bill vetoed by President Clinton that would have strengthened the
Espionage Act,333 Congress has done little to address national security
leaks or the classification system that underlies them. A variety
of committees have held hearings on high-profile incidents, and the
intelligence committees have recently mooted measures to curb certain
forms of planting and pleaking. But in general legislative action has
been minimal for decades. Of particular note, members have declined
to make use of the protection afforded by the Constitution’s Speech or
Debate Clause334 to reveal, or threaten to reveal, executive branch information without fear of criminal or civil liability.335 One might expect that a responsible legislature would try to steer classified information leaks its way, so as to preserve legitimate secrecy while
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
331 See generally Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984) (distinguishing these
two models of oversight).
332 See Charlie Savage, 2 Inquiries Set to Track Down Paths of Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
2012, at A1 (describing accusations by congressional Republicans that “the White House [has]
risk[ed] national security for political gain by deliberately disclosing secret information that makes
Mr. Obama look tough”). The most recent intelligence authorization act included a new measure
requiring responsible officials to notify the congressional intelligence committees of “authorized disclosure[s] of national intelligence” made to the media outside of the FOIA, litigation, and
declassification-review contexts. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013, Pub. L. No.
112-277, § 504, 126 Stat. 2468, 2477 (2013); see also Steven Aftergood, Senate Passes Intelligence
Bill Without Anti-Leak Measures, SECRECY NEWS (Dec. 31, 2012), http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy
/2012/12/2013_intelauth (discussing this “unprecedented” reform). The degree to which this measure — which never defines “authorized” or “intelligence” — will alter high-level officials’ planting
calculus is an important open question.
333 See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text.
334 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (“[F]or any Speech or Debate in either House, [Senators and
Representatives] shall not be questioned in any other Place.”).
335 See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 742–53 (2012). Senator
Mike Gravel is an outlier for the way he placed much of the Pentagon Papers in the Congressional Record on the eve of the Supreme Court’s ruling in New York Times Co. v. United States. See
id. at 745–48. No comparably dramatic breach of executive secrecy rules has occurred on the
House or Senate floor in all the years since.
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providing an outside check on the executive.336 Congress has largely
bypassed this approach, which would force it to take greater responsibility over the revelations that emerge, and has instead countenanced
minimal enforcement against media leakers while directing all prospective whistleblowers to their agency inspectors general in the first
instance.337 Many members of Congress seem quite content to be regular readers (and perhaps occasional purveyors) rather than recipients
of leaks. Systematic recourse to leaking emerges, once again, as the
more efficient and politically palatable alternative to systematic legal
reform.
Congress’s role in the ecosystem of national security leaks is a large
and complex subject. Certain congressional entities receive a steady
flow of classified information through official channels, supplemented
by a side traffic in direct and indirect unofficial disclosures. Agencies
typically incur political risk if they try to limit this traffic by clamping
down on staffers’ communications with their oversight committees.
Partisan motivations and sincere good-governance sentiments sustain a
perpetual interest on the Hill in leaks, along with a ready-made rhetoric of crisis about their prevalence. The recent rise of a “commuter
Congress,” in which many members spend as little time as possible in
Washington, may have helped strengthen relationships between elite
reporters and less peripatetic executive officials, shifting power to the
latter in the intragovernmental game of leaks.
While a full account of Congress’s disclosure practices is well beyond the scope of this Article,338 the key point here is simply that leaks
offer Congress a low-cost mechanism for monitoring and disciplining
the executive and for providing transparency. These benefits powerfully if imperfectly reinforce the executive’s own interests in leakiness.
Congress, too, stands to lose a great deal from the demise of permissive
neglect.
Civil servants and game players. — Fourth, leakiness moderates
certain structural tensions within the executive branch. It is widely
believed that career bureaucrats are, on average, more change–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
336 Cf. David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257, 329–33 (2010) (discussing this
general strategy).
337 See supra notes 63–66 and accompanying text. In several famous cases, executive branch
leakers reached out to the press only after failing to receive what they felt was an adequate response from Congress. See, e.g., DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM AND
THE PENTAGON PAPERS 365 (2002) (describing Ellsberg’s turn to the New York Times after
“striking out” with two senators); Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer, NEW YORKER, May 23, 2011,
at 46, 52–55 (describing Thomas Drake’s turn to the Baltimore Sun).
338 The subject merits greater attention. So far as I am aware, the most significant treatment
remains a 1977 study by Hugh Heclo that focused primarily on the executive branch. See
HECLO, supra note 23.
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resistant, expertise-driven, and risk-averse than the presidential appointees who cycle in and out around them.339 When new administrations consider bold plans that roil staff who were installed by their
predecessors or who feel invested in the prior program, anonymous
disclosures to the media provide a means to fight back. Presidential
plants can be used to advance radical agendas: the Bush II Administration’s campaign to build the case for the Iraq invasion is, for
some, a notorious case in point. Inasmuch as leaks and pleaks (and
the specter of leaks and pleaks) tend to be a conservative force in policymaking — debilitating to sudden shifts and extreme proposals on either end of the ideological spectrum — they may help to keep the bureaucracy reasonably satisfied with the policies that are pursued and
with their level of knowledge thereof. Leaks and pleaks, more broadly,
help to keep the National Security Council (NSC) reasonably well
aligned with agencies even as the former continues to consolidate power in the postwar era.340 While specific disclosures by senior civil
servants and military brass may serve to constrain the President, their
general availability is critical to maintaining her own disclosure discretion and sociological legitimacy, not just with the general public but
with the vast workforce she needs to carry out her policies.
Leakiness also offers cultural and psychological benefits for those
involved. Leaks, we have seen, are a medium through which political
appointees challenge civil servants and vice versa, ideological factions
challenge other ideological factions, agencies challenge other agencies,
individuals challenge other individuals, and the “multivocality” of the
executive branch passes from metaphor to reality. Whether leaking
ultimately does more to inflame or improve relations across bureaucratic components, its very existence as a forum for disputation enhances all components’ ability to exercise voice and exit341 on sensitive
matters. To shut down this forum through vigorous enforcement
would impoverish not only executive branch deliberations but also the
experience — the degrees of freedom, the opportunities for strategic
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
339

See generally RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERSYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 154–76 (1994) (discussing the political
autonomy and professional orientation of career bureaucrats). In numerical terms, the civil service dwarfs the “politically” selected portion of the executive workforce. See DAVID E. LEWIS,
THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 56 (2008).
340 On the postwar rise of the NSC to predominance in national security and foreign affairs
policymaking, see generally AMY B. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
CIA, JCS, AND NSC 76–108 (1999); and Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1573, 1677–87, 1693, 1699–1703, 1746 (2011).
341 See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970) (describing
“voice” and “exit” strategies). By “exit,” I mean that in publicizing their positions, leakers may
depart, legally and metaphorically, from the executive branch’s internal deliberative process and
the rules governing disclosure.
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behavior, the sense of self-importance, the intrigue, the thrill — of being an executive branch insider.
Common references to the “game of leaks”342 capture something
important about the competitive, pleasurable outlet leaking can provide for some. A policy of lax enforcement avoids darkening the
clouds with widespread investigations, prosecutions, and the like, preserving these experiential rewards. Participants in the game of leaks
are hedonically, not just instrumentally, invested in keeping enforcers
at bay.
III. “ORDER” IN DISORDER:
DISCIPLINING LEAKERS WITH AND WITHOUT LAW
To submit that the laws on the books have been underenforced is
not to suggest that anything goes in the realm of leaking. To the contrary, in the absence of more supple formal proscriptions, a set of customary norms appears to have arisen that conditions disclosure and
enforcement behavior alike, imposing some amount of order in the absence of regularly applied law. Leakers do get disciplined. It is just
that the system of social control is partially nonhierarchical, largely informal, and almost completely invisible to the outside observer.
This Part sketches that system. The sketch is necessarily tentative
and incomplete. Interviews, personal observations, and a small number of generally available sources provide a sufficient basis to construct a preliminary account of the values, conventions, and sanctions
that “regulate” national security–related leaking, separate and apart
from the laws on the books. I believe that this account has substantial
descriptive power — indeed, that without a grasp of its basic contours,
one cannot begin to understand or evaluate the law and policy of
leaks. Many of the points made in this Part likely obtain outside the
national security field as well. But it must be stressed that the regulation of leaking is a diffuse practice, my visibility into which is limited.
To refine the inductive story I tell here, much more work would need
to be done to establish relevant norms, trace their development, formalize a model, consider case studies, and so on. The overriding goal
of this Part is to lay the foundation for that work, to set a new research agenda for scholarship in the area as much as to convince on
any particulars.343
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
342 E.g., Papandrea, supra note 33, passim; Howard Kurtz, Sez Who? How Sources and Reporters Play the Leak Game, WASH. POST, Mar. 7, 1993, at C5.
343 Existing scholarship has valuably explored issues such as the journalistic norms that influence newspapers’ decisions whether to publish secret information, see, e.g., Note, Media Incentives, supra note 14, at 2234–42, and the ethical considerations specific to whistleblowers, see, e.g.,
C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL POWER 63–
81 (2001), but it has not considered the institutional norms that structure leak regulation.
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For all the reasons detailed in Part II, it is not in the interest of executive branch principals to throw the book at a great number of leakers. And yet neither is it in their interest to allow prohibitions on leaking to fall into desuetude and to invite informational anarchy. A
strategic administration, rather, will seek to maintain a steady stream
of disclosures that are understood by the public to be leaks, while minimizing these disclosures’ policy costs. In the sketch offered below, I
suggest that a pragmatic code has developed within the executive to
help mediate this tension. This code has come to gloss, and nearly
displace, the inert and overbroad Espionage Act,344 functioning as a
parallel law of leaking. Critics like James Bruce miss these dynamics
entirely when they assert that on account of the “glaring absence of
criminal penalties,” the message sent to executive employees is, “[l]eak
all you want, and no matter how much, or how serious, nothing will
happen to you.”345 Permissive neglect is not nearly that permissive.
A. Internal Signaling and Informal Sanctions
Stated most generally, instead of linear, legalistic supervision of the
release of confidential information to the media, the executive exercises
supervision to a large degree through suasion and the threat of informal sanctions if an employee goes too far. Top White House officials’
complaints about specific instances provide a signal as to which disclosures cross the line. These complaints are sometimes aired publicly, as
when President Reagan’s spokesperson called a press briefing to vent
the President’s anger over the leak of a scuttled fighter-jet sale to Taiwan.346 More often, they are communicated privately, as when President Obama phoned the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to express dissatisfaction with the leak of a finding on
greenhouse gases.347
A variety of sanctions back up these threats. The key mechanisms,
interviews and anecdotal accounts suggest, involve shaming, shunning,
and exiling.348 Through shaming, suspected leakers may be targeted
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
344 On its face, as suggested above, the Espionage Act fails to distinguish among different types
of leakers or even different parties to the leak transaction: it crudely lumps together classic saboteurs with ill-motivated leakers, well-intentioned whistleblowers, and members of the media. See
Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 37, at 1083–84 (calling the Act “fatally defective,” id. at 1084, for
failing to distinguish among “spies, government employees and ex-employees, and newspapers and
the rest of us,” id. at 1083); see also sources cited supra note 54.
345 Bruce, supra note 120, at 43. In Bruce’s telling, the “enforcement climate” is one of “utter
indifference.” Id.
346 See HESS, supra note 82, at 89–90.
347 See JONATHAN ALTER, THE PROMISE: PRESIDENT OBAMA, YEAR ONE 155 (2010).
348 There is nothing exceptional about this aspect of the leak regime. In general form, these
sanctions — which are not mutually exclusive and may overlap in any given case — are ubiquitous in bureaucratic settings. See, e.g., HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A
STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 220–21 (1960) (noting the importance of shaming);
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with damaging rumor campaigns, given the cold shoulder, or berated
by agency bosses and White House overseers. President Obama’s
Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel is said to have been “a big screamer”
who relished “hauling in” suspected offenders, including the occasional
cabinet secretary.349 Through shunning, suspected leakers may be cut
out of certain types of meetings, working groups, or email chains; denied face time with key policymakers; or brought in on plans only at
the last minute. A former top aide at the State Department recalled
that after an NSC official accused him of divulging sensitive information on Africa policy, he was told he was no longer welcome at
White House strategy sessions.350 Through exiling, suspected leakers
may be moved to obscure posts, denied promotions, or pressured to resign. Morton Halperin, cited throughout this Article as a leading
chronicler of the role of leaks in the policy process, was forced out of
the Nixon Administration’s NSC when his colleagues suspected he had
passed information on the secret U.S. bombing of Cambodia to the
New York Times.351
Exclusion from meetings and projects appears to be an especially
common remedy. Among senior government officials, loss of such access means loss of status, influence, power. One White House interviewee asserted that those leakers who are seen as undermining “message discipline” are “going to quickly be rendered irrelevant. . . . I
think that really shuts some people up.”352 If no suspect has been
identified, key authority figures like the President’s national security
adviser or chief of staff may issue warnings to a larger audience of potentially guilty employees, threatening to initiate an investigation and
expose offenders if similar leaks recur. Unlike with formal disciplinary
methods, these enforcers need not build a case against any particular
individual. Informal enforcement, moreover, allows for sanctions at
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY
DO IT 156–58 (1989) (discussing shunning and exiling strategies); Aimee L. Franklin & Javier F.
Pagan, Organization Culture as an Explanation for Employee Discipline Practices, 26 REV. PUB.
PERSONNEL ADMIN. 52, 56 (2006) (reviewing research finding that informal disciplinary methods “are widely employed” in public organizations).
349 Telephone Interview with former White House official (Aug. 20, 2012).
350 Interview with former State Department official, in New York, N.Y. (July 28, 2012).
351 Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1196–97 (D.C. Cir. 1979). In Halperin’s case, as in
many others, it is difficult to disentangle whether he was marginalized because he leaked about a
certain subject or because the content of the leak indicated he did not share key administration
goals.
352 Telephone Interview with White House official, supra note 258; see also Daniel Ellsberg,
Secrecy and National Security Whistleblowing, 77 SOC. RES. 773, 778–81 (2010) (asserting that,
within the U.S. national security bureaucracy, “what is most feared by most prospective secrettellers . . . is social isolation, ostracism, exile,” id. at 781, and that “[b]reaking the pledge of secrecy
in a way that is not tacitly tolerated or authorized by group leaders or practices is generally the
surest and fastest way . . . to be expelled,” id. at 778).
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the agency level. If it is believed that someone known or unknown
from the State Department was responsible for a damaging disclosure — for example, because the disclosure corresponded to the policy
preferences of Department leadership — officials from other parts
of the executive branch may seek to limit State’s influence in related
matters.
As the executive’s main architect of communications strategy, coordinator of the interagency process, and ultimate policy authority, the
White House is the primary issuer of these informal sanctions. It is
not the only issuer. Agency leadership may supplement or assist, and
occasionally resist, the White House’s efforts. IC elements like the
CIA may try to punish leaky agencies, and even certain members of
the White House itself, by limiting access to highly classified undertakings. But by and large, consistent with the insight that top White
House aides have the strongest claim to communicative license as presidential planters,353 one finds that they are more likely to be dispensers
than to be recipients of disclosure discipline.
The executive takes efforts to prevent leaking as well as to punish
it. All components that handle classified material, for instance, employ
a wide range of information security technologies and protocols.354
The President’s main practical tool of prevention is limiting the circle
of secret keepers. As one White House official explained, “when
there’s been a ton of leaking on an issue, senior folks in this building
change the process in a way that reduces the number of people who
have access to the information.”355 These programs become, in the
jargon, a closer hold. Yet while the expected odds of leaking may
thereafter decline, the risks of decisionmaking defects associated with
insularity and compartmentalization356 rise — as does the risk of triggering a vicious cycle whereby excluded officials come to feel aggrieved and so speak increasingly freely to the press, which only reinforces the secret keepers’ perceived need to close ranks, further fueling
bureaucratic alienation, and on and on. Vicious cycles involving exclusion, disobedience, and retrenchment appear to have developed in
the Nixon and Bush II Administrations.357 These predictable pathologies, along with the simple need to disclose information broadly
enough to effectuate any given policy, inherently constrain the ability
to head off leaks through precautionary strategies.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
353
354

See supra section II.B.2, pp. 565–73.
See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,587, §§ 1–2, 3 C.F.R. 276, 276–77 (2011), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 435 app. at 247–49 (Supp. V 2011) (directing “structural reforms to ensure responsible sharing
and safeguarding of classified information on computer networks,” id. § 1, 3 C.F.R. at 276).
355 Telephone Interview with White House official, supra note 258.
356 On these risks, see generally Pozen, supra note 336, at 278–80.
357 See HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 256–57.
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For senior officials (the sorts of people, roughly at the level of deputy assistant secretary and above, who regularly or semi-regularly attend meetings at the White House358), the informal enforcement regime
is easily the most important source of discipline for leaking. A crude
set of vetogates359 insulates these officials from prosecution. As explained above, a referral by the victim agency to DOJ is typically a
precondition to criminal action, and referrals have seldom been submitted by agencies other than the CIA and NSA.360 Outside of the IC,
there seems to be no systematic process in place to govern the production or transmission of these crime reports.361 Former DOJ officials
with whom I spoke knew almost nothing about how agencies determine whether to submit them. As a matter of practice, it appears that
in many agencies politically connected appointees exercise substantial
control. Rather than encourage individual employees to contact DOJ
or coordinate referrals through a relatively independent inspector general, agencies reportedly tend to route concerns through their general
counsels’ offices.362 Referrals, consequently, are unlikely to be made
over the opposition (tacit or overt) of the general counsels’ superiors.363
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
358 Recall that in the Kennedy School’s survey of officials at the level of assistant secretary and
above (as well as a few members of Congress), nearly half of the respondents acknowledged having found it appropriate to leak. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
359 Vetogates are “the choke points” in a legal process, key preliminary phases in which discrete
groups can block final action. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 66–68 (4th ed. 2007) (describing vetogates in the legislative context).
360 See supra notes 128–33 and accompanying text.
361 Within the IC, a formal policy directive currently requires all senior officials to report suspected unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the Special Security Center within
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE No. 701 (Mar. 14, 2007), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-701.pdf; see also OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ODNI FAQ 2–4, 9, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/faq?tmpl=component&format
=pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2013) (explaining that the ODNI has coordinated the work of the
CIA, the NSA, and the rest of the IC since the mid-2000s). This directive reinforces the broader executive branch policy of placing special reporting responsibilities on the IC, with
the consequent “intelligentization” of leak enforcement. See supra notes 221–28 and accompanying text.
362 A former DOJ official who worked on leak cases stated that referrals “always” seemed to
come from general counsels’ offices, Telephone Interview with former DOJ official, supra note
213, and high-level lawyers from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and State assumed that this is how leak referrals would be handled in their agencies, in the unlikely event
such a referral was made. Throughout the executive, most agencies have presidentially appointed, Senate-confirmed general counsels. See CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS & JERRY W. MANSFIELD,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30959, PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEE POSITIONS REQUIRING
SENATE CONFIRMATION AND COMMITTEES HANDLING NOMINATIONS passim (2012).
363 My impressionistic sense is that the primary users of the referral system, in the CIA and
NSA, often suspect that someone employed by another part of the government leaked “their” information. Referrals of such leaks are less likely to implicate the CIA’s or NSA’s own high-level
officials. Unlike their counterparts in non-IC agencies, the heads of the CIA and NSA are also
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On top of the ordinary gatekeeping done by career prosecutors who
decide whether to move forward with a case, the referral process can
give an effective veto to the leadership of critical agencies.
There may be yet another veto, held by the President and his appointees at DOJ. Notwithstanding the norm of declining to interfere
with specific prosecution decisions, Oval Office executives have been
known to encourage their DOJ counterparts to prioritize or deprioritize certain categories of cases,364 and some interviewees suggested that
media leaking has historically been an area on which the White House
has counseled caution.365 Even if line-level prosecutors typically have
no special compunctions about pursuing leakers — and I am not
aware of evidence that they do — it is conceivable that their FBI and
NSD bosses would curtail their discretion upon receiving a negative
signal from the President, the Attorney General, or the President’s or
the Attorney General’s top aides. DOJ’s tradition of running leak cases out of Main Justice, instead of individual U.S. Attorneys’ Offices,
strengthens these sources of “political” influence.366
Beyond the criminal process, agency heads may hold additional vetoes over administrative penalties for senior staff who disclose information with their bosses’ assent or acquiescence. Agencies have broad
discretion to withhold most punishments in most cases. Their disciplinarians cannot easily ruin someone’s career against the wishes of
agency leadership;367 in the vast majority of cases, one assumes, they
would not even contemplate trying to do so.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
required by executive order to report possible violations of federal law. See supra note 228 and
accompanying text.
364 See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1034 (2013)
(explaining that “the White House has long influenced administrative enforcement efforts within
and across executive branch agencies”); id. at 1051–54, 1056, 1060, 1066 (reviewing examples of
“presidential influence over criminal enforcement,” id. at 1053).
365 One interviewee, for instance, stressed that before the Obama Administration, no recent
White House had given DOJ “carte blanche” to pursue leak cases. Telephone Interview with Department of Homeland Security official (Sept. 10, 2012).
366 See supra notes 126–37 and accompanying text (describing relevant DOJ policies and procedures); see also infra note 394 (explaining that under pressure from critics in Congress, DOJ
granted an unusual degree of independence to the mid-2000s investigation that led to Scooter
Libby and to the ongoing investigation that reportedly has led to James Cartwright).
367 Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7532 (2012) (granting agency heads final authority to suspend or remove employees in the interest of national security); LEAKS IN WHITEHALL, supra note 281, at 13–14
(observing that in the United Kingdom, while “[s]pecial advisers are, in theory, subject to the same
rules regarding the disclosure of information as other civil servants,” id. at 13, in practice the
minister responsible for their discipline is unlikely to take any action “where the adviser has been
acting in what they [sic] believe to be the minister’s interests,” id. at 14). Even in cases where
their bosses would be supportive, administrative disciplinarians have limited ability to punish
presidentially appointed leakers who work in other parts of the executive or who have the option
to leave government service at low cost.
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The existence of multiple, institutionally diverse vetogates predictably biases the formal enforcement system against action. For all the
reasons given in Part II why a strategic executive should be wary of
public sanctions, this bias is perfectly rational. Informal remedies for
leaking are not only easier to calibrate and administer but also comparatively obscure. They can preserve a veneer of bureaucratic harmony at the same time that they minimize backlash. The spillage of
sensitive information is seen by some as a “management problem,” one
White House official noted, and Oval Office brass (“chief of staff–level
people”) generally do not wish to highlight their managerial failures.368
B. Senior Officials, Junior Officials, and Mixed Deterrence
Lower-level officials are subject to some of the same informal sanctions as their superiors, which may be replicated in miniature within
an agency. They may also be exposed, secondhand, to some of the
same internal White House signals regarding the boundaries of acceptable leaking. But, for them, the precise contours of the “game of
leaks” are likely to remain opaque, and the possibility of careerjeopardizing investigation and formal sanction — while still statistically remote — is more realistic.369
From an enforcement perspective, the value of informal sanctions
generally declines as one moves down the bureaucratic hierarchy. For
employees as low on the totem pole as Chelsea Manning, a private first
class soldier stationed abroad when she transferred materials to
WikiLeaks, many informal sanctions would not even be possible.
Manning was never part of any inner circle from which she could have
been marginalized. The same appears to hold true for NSA contractor
Edward Snowden. Shaming, shunning, and exiling work best when
the professional community is close-knit and the personal costs associated with loss of access are high.370
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
368
369

Telephone Interview with White House official, supra note 258.
Although civil service rules raise the cost of pursuing administrative remedies, they allow all
agencies to punish employees for misconduct. See Kent H. Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1375 (2012) (“[F]ederal law uniformly provides
that insubordination is a suitable ground for good-cause removal.”). For a recent example of administrative punishment, see Gidget Fuentes, 7 SEALs Punished for Secrecy Breach, NAVY
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2012, 8:21 PM), http://www.navytimes.com/article/20121108/NEWS/211080305/7
-SEALs-punished-secrecy-breach (reporting that seven members of Navy SEAL Team 6 received
letters of reprimand and a partial forfeiture of pay for two months for divulging classified information to a video game maker).
370 I offer no direct evidence for this claim as regards leakers, but it is consistent with the literature on relational contracting and private ordering in homogeneous communities. See, e.g., Lisa
Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 140–41 (1992) (exploring the use of informal governance mechanisms within the diamond industry).
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Below the senior policymaking level, then, the machinery of formal
enforcement assumes greater significance. How much significance
varies by agency. The returns from my FOIA requests indicate that in
responding to leaks, certain executive branch components are substantially more active than others in their use of administrative remedies.
As noted above, it appears that over the past several decades, the Departments of Energy, State, and the Treasury have never once levied
an administrative sanction for an unauthorized disclosure to the media
(or at least, none that was identifiable as such by FOIA staff in their
Offices of Inspector General),371 whereas the CIA has reportedly used
“single issue” polygraphs in leak investigations and fired at least one
veteran officer for leaking within the past decade.372 Particularly in
the IC, if not elsewhere, leakers cannot take administrative apathy for
granted.
Once we attend to its extralegal dimensions, we thus find that the
executive’s regime for regulating leaks is in significant respects more
pluralistic than unitary. Even though the classification rules and the
laws against leaking are written in generally applicable terms, in practice the regime privileges White House officials over agency officials,
political appointees over civil servants, senior staff over junior staff,
and non-IC employees over IC employees, both in terms of the type of
sanctions utilized and the amount of disclosure discretion given. The
first three discrepancies are ingrained in the way the executive organizes its work. High-level officials — above all, top White House officials — are expected to speak with the press as part of their jobs, to
explain and defend administration policies. There is widespread
recognition that this may entail, as one former White House official
put it, some “informal trimming” of the boundaries of confidentiality
and classification.373 Lower-level employees have no comparable discretion, no reliable safe harbor. For many in the White House, leaks
by low-level career employees are seen as “totally unacceptable from
the standpoint of running the government.”374
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
371
372

See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
See Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, C.I.A. Director Has Made Plugging Leaks a Top Priority,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 1, at 31.
373 Telephone Interview with former White House official, supra note 349.
374 Telephone Interview with White House official, supra note 258. Across a range of fields, it
has been noted that American legal practice appears more pluralistic than unitary in “its implicit
acceptance of customs founded on multiple sources of legal authority.” Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and
Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 899, 935. It is nonetheless striking to find such pronounced pluralism within the executive branch, in a core national security area. These fissures reflect leaking’s
role as a means by which different normative communities within the executive coordinate and
compete with one another, as well as leaking’s relevance to a diverse set of governmental ends,
from retaining power to shaping public opinion to securing the nation.
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In effect, senior officials are given a standard: “Don’t disclose confidential information in a manner that causes serious harm to U.S. interests or the President’s agenda.” The difficulty of delineating a comprehensive policy ex ante is too great for this group, so the details are
largely left to be worked out through ex post, informal enforcement.
Junior officials are given a rule: “Don’t disclose confidential information, period.” Violations of this rule are largely endured by those
who run the executive branch, as Parts I and II explained, and in the
abstract their utility may even be appreciated. But these disclosures
are not similarly approved, much less cultivated.
The system for senior officials, moreover, is designed to facilitate
learning. Statements and sanctions issued by the President and his top
aides establish the disclosure standard applicable to this group; discrete leaks, pleaks, and plants progressively test that standard and
stimulate refinements. Generalized grievances about unauthorized disclosures (“too much is being shared with the media about China policy”) yield, over time, to more particularized enforcement cues (“the
next leak about our negotiations with the Taiwanese military will not
be tolerated”). Agency participants and White House overseers continually learn from each other and iteratively codetermine the limits of
acceptable disclosure behavior, in an active feedback loop. Even if
certain components of the executive have more or less tolerant cultures
with regard to leaking, this dynamic process, together with the
vetogates that minimize formal sanctions, helps ensure that those overlapping normative orders substantially converge on an authoritative
system for disciplining senior officials.375
From the executive’s perspective — that is, taking the institution’s
objective interests and not social welfare as the maximand — this mix
of threats, rhetoric, occasional informal sanctions, and very occasional
formal sanctions may generate something approximating privately optimal deterrence. Given the benefits of leakiness and the high costs of
enforcement, rare imposition of stiff penalties may be an efficient approach.376 Prosecutions invite backlash. They can also overdeter.
The executive’s relatively invisible, asymmetric regulatory model conserves political capital and curtails litigation risk, even as it skews the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
375 An analogy might be drawn to the way in which OLC opinions on questionable practices
generate effective immunity for those who follow them. See Developments in the Law — Presidential Authority, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2057, 2092 (2012) (“[OLC] opinions are not only followed by
the entire executive branch, but arguably also confer nearly complete civil and criminal immunity
for officials that act in accordance with OLC’s view of the law.”). A reasonable expectation attaches that those high-level sources who stay within the bounds of acceptable disclosure, as signaled by the White House and agency heads, will escape formal punishment.
376 Cf. Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
183–84 (1968) (arguing that harsh penalties, rarely imposed, may be a socially optimal strategy
when enforcement is costly).
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balance of leaks, pleaks, and plants toward the latter two.377 If one
assumes some normal distribution of risk preferences among those junior officials with access to classified information, the government need
create only a modest sense of danger to discourage all but the most
risk-loving tail of the distribution. And so much of that tail may be
sufficiently reckless that invigorating criminal enforcement would have
little effect beyond a small number of individuals at the margins. By
allowing junior officials to challenge the secrecy rules through leaking,
but only at significant personal peril, the executive likely weeds out
many idiosyncratic appeals while preserving some of the most important communications.378
Taking all of these observations together, the picture that emerges
looks quite different from the conventional view of leak regulation as
a field in which top-down efforts by the White House to control the
executive branch have lost out to balkanized assertions of power by
lower-level players across the various agencies. The reality puts pressure on that very distinction. Leakers operate with a high degree of
impunity from criminal, civil, and administrative discipline. Decentralization seems to run riot. Yet through the design of the criminal
referral process and DOJ’s journalist subpoena policy, the failure to
promote legislative revisions or invest significant resources in apprehension, and the informal signaling and sanctioning mechanisms just
described, the diffuseness of the system is constructed to a significant
extent by the President and his appointees. The White House plays a
key role both in establishing the boundaries of acceptable leaking and
in enforcing them through periodic interventions — sometimes
through the very practice (anonymous disclosures to the press) the
White House means to discipline.
Put another way, in lieu of the command-and-control regulation of
national security information that the classification scheme and certain
versions of the unitary executive theory might seem to envision, the
White House gives agency leadership a kind of informational block
grant.379 What Presidents lose in control over specific disclosures, they
gain in deniability and other rewards from leakiness. Part II demonstrated that switching to a more formal, centralized model of disclosure would impose enormous costs on the executive, not only in terms
of transactional efficiency but also in terms of legal flexibility, popular
credibility, policy development, and bureaucratic harmony. There is
no need to make this switch, however, unless the misallocations and
missteps inevitable in an informal system are perceived to outweigh
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
377
378
379

On this skew, see supra section II.B.2.
Cf. supra section II.B.4 (discussing the intragovernmental communicative economy of leaks).
I thank Professor David Super for suggesting this metaphor.
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these costs. That the existing model has persisted for so long suggests
they do not. To the contrary, the analysis here lends more support to
the notion — roughly in line with Professor Robert Ellickson’s famous
hypothesis about close-knit groups380 — that members of the President’s national security team have developed informal norms of disclosure that tend to maximize their aggregate welfare.
C. Substantive Norms
Ideally, an account of the executive’s informal code of leaking
would elaborate not just the procedural and remedial conventions
sketched above, but also the content of the primary unwritten norms
that tell government actors what they may say and do. Leaking is
such a broad, varied, and clandestine phenomenon that it is impossible
to specify this content with precision. No doubt certain norms have
evolved over time. Nevertheless, from the opinions shared by insiders
and the enforcement known to have occurred, it is possible to piece together some basic elements. U.S. officials routinely vilify “leakers,” as
a class, and deny the existence of any First Amendment protections
beyond whatever might be afforded to members of the media.381 It is
therefore striking to find that the substantive norms on leaking appear
to incorporate a fairly nuanced set of ethical and constitutional distinctions. If Professor Goldsmith is right that the government’s failure to
crack down reflects “a recognition . . . that press coverage of secret executive branch action serves a vital function in American democracy,”382 these norms help to operationalize that sentiment and reconcile
it with the equally widespread recognition that certain leaks can do
great damage.
A limited amount of evidence on disclosure norms can be gleaned
from the criminal cases that have been brought against suspected media leakers383 — the expressive value of which far transcends their specific facts. The leading Espionage Act case, United States v. Morison,384
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
380 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW 167 (1991) (predicting that “members of a close-knit group [will] develop and maintain norms whose content serves to maximize
the aggregate welfare that members obtain in their workaday affairs with one another” (emphasis
omitted)). As Ellickson acknowledges, welfare assessments in most such contexts will be “impossible to quantify with precision” and must rely on “largely intuitive assessments of the utilitarian
potential” of the social norms that are employed versus alternative norms that are not. Id. at 183.
381 The government’s longstanding official position is that, to the extent conveying classified
information to unauthorized parties even “constitutes speech, that speech is wholly unprotected by
the First Amendment.” Consolidated Response of the United States to the Defendant’s Pretrial
Motions at 30, United States v. Kim, 808 F. Supp. 2d 44 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 10-225).
382 GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 222.
383 Cf. ELLICKSON, supra note 380, at 183 (“Norms are also identifiable. They are evidenced
by patterns of sanctions, patterns of primary behavior, and aspirational statements.”). Too little is
known about the details of administrative sanctions to mine them similarly for insights.
384 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
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is particularly instructive. As recounted by the appellate court, Samuel
Morison was a disaffected American naval intelligence analyst who
sought to gain full-time employment with the British circular Jane’s
Defence Weekly.385 Seemingly to impress the Jane’s editor-in-chief,
Morison purloined reconnaissance satellite photographs of a Soviet
military site, cut off the Top Secret markings on their border, and
mailed them, with an expectation of payment, to the editor-in-chief.386
The Morison court squarely rejected the alternative narrative advanced by the defendant: that he had leaked the photographs, not for
pecuniary or professional reasons, but in a patriotic bid to alert the
American public that the Soviet Union was preparing to expand its
naval reach.387 The Fourth Circuit upheld Morison’s conviction on all
counts.388
Morison not only violated several laws against leaking, like so
many before and after him, but also transgressed several ethical lines.
In the court’s telling, he (i) sold protected information, (ii) in a manner
not designed or intended to advance U.S. policy or broader First
Amendment values, (iii) to a foreign publication. Morison’s activities
were, in these respects, closer to espionage than to whistleblowing.389
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
385
386
387
388

Id. at 1060–61.
Id.
Id. at 1076–80.
Id. at 1060. Morison was convicted on two counts of violating provisions of the Espionage
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) and (e), and two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 641, see Morison, 844 F.2d
at 1060, and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment (in the form of four two-year terms to run
concurrently), see Ex-Intelligence Analyst Morison Sentenced to Two Years in Spy Case, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 1985, at 22.
389 It is something of a puzzle, then, why President Clinton pardoned Morison on his last day in
office. The U.S. Attorney who handled the case on appeal spoke for many in government when
he complained that the pardon was “inexplicable,” as Morison had acted “with the basest of motives.” Breckinridge L. Willcox, Editorial, Speaking of Pardons . . ., WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2001,
at A23; see also Vernon Loeb, Clinton Ignored CIA in Pardoning Intelligence Analyst, WASH.
POST, Feb. 17, 2001, at A6. A FOIA request I submitted to the William J. Clinton Presidential
Library sheds a bit of new light on this episode.
It appears that several letters sent to Clinton late in his presidency may have influenced his
decision. In 1998, Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan began to press the case for a pardon. Senator Moynihan asserted, without explanation, that Morison had been seeking “to bring pressure to
bear on a policy question”; repeatedly equated Morison’s conviction with “press censorship”; and
suggested that Morison’s rank — “not too high, not too low” — influenced the Reagan Administration’s decision to prosecute. Letter from Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan to President
William J. Clinton (Sept. 29, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2001/04/moynihan
.html. Senator Moynihan also emphasized the potential for leak-law enforcement to jeopardize
presidential interests: “An evenhanded prosecution of leakers,” he noted, “could imperil an entire
administration.” Id. Two years later, the famed historian Arthur Schlesinger and journalist Anthony Lewis followed with their own missives.
Schlesinger and Lewis characterized
Morison as a patriotic policy leaker and criticized the application of the Espionage Act to media
leaks as a Reagan Administration gambit to create a de facto Official Secrets Act. Letter from
Anthony Lewis to Sidney Blumenthal, Senior Adviser to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 28,
2000) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (attaching several columns Lewis had writ-
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These ethical lines remain significant. Another convicted media
leaker, Jonathan Randel, sold tangible documents to a British publication.390 (For their part, the British authorities also seem more inclined to prosecute leaks involving the sale of information.391) And
virtually every U.S. official with whom I spoke affirmed that they
would judge a leak more critically if it possessed the above-described
attributes.
The Morison episode is best known for the Fourth Circuit’s legal
analysis. Given how rarely the laws against leaking are enforced, the
most notable aspect of the case is simply that it was brought. Morison
stands not just for the legal proposition that the Espionage Act and 18
U.S.C. § 641 may be applied to media leaks, but for the broader proposition that leaks made without any apparent patriotic or policy justification are the most deserving of punishment.
Post-Morison cases elaborate on this theme. It is a staple of leak
litigation that the prosecution portrays the defendant as lacking
in public-regarding motive and personal virtue. In several cases, the
prosecution has alleged that the defendant turned to the press in retaliation for a perceived slight by his employers, such as the CIA’s
denial of Jeffrey Sterling’s racial discrimination claims;392 or that he
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ten about Morison in the 1980s); Letter from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., to President William J. Clinton (Dec. 7, 2000) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library). Schlesinger further noted that
Morison’s grandfather was his “teacher and friend, the great historian Samuel Eliot Morison.”
Letter from Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., supra. None of these letters mentioned the Constitution,
though their arguments were pregnant with First Amendment implications. The journalist Bob
Scheer evidently wrote President Clinton to similar effect. On the internal cover letter for the
Lewis and Scheer letters, Clinton scrawled a handwritten note to his advisers: “looks like something we probably should do.”
What ultimately drove President Clinton’s decision to pardon Morison (among many others)
remains largely unknowable, as do the thought processes of Senator Moynihan, Schlesinger,
Lewis, and Scheer. On their face, these documents suggest that President Clinton may have been
moved by a sincere concern for press freedom — or perhaps a concern to be seen by history as
concerned for press freedom — as well as by a pragmatic interest in maintaining the viability of
pleaks and plants. One wonders whether President Clinton would have made the same decision
had he read the Fourth Circuit’s discussion of the facts, if indeed he did not do so. Inasmuch as
the Morison pardon holds any generalizable lessons on leaks, it might be taken as evidence that
behind all the tough rhetoric, at least some Presidents consciously appreciate their democratic,
political, or policy value.
390 See Hargrove-Simon, supra note 43.
391 See LEAKS IN WHITEHALL, supra note 281, at 17 (stating that the police’s decision not to
investigate a recent leak on the expenses of Members of Parliament “might seem surprising” if the
information had been sold for personal gain); UK Anthrax Officer Jailed for a Year, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 23, 1998, 2:57 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/199796.stm (describing the conviction of a British naval officer for disclosing information about an alleged anthrax plot to The Sun
in exchange for £10,000).
392 See Indictment at 7–8, United States v. Sterling, 818 F. Supp. 2d 945 (E.D. Va. 2011) (No.
1:10CR485 (LMB)) (asserting that Sterling leaked classified information “[i]n retaliation for
the CIA’s refusal to settle on terms favorable to [him],” id. at 7, as well as other decisions made by
the CIA).

2013]

THE LEAKY LEVIATHAN

599

employed spy-like tactics to communicate with journalists, such as
Stephen Kim’s use of an online pseudonym or Thomas Drake’s use of
encrypted email accounts and his efforts to gather information from
unwitting NSA colleagues.393 Most defendants have been accused of
leaking tangible items. Tangibility not only eases the government’s evidentiary and Espionage Act burdens, but also limits its ability to
downplay or deny a security breach. All of the recently prosecuted individuals have been low- to mid-level civil servants or contractors, except for Chelsea Manning, who was a soldier, and Drake, who was
more senior in rank though not a bureau chief or presidential appointee.394 Critically, all engaged reporters in some proactive fashion,
without any implicit or explicit backing from agency leadership. These
individuals were not legitimate participants in the game of leaks, as
conceived by the upper echelons of the executive branch. Defense
counsel in these cases, meanwhile, almost invariably seek to portray
their clients as whistleblowers, notwithstanding the failure to follow whistleblowing protocols. Both sides recognize the value of
pitching their arguments in an ethical register against the backdrop of
an overbroad law.
Because there are so few leak prosecutions, those that are brought
can send powerful signals throughout government about the parameters of permissible leaking. The sample size is too small, and the
recent cases (several of which are ongoing) too fresh, to distill neat
lessons. But the general pattern suggests that the most vulnerable
officials are those lone wolves who speak with reporters outside the
context of any active interagency process — true leakers, not pleakers
or planters, in this Article’s typology — and whose claim to a
whistleblowing purpose is complicated by evidence of dubious tactics
or dishonorable aims. The case of Chelsea Manning has highlighted
and reinforced an additional normative line, in Manning’s almost total
failure to discriminate among the hundreds of thousands of documents
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
393 See Shane, supra note 210 (describing the case against Kim); Indictment at 5–7, United
States v. Drake, 818 F. Supp. 2d 909 (D. Md. 2011) (No. 10-cr-00181-RDB), 2010 WL 1513342
(describing Drake’s alleged conduct).
394 News reports suggest that a retired four-star general and former Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, James Cartwright, may soon be indicted for leaking information about a cyber
operation against Iran, following an investigation carried out by the U.S. Attorney for Maryland.
See supra note 114. If Cartwright is indicted under the Espionage Act, he would be far and away
the most senior official to meet this fate. The closest analogue is the case of Scooter Libby, in
which pressure from Congress similarly led to the initiation of an investigation outside of Main
Justice and, ultimately, to criminal charges against someone close to the President. See supra note
116 (explaining that Libby was convicted of perjury, obstruction of justice, and false statements in
connection with this investigation); infra note 457 and accompanying text (describing congressional reactions to the alleged Iran leak).
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she passed to WikiLeaks.395 A strategic administration can tolerate
some significant amount of discrete revelations about perceived
errors or abuses. It cannot tolerate the proliferation of internal dissenters who seek to impeach the entire secrecy and national security
system.
In the leak context as in others, the jury serves as an important
mechanism for bringing these sorts of moral and practical sentiments
into the prosecutorial calculus. One former DOJ official who worked
on leak cases opined that FBI and NSD lawyers “by and large use
good judgment” in assessing whether a leak “was wrong” before deciding whether to move forward.396 Informing these assessments, the
former official further suggested, are the lawyers’ expectations of how
ordinary citizens would think about criminal desert: cases may be
shelved if they lack “jury appeal.”397 The referral process ensures that
prosecutors never encounter most potentially unlawful leaks. Within
the set they do encounter, the prospect of skeptical jurors raises the
cost of pursuing disclosures that appear to be consistent with ubiquitous practices or otherwise justified. It is notable in this regard that
the government never indicted Thomas Tamm, the DOJ employee who
revealed the NSA’s highly classified warrantless-wiretapping program
to the New York Times, even though his identity emerged fairly quickly.398 Tamm’s civil disobedience was vindicated in the court of public
opinion. The failure to bring charges against him sent a message that
disclosures of government conduct widely believed to be illegal will
prove immune from criminal punishment, even if they may not escape
its administrative counterpart.
A focus on relatively unsympathetic, bureaucratically isolated defendants makes sense as a matter of prosecutorial strategy. It economizes on resources and political capital, enhances odds of securing
convictions and averting unfavorable judicial rulings, and refines the
law’s deterrent effect. It also complicates the charge of selective prosecution. That DOJ has chosen to indict only a small subset of leakers
is not necessarily a mark of politicization or double standards, so much
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
395 See Benkler, supra note 325, at 321–30 (summarizing the contents of the materials allegedly
leaked by Manning in 2010); see also supra note 110 and accompanying text (discussing general
leaks).
396 Telephone Interview with former DOJ official, supra note 213.
397 Id.; see also Reno Testimony, supra note 46, at 10 (stating that in some cases, DOJ has identified the leaker but “decided not to prosecute because we concluded that . . . a jury would likely
refuse to convict notwithstanding the evidence”); cf. J.C. Smith & D.J. Birch, Case and Comment,
R. v. Ponting, 1985 CRIM. L. REV. 318 (describing a case of apparent jury nullification in England, involving a civil servant who had leaked documents calling into question the official story
of the Falklands War).
398 See Charlie Savage, No Prosecution Seen for Official in N.S.A. Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2011, at A17.
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as fidelity to the disclosure norms executive officials abide by — norms
that themselves sharply (and problematically) distinguish among different types of speakers and speech acts.
Interviews and apparent leaking patterns suggest several more specific norms governing media disclosure. These norms correlate with
but by no means mirror the formal classification hierarchy. The revelation of “intelligence sources and methods,”399 numerous interviewees
indicated, is generally considered an egregious offense, a line that even
habitual pleakers will not cross. Human sources are considered especially off-limits; revealing the identity of an undercover U.S. agent is
the paradigmatic example of an improper disclosure. Such episodes
have occurred in recent decades, but seemingly rarely. Only two individuals have ever been charged under the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982400 (IIPA). While some of the same forces that depress the overall enforcement rate may help to explain this miniscule
figure, I expect that the primary driver is the degree to which government officials have internalized the underlying norm. The IIPA is
largely superfluous for them. The potency of this norm could be seen
in the widespread outrage — and Special Prosecutor appointment —
that followed the outing of Valerie Plame as a CIA operative.401 Importantly, in this disapprobation of revealing intelligence sources and
methods, national security interests and First Amendment principles
may converge.402 Public awareness of the name of a CIA agent typically creates an immediate risk to that individual, without contributing
anything meaningful to the project of self-government.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
399 Cf. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 167 (1985) (describing sources and methods as “the heart of
all intelligence operations”); Vicki Divoll, The “Full Access Doctrine”: Congress’s Constitutional
Entitlement to National Security Information from the Executive, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
493, 522 n.104 (2011) (noting that the term “sources and methods,” though lacking in clear definition, “has become somewhat of a talisman in intelligence circles” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
400 50 U.S.C. §§ 421–426 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Both individuals served in the CIA. See Indictment at 8–10, United States v. Kiriakou, 1:12cr127 (LMB) (E.D. Va. Apr. 5, 2012); Andrew M.
Szilagyi, Note, Blowing Its Cover: How the Intelligence Identities Protection Act Has Masqueraded as an Effective Law and Why It Must Be Amended, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2269, 2282
(2010); see also Scott Shane, From Spy to Source to Convict, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2013, at A1
(quoting John Kiriakou, recently convicted under the IIPA for leading a reporter to a covert CIA
interrogator, as stating, “I should never have provided the name,” and quoting a former senior
CIA lawyer as stating that while Kiriakou is not “evil,” “it’s not a trivial thing to reveal a name”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
401 See sources cited supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
402 Professor Geoffrey Stone has insightfully observed that all of the traditional examples of
information the publication of which may be criminally punished, including the sailing dates of
military transports and the identities of CIA operatives, share the feature of threatening significant harm while adding little to public debate. See STONE, supra note 17, at 24–25. My research
suggests that internal executive branch norms incorporate this perspective. These exceptionally
high-risk, low-return disclosures are least respected and least tolerated.
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Beyond intelligence sources and methods, some interviewees suggested that disclosures of “operational details” are likewise seen as beyond the pale.403 The key word in this phrase is not “operational,” as
one might expect, but “details.” Leaks about the general contours of a
military initiative or diplomatic negotiation do not necessarily arouse
special outrage. In this case, too, it is the especially particularized nature of the leak that minimizes the possibility of justification and motivates the prohibitive norm.404 Also verboten, it seems, are explicit
threats to leak information if one does not get one’s way.405 Such behavior not only flaunts the speaker’s disrespect for background norms
of legality and collegiality, but makes identification of the source too
easy: enforcers cannot so easily ignore a complaint that tells them exactly who did it. An additional norm, applicable beyond the national
security realm, appears to forbid direct criticism of the President. For
all the difficulties that anonymous U.S. government sources may cause
for the White House, it is exceedingly rare to find a news story in
which one has impugned the President in any overt manner. The
Commander in Chief might be challenged in some of his policy goals,
but he is not mocked.
Although it may seem counterintuitive, there is nothing inherently
odd about the observation that those who flout the rules on disclosing
classified information would nonetheless abide by certain other
norms on leaking. Recent work in social psychology demonstrates
that all but the most sociopathic rule violators want to believe they are
acting ethically, and so maintain certain boundaries they will not
cross even as they blow past the generally applicable proscriptions.406
It seems likely that psychological mechanisms such as the urge to
avoid cognitive dissonance407 help explain how even hardened national
security types can rationalize violating the laws against leaking, as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
403
404

E.g., Telephone Interview with former Defense Department official, supra note 197.
Cf. Pozen, supra note 336, at 275–323 (arguing that there are diminishing marginal returns,
for values such as public debate and democratic accountability, to increasingly specific disclosures
about government policies).
405 See HALPERIN ET AL., supra note 81, at 202 (noting that while bureaucrats may strategically raise the concern that information “will leak,” they do not threaten, “I will leak it” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
406 This is a central theme of DAN ARIELY, THE (HONEST) TRUTH ABOUT DISHONESTY
(2012). Daniel Ellsberg has recently contended that bureaucratic “habits” in the U.S. government
“allow a good deal of leeway and discretion in disregarding formal rules of the classification system,” Ellsberg, supra note 352, at 774, but demand fidelity to “the ‘real’ rules,” which forbid “revelations to potential adversaries or rivals of the policies or agency or bosses one serves,” id.
at 775.
407 See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957) (positing that
the existence of cognitive dissonance — the psychological discomfort that results from holding
conflicting knowledge, opinions, or beliefs — “will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance”).
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most naturally construed. There may be other “strategies of reconciliation” at work here, too.408 For instance, those officials who discuss
classified items with select journalists may tend to hold some sort
of inchoate Dworkinian or natural law–based understanding about the
relationship between legality and justice, whereby their belief in
law’s ultimate reasonableness leads them to resist the very notion of a
“law” that could prohibit what they see as valuable, accountabilityand security-promoting activities. Or perhaps certain officials come to
believe that the classified materials their agency generates are their
property, in some legally significant sense, and that this property relationship gives them a right of disposition that trumps otherwise applicable disclosure restrictions. This hypothesis is speculative but not farfetched. We know from research in behavioral economics that people
pervasively use various sorts of mental accounting to place information into coherent normative frames and to rationalize their conduct,409 and “property talk” about classified information is ubiquitous
in U.S. government circles.410
Let us close with one more speculative, but particularly important,
hypothesis. If the analysis above is sound, then paradoxically it
may be the case that more vigorous enforcement of the laws against
leaking would lead to a greater amount of unlawful disclosures, or at
least to a greater amount of destructive disclosures. It is well
established in the social-psychological literature that enhanced external
prohibitions may correspond with reduced internalization of the
underlying norm411: a classic finding shows that harsh, punitive parenting is associated with decreased inhibitory control and increased
antisocial behavior in adolescence and young adulthood.412 One
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
408 Frederick Schauer, Official Obedience and the Politics of Defining “Law,” 86 S. CAL. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 22–27), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2220923
(cataloguing “strategies of reconciliation” that officials may use to avoid acknowledgment of
lawbreaking).
409 See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 342–46 (2011) (reviewing some of the literature).
410 See MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 10 (3d rev. ed. 2010) (noting the “belief of
many in the government that each branch owns the information it develops” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Based on experience, I would refine the observation just quoted to reflect that
many in government believe each agency or component of the executive branch owns the information it develops.
411 See, e.g., Joan E. Grusec & Jacqueline J. Goodnow, Impact of Parental Discipline Methods
on the Child’s Internalization of Values: A Reconceptualization of Current Points of View, 30 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 4, 10–11 (1994); Mark R. Lepper, Social-Control Processes and the
Internalization of Social Values: An Attributional Perspective, in SOCIAL COGNITION AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 294, 314–16 (E. Tory Higgins et al. eds., 1983).
412 See Diana Baumrind, Effects of Authoritative Parental Control on Child Behavior, 37
CHILD DEV. 887, 897–98 (1966); R. Loeber & T. Dishion, Early Predictors of Male Delinquency:
A Review, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL. 68, 87 (1983); Kristin L. Moilanen et al., Predictors of Longitudi-
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possible causal mechanism for the efficacy of a softer touch is what is
known as “insufficient deterrence.” When parents punish rule violations only lightly, it arouses cognitive dissonance in children who comply without strong external justification for doing so; to dissolve this
dissonance, the children come to internalize the rule.413 There
is no clear reason to expect this dynamic would be confined to juveniles or to rules that lack the force of law. It is an old concern of tax
policy, for instance, that aggressive enforcement may backfire in revenue terms, by attenuating the sociocultural link between taxpaying and
civic virtue and decreasing citizens’ intrinsic motivation to comply
with the laws.414
Low levels of official discipline help preserve the primacy of the
unofficial code on acceptable leaking. Unpatriotic disclosures, disclosures made for money, disclosures with a high ratio of expected national security harm to democratic benefit — all are kept in check by a
broadly held set of norms condemning such conduct. To be sure, these
norms can be vague as guides to decision and are highly imperfect as
social controls. In certain cases, they may be distorted or disregarded.
Yet given the difficulty of detecting and punishing leakers, any system
that relied solely on external enforcement to suppress unwanted disclosures would be either exceedingly ruthless or exceedingly ineffective.
An escalation in formal enforcement risks alienating those many officials who take the informal prohibitions on leaking seriously, corroding
their feeling of stewardship over the secrecy system and unraveling associated cultural and psychological constraints (even if it is impossible
to estimate the causes and effects of such alienation with any precision). Permissive neglect maintains loyalty to the social norms against
improper disclosures even as it destroys loyalty to the legal norms
against unauthorized disclosures.
The policy implications of this tradeoff are potentially profound.
And perverse. By making government employees feel like they are not
trusted to look after the nation’s important secrets, a stern, suspicious
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
nal Growth in Inhibitory Control in Early Childhood, 19 SOC. DEV. 326, 343 (2010); Gerald R.
Patterson, Performance Models for Antisocial Boys, 41 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 432, 441–42 (1986).
413 See, e.g., Elliot Aronson & J. Merrill Carlsmith, Effect of the Severity of Threat on the Devaluation of Forbidden Behavior, 66 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 584 (1963) (finding that a
mild threat influenced children’s perceptions of the desirability of a toy more than a severe threat
or no threat); Jonathan L. Freedman, Long-Term Behavioral Effects of Cognitive Dissonance, 1 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 145 (1965) (finding that children who encountered a mild
threat when playing with a toy were less likely to play with the toy at a later date than children
who faced a severe threat or no threat).
414 See Lawrence Zelenak, The Great American Tax Novel, 110 MICH. L. REV. 969, 973 (2012)
(book review). See generally Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1482–1527 (2005)
(reviewing theory and evidence on the idea that law undermines various forms of trust).
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administration may foster the very sort of leaking behavior it most
fears.
IV. SOME NOTES ON LEAKINESS AND EXECUTIVE POWER
To offer a new theory of how the legal regime on leaking works is
to invite questions about how it should work. For reasons already
suggested, I am skeptical of global assessments and optimizing proposals in this area. The secrecy that surrounds disclosure and classification practices necessarily limits our understanding of leaks’ incidence, impacts, causes, and relationships to other forms of transparentransparency.415 Leaking implicates so many governmental interests
and social goods that prescription necessarily entails significant value
choices. And regardless of one’s empirical assumptions or normative
priors, a thicket of practical and political obstacles stands in the reformer’s path. President Reagan learned this lesson the hard way.416
While it is undoubtedly true, as Professors Louis Henkin and Cass
Sunstein insist in well-known works,417 that the United States’ mixture
of broad official secrecy with broad leaking fails to ensure that improperly concealed information will be revealed or that properly concealed information will remain under wraps, the observation is unhelpful. No system this large could ever ensure against failure. The
pertinent question is how our system compares to viable alternatives in
facilitating ends suchas national security, government accountability,
and informed public debate. That question cannot be answered satisfactorily in the abstract.418
These caveats notwithstanding, the positive theory advanced in this
Article clearly carries a range of potential implications, not just for
how we conceptualize and study leaks but also for how we understand
the executive branch and judge its policies. Parts II and III interspersed a number of evaluative and predictive observations — for instance, the point made just above about social-psychological factors
that may lead a crackdown on leakers to generate perverse conse–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
415
416

See supra section I.D, pp. 542–44.
See supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text (discussing President Reagan’s failed attempt to minimize leaking).
417 Louis Henkin, Commentary, The Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the
Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 271, 278 (1971); Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of
Information, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 889, 901–04 (1986).
418 In turning away from ideal theory and optimific prescription on the balance to be struck
between government openness and other public values, I join company with Professors Jack
Goldsmith, Seth Kreimer, and Geoffrey Stone. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 210–11, 218,
228; STONE, supra note 17, at 2–3; Kreimer, supra note 88, at 1074–79. Professor Rahul Sagar
similarly stresses the intractability of the “puzzles” posed by secrecy regulation in a valuable new
book. SAGAR, supra note 181, at 14.
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quences.419 This Part considers some additional implications of broader scope. The issues addressed are large, and my arguments are offered in a preliminary, provisional spirit. Far from seeking the last
word on the subjects covered, I seek principally to suggest productive
new lines of inquiry.
A. Revisiting the Source/Distributor Divide
The question whether journalists and publishers deserve greater
First Amendment protection from criminal penalties than do their
government sources has been a central concern of the literature on
leaks. In theory, scholars have defended the source/distributor divide
as facilitative of the special social role of the press, the special professional responsibilities of executive employees, and the need for a judicially administrable rule.420 In practice, the government has established the media’s privileged legal position largely through inaction.421
The source/distributor divide is under threat, however. Scholars, pundits, and politicians continue to contest the media’s criminal immunity,422 and the courts have never squarely ratified it. Although a rigorous exploration of this issue is well beyond the scope of this Article
(which has endeavored to move the legal conversation away from the
standard set of doctrinal questions), the analysis above prompts two
brief remarks regarding the divide’s continuing vitality.
First, the divide makes good sense for a government concerned
with preventing certain especially harmful leaks while preserving a
larger pool of strategically valuable disclosures. The obvious point is
that focusing enforcement on employees, rather than journalists and
publishers, reduces short-term backlash. Although members of the
media may feel threatened by cases brought against their sources and
by the subpoenas these cases can entail, the government avoids picking
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
419
420

See supra notes 411–14 and accompanying text.
For a representative statement of this position, see STONE, supra note 17, at 7–13, 21–
22. See also supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (describing the source/distributor divide);
Heidi Kitrosser, Free Speech Aboard the Leaky Ship of State: Calibrating First Amendment Protections for Leakers of Classified Information, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 409, 410 (2013)
(challenging “the common view . . . that publishers must be strongly protected under the First
Amendment, while leakers can be punished with little or no constitutional difficulty”).
421 See supra note 117 and accompanying text (explaining that over the past half century no
member of the media has been prosecuted for leak-related activity). Whether the government’s
longstanding failure to use its criminal authorities against the media gives rise to a kind of negative constitutional custom, with independent normative significance, is an interesting theoretical
question that has received little attention.
422 For a prominent recent example, see SCHOENFELD, supra note 159, at 265–68. See also Walter Pincus, Prosecution of Journalists Is Possible in NSA Leaks, WASH. POST, May 22, 2006, at A4
(discussing Attorney General Alberto Gonzales’s televised statement that New York Times reporters
could be prosecuted for publishing classified information regarding the NSA’s warrantlesswiretapping program).
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a direct fight with those who buy ink by the barrel. The deeper point
is that, over the long term, protecting the media helps protect the system of pleaking and planting upon which, this Article has shown, executive branch principals have come to rely. Journalists, recall, often
cannot be certain about the extent to which a source is authorized to
speak with them. They find this issue difficult because the government makes it difficult, by declining to clarify the law governing ad
hoc declassification, by condoning vast amounts of pleaking, and by
attempting to camouflage certain plants as leaks.423 Only very rarely
do journalists receive a major scoop from a low-level employee
through no effort of their own;424 far more frequently, they acquire
confidential information through their ongoing relationships with highlevel contacts. The legal and bureaucratic fog that enshrouds these
exchanges, we saw in Part II, preserves the President’s plausible deniability and communicative flexibility as well as her enforcement discretion. It is not a design defect but a critical feature of the executive’s
information control regime.
Media prosecutions could jeopardize this constructive ambiguity.
Even under the broadest provisions of the Espionage Act, the retention and dissemination of national defense information from authorized sources does not generally give rise to liability.425 If faced with a
realistic threat of prosecution, journalists and publishers who cover national security topics would need to spend substantially more time and
effort investigating their sources’ legal credentials. The government,
in turn, would need to clarify lines of disclosure authority and render
more transparent — to the press, the public, and itself — the pedigree
of specific revelations and the processes by which it publicizes secret
information.
Cases brought against sources can be confined to bureaucratically
isolated, low- and mid-level officials who have clearly violated the
classification rules and have no colorable defense of apparent authority.426 Cases brought against distributors would invite a more searching inquiry into the government’s disclosure practices, highlighting the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
423
424

See supra sections II.B.1–2, pp. 559–73.
Top national security reporters confirm this hardly ever occurs. E.g., Telephone Interview
with Charlie Savage, supra note 287; Telephone Interview with Scott Shane, supra note 287. To
the extent it does occur, the recipient’s track record of covering a certain subject may lead the
source to seek him or her out. Telephone Interview with Barton Gellman, supra note 187.
425 See 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (2012) (conditioning liability on “unauthorized” possession, access, or
control). While 18 U.S.C. § 793(d) lacks the “unauthorized” qualifier, the requirement that the
national defense information have been passed to or retained by a “person not entitled to receive
it,” id. § 793(d), (e), similarly invites defenses based on the source’s actual or apparent authority to
share the information under the terms of the executive order on classification, established bureaucratic conventions, or theories of presidential discretion.
426 See supra notes 384–95 and accompanying text (summarizing cases that have been brought
to date).
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plasticity of the rules themselves. They would be a far cruder instrument of deterrence, with costs and benefits much closer to one another.
Whether or not it is constitutionally rooted, the source/distributor divide has proven so resilient in part because it allows the government
to target certain especially worrisome incidents (through noncriminal
as well as criminal sanctions) without compromising the mine-run of
individually tolerable, and collectively useful, classified information
disclosures.
The government’s relatively aggressive responses to Daniel Ellsberg’s
and Chelsea Manning’s general, tangible leaks427 — a qualitatively
more threatening mode of disclosure associated with disaffected junior
officials — suggest that when maximizing deterrence is seen as an unalloyed good, distributors become much more vulnerable. WikiLeaks
may deserve to be treated as “the press” for various First Amendment
purposes. But it does not function anything like a traditional U.S. media actor in the way it bypasses oral exchanges with high-ranking
power players in favor of document drops by marginal dissenters.428
Any number of new media outlets with less sensational methods may
be similarly beginning to attract lower-level leakers of factual content,
without developing repeat relationships with senior policymakers. Inasmuch as their aim or effect with regard to U.S. government information is to publicize only those confidential items that cast top officials in a harsh light, WikiLeaks and other such outlets put enormous
pressure on the source/distributor divide.
Second, these same insights strengthen the First Amendment case
for press immunity. In numerous areas of law, the Supreme Court has
read the First Amendment to permit direct restrictions on public employees’ speech or private actors’ expressive conduct, while prohibiting
restrictions on the subsequent dissemination of information relating to
that speech or conduct.429 Most recently, in United States v. Stevens,430
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
427 See Benkler, supra note 325, at 330–47 (discussing efforts by government officials and private actors to disrupt the work of WikiLeaks); supra notes 51, 110 and accompanying text (discussing general leaks and the government’s efforts to obtain a prior restraint against publication
of the Pentagon Papers).
428 WikiLeaks’s most famous source, Chelsea Manning, revealed at trial that she had reached
out to the New York Times and Washington Post, unsuccessfully, before turning to Julian Assange.
See Bill Keller, Private Manning’s Confidant, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2013, at A21. The Times’s
former executive editor finds it “puzzling . . . that a skilled techie capable of managing one of the
most monumental leaks ever couldn’t figure out how to get an e-mail or phone message to an editor or a reporter at The Times.” Id. Yet while getting a message to someone at the Times may
have been easy, navigating the bureaucratic maze of a large press organization, earning the trust
of a Times reporter, and maintaining control over the story that emerged would have been far
more difficult for a low-level operator like Manning. WikiLeaks was a more accessible intermediary on multiple dimensions that transcend technology.
429 See STONE, supra note 17, at 26 n.8.
430 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
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the Court struck down a federal statute criminalizing the creation,
sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal cruelty, including
acts of unlawful cruelty. The Court has clarified, however, that even
in the absence of criminal solicitation, inducement, or conspiracy, certain speech acts may be proscribed when they are intimately and “intrinsically related” to the underlying crime, as by (i) incentivizing its
commission or (ii) magnifying its harms.431
As a matter of common sense, the media’s publication of classified
items might seem related to their sources’ leaking of such items in
precisely these two ways. Again, though, only a subset of these
disclosures is potentially criminal — the legally unauthorized subset.
And as just discussed, the media cannot reliably ascertain which
disclosures fall on the unauthorized side of the line; the executive has
devised a system that keeps this line vague and discourages reporters
from looking into questions of authorization too closely. The resulting
ambiguity attenuates the relationship between the crime of leaking
national defense information and the practice of researching and writing news stories thereon. In so doing, it renders the Espionage
Act overbroad with respect to national security journalism under the
logic of cases like Stevens.432 A law that criminalized only the publication of exceptionally sensitive information received from demonstrably
or manifestly unauthorized sources, and that defined these terms,
would have a better chance of meeting the “intrinsically related”
standard. Because such a law would be contrary to the interests of
those who run the government,433 it would also presumably never be
enacted.
B. Silver Linings and Media Narratives
Some readers may wish to learn more about the national security
damage caused by classified information leaks. Does the theory of
“leakiness” developed in this Article pay sufficient heed to all of the
tactical advantages and public dollars that have allegedly been squan-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
431 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249–50 (2002) (child pornography);
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759–62 (1982) (same).
432 See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1586, 1592 (explaining why Ferber’s “intrinsically related” rationale, id. at 1586 (internal quotation marks omitted), does not save the statute at issue, id. at
1592); Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 250 (demanding more than a “contingent” causal link between the proscribed category of speech and the first-order criminality it purportedly fosters).
Whether this attenuation similarly renders the Espionage Act overbroad with respect to the activities of an outfit like WikiLeaks is a trickier question. WikiLeaks’s model, the government might
argue, has a much tighter connection to unlawful, unauthorized disclosures. These, and not
pleaks or plants, are the very divulgences WikiLeaks most seems to crave.
433 See supra notes 290–92 and accompanying text.
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dered?434 I do not doubt that some unauthorized disclosures have
caused significant harm, worthy of sanction and condemnation. I worry about this issue as a citizen. However, several considerations complicate the standard picture of leaks as exclusively a menace to national security interests, even if we bracket all the diffuse benefits that
leaking provides in the aggregate for the executive435 and focus only
on the short-term production of security.
The first, and in my view least significant, consideration has
been suggested in the literature: in cases where a secret is already
known or assumed by adversaries, media leaks can puncture a false
sense of comfort. Professors Harold Edgar and Benno Schmidt opined
forty years ago that “[t]he greatest damage occurs when the government believes that ‘secrets are secret’ . . . when in fact they are not. In
that situation, the government is easy prey to tactics that take advantage of its predispositions and biases.”436 The very same legibility
of leaks that makes them so worrisome to secret keepers — the way
they sit there for all to see in the morning newspaper — is also what
enables corrective action and creates the possibility for securitypromoting substitution away from policies that have already been
compromised. Espionage, by contrast, has no such built-in damage
control mechanism; it may go on indefinitely without the government
having a clue.437
Edgar and Schmidt’s insight is powerful conceptually. It is impossible to make any strong claims about its practical significance, however, because it is impossible to estimate with any confidence the relative frequency of leaks that have uncovered false (non)secrets versus
leaks that have uncovered true secrets. It might be the case that national security–related media leaks are more likely to occur after adversaries have already stolen, gleaned, or guessed the putatively secret
information — for instance, because adversaries tend to focus their acquisitive efforts on the policy planning stage whereas leakers tend to
turn to the press during the policy execution stage. But one could not
even begin to test that hypothesis.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
434 See supra section I.D, pp. 542–44 (discussing governmental claims about the harms caused
by leaks).
435 These benefits were explored in detail in section II.B, supra, pp. 559–86.
436 Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 309, at 401; accord Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction — Is
Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 656 (1975); Edward L. Xanders, Note, A Handyman’s Guide to Fixing National Security
Leaks: An Analytical Framework for Evaluating Proposals to Curb Unauthorized Publication of
Classified Information, 5 J.L. & POL. 759, 780 (1989).
437 As a Defense Department committee poignantly noted in 1956, “[t]he unknown [unauthorized disclosures] are probably the most vicious in that they are likely to include those involving
real espionage. We can only hope that there are not many of them.” COOLIDGE REPORT, supra
note 154, at 6.
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A second, and more global, consideration is epistemic in nature. As
Mark Fenster has illustrated, in a great number of situations the government does not know very much about what the costs or benefits of
revealing classified information will be.438 By the terms of the relevant executive order, every classified item must threaten “damage to
the national security” if disclosed.439 Those threat assessments are often speculative at best. (What it even means to threaten “national security” is itself hardly pellucid.440) Given the limitless range of variables that may bear on how information is processed, mediated, and
used by private and public actors, the effects of disclosure are apt to
be highly contingent and contextual, and to defy reliable modeling.441
This predictive problem has always dogged the classification system.
Reviewing the categories of Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret, a Defense Department committee observed in 1956 that “[t]wo reasonable
men of similar background and possessing equal knowledge could well
disagree on the application of these criteria to a particular piece of information.”442 The problem has only grown more acute in the years
since. “As information implicating national security has become more
heterogeneous and more abundant,” and as the pace of technological
and social change has quickened, “we increasingly do not know what
information matters, or who has it, or how to control it.”443 Together
with bureaucratic incentives, government culture, and collective action
problems, this pervasive uncertainty helps explain the persistence of
overclassification.444
Against this backdrop, leaks can be usefully information eliciting.
I explored above how leaks (including pleaks and plants) can be an
efficiency-enhancing vehicle through which government insiders learn
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
438 See generally Fenster, supra note 165. Fenster supports this theoretical claim with a detailed analysis of WikiLeaks’s effects, which he concludes have thus far been “uneven and unpredictable” overall and “relatively insubstantial” in the United States as compared to other countries. Id. at 758.
439 Exec. Order No. 13,526, § 1.2(a), 3 C.F.R. 298, 299 (2010), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 app.
at 233–45 (Supp. V 2011); see also id. § 1.2(a), 3 C.F.R. at 298–99.
440 See Steven Aftergood, An Inquiry into the Dynamics of Government Secrecy, 48 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 513 (2013) (stating that the definitions used in the executive order “grant
all but unlimited discretion to classification officials”); see also JEREMY WALDRON, TORTURE,
TERROR, AND TRADE-OFFS 112 (2010) (contending that “there has been little or no attempt in
the literature of legal and political theory to bring any sort of clarity to the concept” of national
security).
441 Cf. Frederick Schauer, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1339, 1356 (discussing “the undeniably contextual and contingent nature of the value of transparency”).
442 COOLIDGE REPORT, supra note 154, at 3; accord COMM’N ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOV’T SECRECY, REPORT, S. DOC. NO. 105-2, at 25 (1997) [hereinafter MOYNIHAN
COMMISSION REPORT].
443 Pozen, supra note 106, at 651.
444 Cf. supra notes 326–29 and accompanying text (discussing overclassification).
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from and about each other.445 In some cases, the executive can also
benefit from what it learns about adversaries and allies through their
reactions to media disclosures. Even if, in their ideal world, certain
disclosures never would have been made, U.S. policymakers can still
exploit leaks as an observational window to gauge how outside actors
process new information and respond to perceived U.S. plans and vulnerabilities — at least in situations where those actors’ responses are
themselves discernible. This is the familiar logic that motivates the
use of plants and pleaks as “trial balloons,”446 translated to the realm
of national security rather than ordinary politics and to unintended
eruptions rather than controlled experiments. Policymakers can gain
additional valuable information through the enhanced criticism and
input from domestic actors that leaks enable. They can break through
some of the insularity and groupthink that, in the view of many, characterize the national security state.447 As one White House official reflected, “[t]here’s always a silver lining to intelligence being released
into the world before it was meant to be.”448
There is also a more direct way in which leaks may serve security
objectives: through what security strategists call “deterrence by denial.”449 Originally theorized during the Cold War, deterrence by denial
aims to prevent adversarial action by increasing not the expected cost
of punishment but the expected odds of failure. Instead of scaring off
enemies through threats of ex post retaliation or preempting their plots
through ex ante detection, deterrence by denial seeks to convince relevant populations that such plots are unlikely to yield significant benefits, and thus that they are not worth hatching in the first place.450 On
this approach, the U.S. government should want prospective terrorists
to believe it has terrific capabilities of surveillance, infiltration, incapacitation, and so forth, regardless of the true state of those capabili–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
445 See supra section II.B.4, pp. 577–79. Like the previous efficiency argument, see supra note
318 and accompanying text, the one made here is a second-best claim.
446 See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing this phenomenon).
447 See generally Brandon Kennedy, Note, The Hijacking of Foreign Policy Decision Making:
Groupthink and Presidential Power in the Post-9/11 World, 21 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 633
(2012) (reviewing arguments to this effect); see also PAUL ’T HART, GROUPTHINK IN GOVERNMENT ch. 14 (1990) (analyzing the executive’s management of the Iran-Contra affair through the
lens of groupthink theory).
448 Telephone Interview with White House official, supra note 258.
449 The foundational works are GLENN H. SNYDER, DETERRENCE BY DENIAL AND PUNISHMENT (1959), and GLENN H. SNYDER, DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE (1961).
450 See David P. Auerswald, Deterring Nonstate WMD Attacks, 121 POL. SCI. Q. 543, 547
(2006) (“[W]hereas defense is the use of brute force to repel or defeat an attack, deterrence by denial uses the threat of defeat to prevent the attack before it occurs.”). See generally Samuel J.
Rascoff, Deterring Terror, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2014) (manuscript at 18–21) (on
file with the Harvard Law School Library) (summarizing deterrence-by-denial theory and noting
its resurgence in the strategic studies literature).
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ties. Indeed, the larger the gap between our actual expenditures on defensive measures and our adversaries’ perceptions of their potency, the
more efficient our system of deterrence.
Inasmuch as leaks are systematically skewed toward publicizing
the aggressive, effective, or legally dubious aspects of our national security efforts — as seems impressionistically to be the case — they
may be well suited to delivering this sort of deterrence. Media leaks
can allow U.S. officials to send dissuasive signals, purposefully or inadvertently, to a distributed network of known and unknown enemy
cells, without incurring an obligation to proffer details, substantiate
claims of success, or permit a full legal accounting. So long as they are
not both tangible and general in form, leaks typically provide enough
information to put adversaries on notice of a given plan or policy, but
not enough to enable a sophisticated assessment. As Professor Samuel
Rascoff notes, if terrorists did not know of the existence of certain surveillance modalities, they could hardly be deterred by them, and yet
“conveying the precise scope and methodologies of counter-terrorism
programs . . . might tend to undermine the deterrent effect being
sought.”451 Because they are not subject to the same discourse constraints as official disclosures, leaks may hit the sweet spot between
these two poles.
Whether or not leaks are ideal instruments of deterrence by denial,
they have become integral to its practice. Such deterrence is possible
only when we “publicly disseminate at least some information regarding our defensive measures.”452 However, the scope of the classification system ensures that almost all relevant facts about those measures
will technically be unsusceptible to public dissemination. Authorized
disclosures to the press enable the administration to bypass some of
these restrictions; unauthorized and quasi-authorized disclosures ensure the reporting is seen as credible. Leaks help overcome a fundamental obstacle to fulfilling the communicative dimension of national
security.
Consider two recent examples. In May 2012, the New York Times
followed the Associated Press in revealing that the United States had
successfully planted a double agent in al Qaeda’s Yemeni cell and
thereby thwarted an airplane bombing.453 Less than a month later, the
Times revealed that the United States had helped plan and execute the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
451
452

Rascoff, supra note 450 (manuscript at 50).
Auerswald, supra note 450, at 548; cf. DAVID M. KENNEDY, DETERRENCE AND CRIME
PREVENTION 41 (2009) (“What is not known cannot deter.”).
453 Associated Press, U.S.: CIA Thwarts New al-Qaeda Underwear Bomb Plot, USA TODAY
(May 8, 2012, 8:03 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-05-07/al
-qaeda-bomb-plot-foiled/54811054/1; Scott Shane & Eric Schmitt, Airline Plotter a Double Agent,
U.S. Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2012, at A1.
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Stuxnet cyberattack on Iranian nuclear enrichment facilities.454 In
both cases, critics asserted the leaks would have devastating consequences for our national security. The opposite cannot be ruled out.
However reprehensible the underlying disclosures might have been,
these stories dramatically showcased the U.S. government’s power and
resolve, without necessarily revealing anything significant about the
limits of either. (Whether the stories compromised any sources or
methods of intelligence collection is unclear at this writing.) As Bill
Keller of the Times speculated — in self-interested fashion, to be sure,
but plausibly — the “double-agent revelations may well have been
good for American security” to the extent that they “sow[ed] some corrosive mistrust among the fanatics” who plan such suicide bombings.455 Professor Goldsmith’s analysis of the Stuxnet leak is particularly apposite:
While many in the U.S. government are no doubt genuinely angry that the
U.S. government hand in Stuxnet was revealed, this revelation probably
has the happy effect of enhancing U.S. cyber deterrence. For it demonstrates that the U.S. government has sophisticated cyberweapons that —
despite legal and other obstacles — it is willing to deploy, even in a
preemptive fashion.456

In demonstrating such decisiveness, the episode suggested that
those who wish to menace the United States will find it very tough
sledding. One of the most assailed disclosures in recent history, a disclosure that helped prompt a vituperative congressional hearing and
widespread calls for criminal prosecution,457 may have been an important instance of deterrence by denial.
Furthermore, even in cases where leaks do not deliver security benefits, other features of our system can reduce their security costs. The
broadest safeguards flow from the temporality of secrecy. Many
(though by no means all) of the government’s most significant secrets
are highly time-sensitive, in that the expected damage from disclosure
falls precipitously after some initial implementation window has
closed. Information concerning specific operations and negotiations
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
454
455

See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
Keller, supra note 4. Keller further contended that “in this case, reporters who worked the
story sought and received assurances that the [outed] agent had finished his work and moved to
safety.” Id.
456 Jack Goldsmith, The Significance of Panetta’s Cyber Speech and the Persistent Difficulty of
Deterring Cyberattacks, LAWFARE (Oct. 15, 2012, 1:26 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/10
/the-significance-of-panettas-cyber-speech-and-the-persistent-difficulty-of-deterring-cyberattacks/
(“USG” replaced with “U.S. government” throughout).
457 See, e.g., National Security Leaks and the Law: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1–2 (2012) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner, Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary); Kim Zetter, Sen. Feinstein
Calls for Hearing on Stuxnet Leaks as FBI Begins Probe, WIRED (June 6, 2012, 1:31 PM),
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/06/stuxnet-leak-investigation.
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often loses most of its value within several months — and then remains classified for years.458
The policy development process is also more conducive to compartmentalization. Fewer officials are needed to devise than to execute
any given scheme. And those officials who participate in secretive policy development exercises not only are often preselected for discretion
and loyalty, but also face an especially high risk of being discovered if
they defect through leaking. As a general matter, even habitual leakers may prefer to sit on secrets for a while before going to the press,
lest the timing of the revelation pinpoint them. The gestation period
that policies go through before they become routinized marks both an
especially critical phase in many secrets’ life cycles and an especially
difficult phase in which to make clandestine disclosures.
An additional buffer against certain forms of national security
damage comes from the nature of the journalistic enterprise. Some
nontrivial percentage of the U.S. government’s most sensitive information is so technical and abstruse that it cannot realistically be
leaked via the press, because it is not readily reducible to a news story.
Consider what may be the single most sensitive topic in government
these days: “cyber.”459 It would be of minimal benefit to our allies and
adversaries to learn, in layperson’s terms, much of what we are thinking and doing in the realms of cybersecurity and cyberwarfare. They
already understand the general parameters. What they really want to
learn are precise technical details about our defensive and offensive
plans and capabilities. And yet it is hard to imagine the Times ever
running a story to this effect, as doing so would not likely make good
copy, win professional esteem, or meet even a loose conception of what
the public deserves to know.
On this account, what limits the spread and cost of leaks is not
necessarily the mainstream media’s ethic of responsible journalism. It
is their simple need to package content in a way that is intelligible and
interesting to a mass audience. There is also a related resource constraint. A mainstream media outlet can only allocate so many pages or
so much airtime to any given news item.460
With this in view, we can see more clearly why WikiLeaks looks so
scary to the U.S. government: it has no narrative imperative.461 As a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
458

See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 442, at 59; ARVIN S. QUIST, 2 SECUCLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION ch. 2 (1993), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp
/library/quist2/chap_2.html.
459 See, e.g., SANGER, supra note 198, at 265 (“Reluctant as the White House is to discuss
drones . . . it is absolutely allergic to talking about our cyber-offense capabilities.”).
460 The cost of making primary documents publicly available has, however, been diminishing
rapidly on account of the Internet.
461 WikiLeaks is an extreme case of a larger phenomenon. Advocacy groups and Internetfocused media outlets such as blogs may as a rule be less interested than print, television, and ra-
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pure pass-through with no comparable need to sell newspapers or tell
stories, it can reveal arcane details as well as broad outlines, code as
well as characterization. It can simply dump general leaks, in toto, into the public domain. Attentive bloggers, crowdsourcing sites, and
tech-savvy platforms such as Slashdot and Wired magnify the risk that
significant nuggets will be identified. Given how important the technical specifics are in fields like cyber, a pure pass-through model is far
more vexing to policymakers. The single greatest external safeguard
of the government’s most recondite secrets was probably never reporters’ professional norms, patriotism, repeat contacts with top officials,
elite socialization, or the like. It was their genre constraints.
To recapitulate, a thorough assessment of leaks’ national security
consequences must take into account the structural factors that have
traditionally limited some of their downside, as well as their potential
to yield security dividends by deflating unwarranted optimism, eliciting information, and facilitating deterrence. And to be clear, none of
this is to suggest that the majority of leaks have been more salutary
than harmful or that some leaks do not cause very serious damage. I
do not take this position. (Nor is any firm empirical stance possible, as
nearly all of the arguments on this subject are perforce conclusory or
conjectural.) What I do mean to suggest is that, on balance, classified
information disclosures to the press are more ambiguous events from a
national security perspective than the government or the literature has
acknowledged. Leaks present opportunities as well as risks. Under
the conditions in which the U.S. executive branch has historically operated, a permissive approach to enforcement in this area is not necessarily suicidal or even severely security-reducing. Perhaps the best evidence for this point is the government’s longstanding tolerance of
leaks.
C. Seeing Like a National Security State
Some readers may be particularly troubled not by the volume or
security impacts of U.S. government leaks, but by the ad hockery and
internal imbalances of the disciplinary system described in this Article.
Low- and mid-level employees certainly generate some notable disclosures, and they typically escape punishment. Yet, as explained in Part
I, the executive’s highest-ranking officials produce the bulk of what we
call “leaks” (a category that encompasses leaks, pleaks, and plants).
And, as explained in Parts II and III, even though the laws against
leaking and the classification guidelines are written in generally appli–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
dio outlets in telling stories or reaching general audiences, and more interested in posting and interrogating official documents. And trade publications have long complicated the media marketplace along some of the dimensions discussed above.
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cable terms, in practice these senior policymakers are given substantially more leeway to disregard them without risk of formal sanction.
Against the background of an overbroad law, executive branch principals have used their enforcement discretion and informational advantages to fashion a significantly more flexible, and self-serving, regime for regulating leaks than the one presented to the public through
their rules and their rhetoric.462
It does not take much critical imagination to find fault with an enforcement model that insulates the most porous stratum of government
from the most coercive forms of discipline. On a cynical reading, this
is purely a function of power dynamics and elite networks. High-level
sources acquire the right allies, attend the right dinner parties, accumulate the resources and connections necessary to fend off formal
sanctions. The system gives them favored treatment not because they
deserve it in any valid normative sense, but because they run the
system.
Such cynicism may not be unfounded, but it is too easy. More
sympathetic readings of this enforcement asymmetry are available.
Authorization to leak is not binary, as explored above, and high-level
officials will often have a better claim to some kind of communicative
warrant — to a legal claim of declassification authority under the executive order on classification, or to a bureaucratic claim of disclosure
authority under the principles of pleaking and planting.463 Importantly, these officials may also be better positioned to judge potential
harms from revelation. Their jobs afford them the richest understanding of U.S. plans and interests; the thickest ties to members of Congress, other executive branch principals, and foreign allies; and the lion’s share of public scrutiny and political accountability. They are
more likely to have amassed relevant facts and experiences with which
to contextualize new information, and to have internalized any signals
that the President and agency heads may be sending. The leak laws,
as enforced, are most apt to chill those employees who feel least secure
about the contours of the policy debates and practical objectives that
key decisionmakers are pursuing at any given time. At least for the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
462 Note, however, that this is not a regime, like plea bargaining in the shadow of statutory
minimum sentences, in which a harsh yet rarely exacted legislative penalty shapes interactions
between executive enforcers and the accused in a quasi-formal system of justice. See generally
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2548 (2004). The Espionage Act may scare some government employees, but there is little reason
to believe it exerts such a profound disciplinary influence when it is hardly ever dangled before
suspects as a possible penalty. Across most of the government, leak suspects are almost never
identified or even meaningfully pursued.
463 See supra sections II.B.1–2, pp. 559–73.
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ends of national security and effective governance, it is not clear this is
a bad arrangement.464
The literature on social planning furnishes additional reasons
to resist equating the superficial lawlessness of the leak regime with
opportunistic rent seeking or bureaucratic chaos. In Seeing Like a
State, the anthropologist James Scott famously critiques centralized
programs of social engineering as elevating the schematic, rationalistic
ideology of “high modernism” over the local, practical knowledge
encapsulated in the Greek term mētis.465 Professor Scott’s dichotomy is highly stylized, and he never considers national security examples. But it does not seem fanciful to suppose that he might find in the
stuff of classified documents — war, diplomacy, statecraft, counterterrorism — precisely the sorts of complex policy challenges that demand
mētis-friendly institutional responses.466 Decisions over whether and
how to disseminate foreign policy and national security information
implicate values such as on-the-ground insight, common sense, experience, adaptation, improvisation. The practices of secrecy and revelation are not amenable to synoptic mastery or standardized formulae,
not conducive to the universalizing, acontextual logic of what the
Greeks called techne.467 They are an art, not a science. The uncertainties and contingencies in these areas are so daunting that sometimes we may do better to bypass top-down approaches and trust the
judgment of regime participants, allow them to apply “educated
guesswork,” proceed piecemeal, feel their way.468 Regardless, Scott
suggests, any effort to banish such initiative will prove quixotic.
Human beings will always resist “the more severe forms of social
straitjacketing.”469
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
464 If it seems odd that officials who play by the executive’s own rules would get off scot-free
for breaking the leak laws, it should not. At least as a technical matter, they may get off scot-free
for breaking all manner of laws. See generally Stephen Holmes, The Spider’s Web: How Government Lawbreakers Routinely Elude the Law, in WHEN GOVERNMENTS BREAK THE LAW 121
(Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2010) (explaining this phenomenon as the product of factors
such as legal immunities, evidentiary difficulties, risk spreading, congressional acquiescence, and
popular acceptance). It is exceedingly difficult to imprison or collect damages from a federal
employee who has violated a statute or someone’s rights in the course of performing a national
security–related function. In all but the most extreme cases, there is no criminal or civil liability.
There are no truth commissions. The curious feature of the leak situation is not that executive
officials avoid meaningful accountability under law, but rather that they are given the freedom to
engage in legally dubious conduct that seems, on its face, like it may run counter to the executive’s own interests.
465 JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE
HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 311 (1998); see also id. at 309–41.
466 See id. at 315 (describing “war diplomacy and politics more generally” as “mētis-laden
skills”).
467 See id. at 319–23 (contrasting techne and mētis).
468 Id. at 327–28.
469 Id. at 348.
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Scott is hardly unique in emphasizing the virtues of adaptable, decentralized approaches in information-rich environments. The great
Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek, for instance, similarly stress the importance of assimilating dispersed wisdom, changing variables, and unintended consequences into the policy
process.470 Any functional bureaucratic system, these theories insist,
“must create and maintain a space for those on the spot to use their local, practical knowledge (even if the hierarchs of the system pretend
not to notice this flexibility).”471
As compared to a system with greater compliance, coordination,
and enforcement levels, the U.S. government’s approach to leaking allows for a larger “space” of this sort. Its leak regime, we have seen, is
substantially more orderly and White House–friendly than it might
appear from the outside. But it is also substantially more fluid, nuanced, and decentralized than one would ever surmise from reading
the relevant statutes and executive orders. Assistant secretaries who
speak regularly with foreign counterparts, NSC members who read
copious intelligence reports, ambassadors and military commanders
who toil in the field472 — all are given bounded discretion to reveal
confidential information as they deem appropriate, subject to the
front-end check of social norms against especially harmful types of disclosure and the back-end check of possible informal sanction. The
leak regulation that we have in practice functionally empowers those
agency leaders and White House aides with greatest exposure to any
given national security issue. It creates opportunities for abuse, to be
sure. Parochial personal and institutional agendas may play an outsized role. But in broad terms, the shift it reflects from techne to mētis
can be sympathetically construed, not as the spoliation of rational design but as an organic, efficient subversion of a scheme to centralize
information control that was always utopian.
Although this sketch of a Scottian/Hayekian defense of our system
is my own invention, interviews uncovered some evidence to suggest
that executive branch secret keepers have consciously internalized
the core ideas. “Part of the trust instilled in political appointees,” one
former Defense Department official remarked, “is that they have the
judgment to talk about what’s appropriate and not talk about
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
470 See generally, e.g., LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS
pt. 5 (Ludwig von Mises Inst. 1998) (1949); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.
ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
471 J. Bradford DeLong, Seeing One’s Intellectual Roots: A Review Essay, 12 REV. AUSTRIAN
ECON. 245, 245 (1999) (discussing commonalities between Hayek and Scott).
472 Whether because of their physical and cultural distance from Washington, their professional
incentive structure, or their relatively intimate relationships with the reporters who live overseas
with them, ambassadors are a famously leaky lot. See supra p. 530 (noting one prominent
example).
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what’s inappropriate.”473 Lived experience underwrites this practical
wisdom: “These judgment calls are made every day by political
appointees in every agency and department.”474 Another former Defense Department official stressed the importance of quick decisionmaking and “situational sense” in fluid contexts involving sensitive national security information. “You don’t want to ossify things too much
here.”475
Whether these sorts of arguments amount to a persuasive consequentialist defense of existing practices is a large subject, and I have
only scratched the surface. There are undoubtedly grounds for skepticism. Perhaps the element of surprise in warmaking and counterterrorism demands a higher-than-normal degree of central planning.
Perhaps the irreversibility of publicity, the fact that secrets cannot be
reconcealed once revealed, exerts its own ossifying influence, thwarting
valuable modes of observation and adaptation. Perhaps the fear of
leaks pushes policymakers toward destructive levels of secrecy and risk
aversion in the planning process476 or biases them toward “short, discreet, one-off operations.”477 (To the extent this occurs, leaking may
have perverse dynamic effects not just on deliberation and strategy but
also on transparency within government.) Perhaps legal theory’s current “cult of flexibility” was misguided from the start with respect to
much bureaucratic decisionmaking.478
The claim here is not that Scott’s or Hayek’s theories ultimately
show the system we have is superior to less leaky alternatives on efficiency or social welfare grounds. The claim is that these theories, and
the lessons they hold about the importance of information flows and
the dangers of central planning, provide resources with which to make
the case. They further complicate the common notion that a leaky
ship of state is more vulnerable than a watersealed one.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
473 Telephone Interview with Phillip Carter, former Deputy Assistant Sec’y of Def. for Detainee
Policy, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (Aug. 28, 2012). My special thanks to Mr. Carter for being willing to
speak with me on the record.
474 Id.
475 Telephone Interview with former Department of Defense official, supra note 197.
476 See LINSKY, supra note 28, at 188–89 (explaining that “[p]olicymakers expect leaks, anticipate their impact, [and] take preventive measures” such as minimizing written documentation).
477 GOLDSMITH, supra note 16, at 68 (crediting the view “that broad, continuous long-term
operations involving many people tend to leak out, while short, discreet, one-off operations . . . are
more likely to remain secret”).
478 David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1375 (2011); see also
Adrian Vermeule, Local and Global Knowledge in the Administrative State (Harvard Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 13-01, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2169939 (identifying theoretical complications with Hayekian critiques of centralized
administrative oversight).
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D. Democracy, Discourse, and Rule of Law
Still other readers will be concerned principally with leakiness’s relationship to democracy and the rule of law. Once more, the issues are
immensely complex and contestable. Once more, my method will
be to steer clear of definitive judgments and optimific prescriptions,
and instead to try to draw attention to some particularly intriguing
hypotheses.
The implications of this Article’s positive analysis for values associated with democracy and the rule of law are, I believe, decidedly
mixed. Indeed, the complicated portrait painted in Parts II and III
helps illuminate why categorical normative positions are difficult
to sustain in this area. It should now be easier to see, for example,
why the argument that “leaking is an assault on democratic selfgovernance”479 relies on an arid and implausible conception of
democratic self-governance. The argument not only minimizes the
potential public benefits afforded by leaking,480 but it also overlooks
that our democratically selected leaders have themselves established a
regulatory environment in which certain types of leaks are effectively
permitted.
Leaking is, however, an assault on a certain vision of the unitary
executive. Its ubiquity both reflects and exacerbates what Professors
Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin refer to as the United States’ “distributed dictatorship,” in which the presidency amasses ever greater
powers even as the President himself experiences diminishing ability to
control their use.481 The intragovernmental struggles that manifest in
leaks provide a glimpse of the pluralism and competition that characterize modern administrative decisionmaking. To some significant extent, the rising volume of leaks that has been observed in recent
years482 may be an epiphenomenal expression of these struggles: in the
disclosures to the press, we see surfacing some of the underlying tensions fostered by the executive’s simultaneous growth in functional authority and internal complexity. While privacy proponents were lamenting the loss of control over one’s information and image that
individuals have been experiencing in the private sphere,483 the gov–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
479
480

Schoenfeld Testimony, supra note 181, at 56.
To take just one, leaks may serve the “checking value” of enabling public opinion to curb
the worst abuses of government. See generally Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First
Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
481 Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789, 1841 (2010) (emphasis omitted).
482 See supra p. 529.
483 See generally, e.g., LORI ANDREWS, I KNOW WHO YOU ARE AND I SAW WHAT YOU
DID: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE DEATH OF PRIVACY (2011); A. Michael Froomkin, The
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000).
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ernment was experiencing an analogous loss of self-possession in the
public sphere. Prominent legal theorists Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule have been asking Americans to accept that they cannot hope
to control the executive branch through law in any rigorous, ex ante
fashion.484 The phenomenon of leaks suggests the President cannot
hope to do so either.
A slew of additional concerns are raised by the extent to which the
executive’s regulatory choices have come to overwhelm the statutory
scheme. Such divergence between the law on the books and the law in
action is always problematic. A congressionalist might see this as a
pernicious form of executive aggrandizement and a displacement of
legislative and popular will. A legalist might worry about the seeming
surfeit of law violations by government officials. A technocrat might
disapprove of the drift away from coordinated solutions toward
relatively haphazard forms of policymaking. All of these critics might
wonder whether permissive neglect enhances the leverage of top military officials, such as regional commanders and members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, to the point of threatening the principle of civilian
control.485
These concerns are not minor. For some, they may provide decisive reasons to denounce the status quo, even if their empirical underpinnings (for example, the frequency with which military brass are
able to hem in the President through pleaking) remain murky. What
tends to soften, but not fully blunt, their critical edge is the order that
lies beneath the disorder. While no President could plug all the leaks,
the story told in this Article demonstrates that the Oval Office retains
significant power to shape the context in which they occur. Through
internal signals, informal sanctions, and media messaging, every White
House continually elaborates the structure of the game of leaks — and
plays the strongest hand — even though it exercises little control over
many moves within the game. The mystery surrounding these maneuvers is not purely a cost for outsiders. To depress the volume of
truly damaging disclosures, maintain flexibility in response to changing
threat environments, and avoid showing open contempt for enacted
law, it may be necessary for the executive to conceal its “real” operational code on leaking to some significant degree.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
484
485

See generally POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 177.
See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD, OBAMA’S WARS 192–95 (2010) (describing President Obama’s
frustration that the “White House was losing control of the public narrative” concerning Afghanistan troop levels on account of leaks by top military officials, id. at 195). See generally BRUCE
ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 43–64 (2010) (arguing
that a variety of structural transformations have politicized the military high command, strengthened its ties to the media, and “placed the future of civilian control in jeopardy,” id. at 45).
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The slack in the system serves a more basic public purpose. So
long as classification levels remain gargantuan and the President
retains unfettered declassification authority, as most assume she will in
the absence of a contrary statute, an off-the-books disclosure regime of
immaculate legality and regularity would potentially be quite scary.
All that would remain are plants. The President could use selective
declassification to reduce national security information policy to
her personal agenda. It is the legally and bureaucratically dubious
component of the system, the leaks and the pleaks, that most
immediately enables external oversight and constrains the President
from consolidating power in this way. Some loss in compliance values
may be the price we have to pay to preserve the more fundamental
rule-of-law value of nondomination. The choice between seeing our
system’s leakiness as a crisis in presidential governance or a healthy
form of democratic self-correction is a false choice. It shares attributes
of both.
Part II’s explanation of how the practice of “leaking” involves a
larger amount of planting and pleaking than wholly unauthorized disclosures may nonetheless alarm some readers. The observation seems
to take a fundamental pillar of good governance and turn it on its
head, reappropriating transparency as a means of manipulation and
control. This is the dark side of a journalistic culture that relies so
heavily on anonymous government sources. We might worry, further,
that the surreptitious nature of planting and pleaking reflects poorly
on, or actively corrodes, the characters of those officials who aspire to
influence policy from behind closed doors. Such esoteric rituals are a
far cry from the civic republican ideal of vigorous, mature, and courageous public debate.486 The instrumental, competitive cast of much of
this behavior may seem similarly disheartening. It disserves the ideal
of the nation’s secrets as a kind of common good over which government employees serve as mere trustees.
Once again, though, it is important not to see only darkness where
there is also light. Plants and pleaks release an enormous amount of
raw data into circulation. Their abusive potential is tempered by
other features of the system, such as the way in which these disclosures
can facilitate healthy modes of intrabranch contestation (what some
call the internal separation of powers487), enable different parts of
government to communicate more efficiently, and stimulate congressional and civil society inquiry. Whether or not leaks tend to be
self-serving or reporters’ interests tend to coincide with their sources’,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
486 See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 99–103 (1991).
487 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
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the media promote checking and balancing in this context simply by
externalizing the executive branch’s internal power struggles. A press
that was little more than a cipher for bureaucratic “conspiracy and
covert warfare”488 would still, in publishing leaks, be a font of illumination and constraint. If the U.S. government really does function as
this Article describes it, then we should understand leakiness not as a
perversion of transparency so much as a more complicated kind of
transparency. The unwritten norms that circumscribe leak-law enforcement help align this administrative realm, imperfectly, with basic
liberal values.
Leaks’ signature virtue, of course, is their capacity to contribute to
public accountability and debate. The notion of leaks as a democratic
“safety valve” is an old one.489 If anything, I believe the point has
been underemphasized. Numerous commentators have stressed that
leaks can expose controversial practices, empower dissenters, pierce
the government’s deepest secrets, trigger transparency cascades, and so
on.490 Less appreciated is the significance of the manner in which they
impart information. Leaking is a highly dynamic mode of disclosure.
Partial or slanted revelations are apt to generate counter-leaks and
counter-counter-leaks that cumulatively flesh out and debias the narrative. Leaking is also a highly salient mode of disclosure. Its promise
of authentic revelation, its association with palace intrigue, its whiff of
illegality — all help to whet reader appetites and generate front-page
coverage. At least so long as they do not spread false information, this
special salience of leaks (including pleaks and plants) enhances their
educative and deliberative value for members of the public, just as it
does for government consumers.491 In an age of information overload,
media fragmentation, and hyperpolarized political discourse, leaks can
cut through some of the noise and convey a particularly loud, credible
message.
Leaks, moreover, can play a pivotal role in enabling certain specialized forms of critical discourse. Not infrequently, former government
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
488 SAGAR, supra note 181, at 6. For the reasons given in the main text, I believe that Professor
Sagar’s fear of leaks’ “contaminating our public life” is overstated. Id.; see also id. at 184 (asserting that “when we rely on unauthorized disclosures to combat the abuse of state secrecy, we inevitably degrade the quality of public deliberation”). Even if particular leaks are prone to being unbalanced or unsavory, it does not follow that leaking will on aggregate disserve deliberation or
other civic values. Cf. supra section II.B.1, pp. 559–65 (explaining, in a related context, how focusing on the individual properties of leaks, rather than their systemic effects, can give rise to a
fallacy of composition).
489 See, e.g., HECLO, supra note 23, at 231; Kielbowicz, supra note 99, at 480; Clarence Page,
Leaks: Democracy’s Safety Valve, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 27, 1991, at 3C.
490 For a particularly important elaboration of these points, see Kreimer, supra note 88, at
1033–46. See also Pozen, supra note 336, at 275–323 (arguing that “deep secrets,” or unknown
unknowns, work special constitutional, democratic, and policy harms).
491 See supra section II.B.4, pp. 577–79.
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officials and sophisticated lay observers suspect that the executive is
pursuing a secret policy of some sort, but they feel unwilling or unable
to discuss their suspicions publicly. Then a leak comes along, stating,
for instance, that the CIA is flying lethal drones in Yemen.492 Henceforth, knowledgeable citizens — say, the authors of the influential
Lawfare blog — have a ready means to talk about the CIA’s operations in Yemen without acting recklessly or violating any confidences
(much less any laws): they can assume arguendo that the leak is correct, and start discussing.493 Government officials, in turn, can
respond to relevant commentary through still more anonymous
disclosures.
Misleading and narrowly self-serving leaks seem less likely to have
such a catalytic effect, insofar as these epistemic communities of insideroutsiders can ignore media reports that they know to be less
credible or illuminating. Through these discursive processes, the more
accurate, significant disclosures come to be accredited, and critical
scrutiny comes to crystallize around them. A cycle of validation progressively filters the government’s leaky matter and refines the associated public debate.
As these arguments reflect, the U.S. government’s system of
information control defies simple normative assessment because of the
way it combines stunningly large levels of formal secrecy with stunningly elaborate modes of informal and semiformal revelation. Professor Balkin has proposed a distinction between “democratic” information states and “authoritarian” information states.494 The latter are
(among other things) “information misers,” concerned to maximize
power and minimize accountability by concealing their activities and
discoveries.495 The former are (among other things) “information
philanthropists,” eager to distribute valuable information to the public.496 The analysis here suggests that the reality in the United States
is much, much messier than these ideal types. By creating a space for
decentralized disclosure, our secrecy regime continually undermines
and sustains itself, mediating the profound threat that it poses to open
and informed self-government. The result is a partially intentional,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
492
493

See supra notes 247–49 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Robert Chesney, What Law Would Preclude DOD, But Not CIA, from Carrying
Out Strikes in Yemen Without Yemen’s Consent?, LAWFARE (June 15, 2011, 5:13 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/what-law-would-preclude-dod-but-not-cia-from-carrying-out
-strikes-in-yemen-without-yemens-consent (analyzing legal issues pertaining to targeted killings in
Yemen on the basis of a “series of articles over the past few days [that] have discussed plans for
the CIA to operate armed drones” there).
494 Jack M. Balkin, Essay, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 17–18 (2008).
495 Id. at 17.
496 Id. at 18.
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partially emergent synthesis of official miserliness and anonymous philanthropy. In light of its leakiness, perhaps we might best characterize
our national security state as a democratic-authoritarian information
state.
E. Comparative Convergence, Obama’s Uptick, and the Road Ahead
Let us close this Part with two particularly important open questions and suggestions for future research, one that looks abroad and
one that looks ahead.
The first question relates to the exceptionalism of the United
States’ regulatory model. A central trope in the U.S. legal conversation on leaking is that, for better or worse, we do not have anything
like the United Kingdom’s Official Secrets Act. Originally enacted in
1889,497 the Official Secrets Act broadly criminalizes the dissemination
and retention of numerous classes of government information, including by members of the media. In light of the United States’
First Amendment guarantees and tradition of press freedom, many
have asserted that such a law “would not be tolerated” here.498 “We
have no Official Secrets Act and can have none restraining publication
of most secrets,” Alexander Bickel once remarked.499 For some American observers who see leaks as compromising national security, this
disparity is cause for lament. For most who have noted the disparity,
it is a source of pride — and a touchstone for advocacy. The suggestion that a proposed reform would import Official Secrets Act tactics
into the U.S. system is a common rhetorical device employed by liberal
opposition.500
What the conventional wisdom misses, I suspect, is that at least in
general terms the United States and the United Kingdom have been
converging on a common approach to regulating leaks. This approach
combines expansive formal prohibitions and permissive enforcement
practices, together with weak whistleblower protections; strong norms
against “unpatriotic” high-risk, low-value disclosures; and the effective
exemption of full-time journalists from civil or criminal liability. Following the overhaul of the Official Secrets Act in 1989,501 U.K. law on
leaks has become less draconian. Following the Fourth Circuit’s 1988
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
497 Official Secrets Act, 1889, 52 & 53 Vict., c. 52 (U.K.), repealed by Official Secrets Act, 1911,
1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28 (U.K.). Section 2 of the 1911 Act was the notorious provision focused on leaks,
as distinct from espionage.
498 ABEL, supra note 19, at 8.
499 BICKEL, supra note 14, at 80.
500 Recall that in lobbying President Clinton to pardon convicted media leaker Samuel Morison,
Arthur Schlesinger and Anthony Lewis each sought to associate Morison’s conviction with the
Official Secrets Act. See supra note 389.
501 Official Secrets Act, 1989, c. 6 (U.K.). For a history of the Act prior to this reform, see
DAVID HOOPER, OFFICIAL SECRETS: THE USE AND ABUSE OF THE ACT (1987).
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opinion in Morison,502 U.S. law has become more stringent — with
questions about whether the Espionage Act and 18 U.S.C. § 641 could
be applied to media leakers, as a legal matter, largely giving way to
questions about how aggressively they should be applied, as a policy
matter.503 The text of the Official Secrets Act still seems to reach
journalists and the mere unauthorized possession of protected information.504 So does the text of the Espionage Act.505 The Official Secrets Act covers a wide range of information relating to intelligence,
defense, and international relations.506 So does the Espionage Act, as
it has been construed by the courts.507 The Official Secrets Act effectively relieves the government of a burden to prove that national
security–related disclosures were in fact “damaging.”508 So do parts of
the Espionage Act, as they have been applied.509 The Official Secrets
Act has not been read to permit a defense of improper classification,
compelling public interest, or the like.510 Neither has the Espionage
Act.511 The daylight between these two laws is nowhere near as great
as is commonly presumed. And this is before one turns to all the other
U.S. criminal laws that might be used against leakers.512
Convergence has occurred at a functional level as well. The Official Secrets Act now requires the consent of the Attorney General for
most prosecutions to be brought,513 in line with the U.S. custom of
keeping leak cases in Main Justice and requiring the Attorney General’s sign-off for journalist subpoenas.514 Since the current version
entered into force in 1990, twelve individuals have been prosecuted for
leak-related offenses under the Official Secrets Act,515 as compared to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
502
503

United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1988).
See supra notes 33–48, 384–95 and accompanying text (discussing Morison and subsequent
case law).
504 Official Secrets Act §§ 5–6, 8.
505 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
506 Official Secrets Act §§ 1–3.
507 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
508 See Official Secrets Act §§ 1(5), 2(3), 3(4); see also R v. Keogh, [2007] EWCA (Crim) 528
(Eng.) (upholding this “reverse burden of proof” for defense and international relations information on the condition that the burden is construed as evidentiary in nature).
509 See supra notes 37–39, 48 and accompanying text.
510 See, e.g., R v. Shayler, [2003] EWCA (Crim) 2218 (Eng.) (discussing the Act’s lack of a public interest defense).
511 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
512 See supra p. 523 (cataloguing these laws).
513 Official Secrets Act § 9.
514 See supra notes 126–37 and accompanying text.
515 For a summary of these cases, see Sandra Coliver & Zsolt Bobis, The United Kingdom’s
Official Secrets Act 1989, at 4–8 (Dec. 14, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.right2info.org/resources/publications/UKOfficialSecretsAct1989byOSJI.pdf (updated
version on file with author).
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more than thirty prosecutions in the preceding decade.516 Ten of the
twelve were current or former public employees or contractors; one
was a Member of Parliament’s staffer; one was an independent scholar
and freelance journalist whose case was dropped prior to trial.517 U.S.
prosecution levels during this period, we have seen, are similar in raw
numeric terms.518 A high-level committee was recently convened in
the United Kingdom to examine possible responses to widespread leaking, only to run up against the uncomfortable finding that “the majority of leaks tend[] to be political in origin, primarily coming from special advisers or ministers” and above all “the Downing Street
machine.”519 The U.S. government, we have seen, has a long history
of commissioning thoughtful, fruitless reports of this nature.520 The
legacy of previous unpopular prosecutions, the specter of European
Court of Human Rights review, and the reconfiguration of its criminal
regime seem to have sharpened the U.K. government’s substantive
norms on disclosure discipline. The 1989 Official Secrets Act is
especially harsh on intelligence leaks,521 and like their American counterparts, British prosecutors appear to be focusing on low- and midlevel officials accused of disclosing tangible, intelligence-related materials.522 Certain specific norms, such as the strong norm against
divulging information for money, fairly clearly prevail on both sides of
the Atlantic.523
The scope of convergence should not be overstated. There are profound differences in the two countries’ media practices, government
structure, and (quasi-)constitutional free speech law524 that complicate
apparent similarities. Political appointees are as a rule much less powerful and civil servants more powerful in the British parliamentary
system, which may reduce factionalism, turnover, and incentives for
pleaking. Through its Defence Advisory Notice (DA-Notice) system, a
U.K. government committee has issued a standing request to the media not to publish stories discussing five categories of sensitive infor–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
516
517
518
519
520

See K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, FREEDOM UNDER THATCHER 139 (1990).
Coliver & Bobis, supra note 515, at 4–8.
See supra notes 113–25 and accompanying text.
LEAKS IN WHITEHALL, supra note 281, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See, e.g., COOLIDGE REPORT, supra note 154; WILLARD REPORT, supra note 37; Ashcroft
Report, supra note 46.
521 See Laurence Lustgarten, Freedom of Expression, Dissent, and National Security in the
United Kingdom, in SECRECY AND LIBERTY, supra note 161, at 457, 471.
522 See Coliver & Bobis, supra note 515, at 4–8.
523 See supra notes 389–91 and accompanying text.
524 In the British case, key quasi-constitutional authorities on freedom of expression include
article 10 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, and section 12 of the Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.).
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mation, including “Military Operations, Plans & Capabilities.”525
Compliance with the DA-Notice system is optional, but reportedly
regular.526 Moreover, in cases where it seeks to block publication, the
U.K. government retains somewhat greater legal authority than the
U.S. government to obtain a prior restraint.527
This brief discussion is plainly insufficient to make out a convincing case for the convergence thesis. I hope it is sufficient, however, to
put the thesis on the map. Detailed comparative research could make
a large contribution in exploring whether and to what extent the United States and the United Kingdom — among other advanced democracies with substantial national security bureaucracies — have arrived
at common solutions for regulating leaks on the books and, more importantly, in action. The suggestion here is that the systemic benefits
of leaks may be too great, and the costs of enforcement too high, for
any modern, democratically accountable executive to maintain a system that is effective at plugging them.
The second question relates to the exceptionalism of President
Obama’s first term. Critics have been asking how a President who
campaigned on a transparency platform could preside over an unprecedented — though still statistically meager — succession of leak prosecutions. There are numerous possible explanations for this uptick in
enforcement.
The uptick may have been “accidental,”528 the product of idiosyncratic circumstances unlikely to be replicated in the future with any
regularity. (Recall in this regard that at least two of the eight cases
commonly attributed to President Obama were initiated in the prior
Administration.529) The uptick may have been driven by the advent of
investigative and communicative technologies that make it easier to
locate leakers,530 and aided further by the decline over the past decade
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
525 Standing DA-Notices, DEF., PRESS & BROAD. ADVISORY COMM., http://www.dnotice.org
.uk/danotices/index.htm (last updated Aug. 14, 2013). This committee also periodically issues
guidance letters on specific matters. For a summary of the evolution of the DA-Notice system,
see Laura K. Donohue, Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 233, 287–90 (2005).
526 See, e.g., Frequently Asked Questions, DEF., PRESS & BROAD. ADVISORY COMM.,
http://www.dnotice.org.uk/faqs.htm (last updated Mar. 20, 2012) (considering why “the media follow[s] a voluntary code”).
527 See DAVID FELDMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN ENGLAND AND
WALES 869–89 (2d ed. 2002) (comparing U.S. and U.K. law on prior restraints against publication
of official secrets).
528 Shane & Savage, supra note 124.
529 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
530 See, e.g., Shane Harris, The Obama Administration’s War on Information Leaks, WASHINGTONIAN (June 14, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.washingtonian.com/blogs/capitalcomment
/news-gossip/the-obama-administrations-war-on-information-leaks.php (arguing that the enforcement level is up because the government “has the technological capabilities to track and monitor
government employees’ phone calls and e-mails in a way it hasn’t in the past”).
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of the federal reporter’s privilege.531 It may have been spurred by the
creation of the NSD in 2006, inasmuch as this unit has brought additional resources or a more aggressive mindset to the Department of
Justice’s work on leak matters.532 It may reflect the Obama team’s
concern to burnish its national security credentials,533 its reluctance to
challenge an increasingly powerful Intelligence Community,534 or its
alarm over WikiLeaks.535 More generally, it may respond to a perception that the government has suffered a rising number of disclosures
that are genuinely threatening to security interests — for instance, because of the larger volume of sensitive counterterrorism information
produced since 9/11 or because of adversaries’ enhanced capacity to
exploit data-mining and pattern-analysis tools — or a rising number of
disclosures that are threatening to other policy objectives — for instance, because of lower-level employees’ increased access to
nonestablishment media outlets or their increased capacity to carry out
large-scale leaks.536
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See supra notes 56–62 and accompanying text (describing this doctrinal trend).
See supra note 127 and accompanying text (explaining that the NSD now coordinates leak
investigations and prosecutions with the FBI). Within the IC, the creation of the ODNI around
the same time, see supra note 361, may have similarly fortified bureaucratic will or capacity to
pursue leakers.
533 See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, In Probing Disclosures, Officials Face Massive Task, WASH. POST,
June 16, 2012, at A8 (citing several defense attorneys for this view). During the 2012 presidential
race, President Obama’s campaign trumpeted the historically unprecedented number of leak
prosecutions as a rebuttal to charges of excessive planting. See Fact Check: President Obama Has
Aggressively Pursued and Addressed National Security Leaks, BARACK OBAMA (Aug. 16, 2012),
h t t p : / /w w w . b a r ac k o b a m a . c o m / t ru t h - t e a m / e n t r y /fa c t - c h e ck - p r e s i de n t- o b a m a - h a s - ag g r e s s i v e l y
-pursued-and-addressed-national (“[A] new conservative Super PAC . . . is deploying Swift Boat
tactics against the President by claiming that his administration is deliberately leaking national
security information and risking American lives in the process. . . . But this manipulative and unfounded attack flies in the face of reality. President Obama has done more than any other administration to forcefully pursue and address leaks of classified national security information.”). Part
II’s analysis shows why this response was a non sequitur. If anything, the use of White House–
approved plants becomes more, not less, troubling when combined with a crackdown on leaks.
The decision to advance such a spurious argument reflects — and exploits — deep popular confusion about the leak/pleak/plant distinction.
534 See Sharon LaFraniere, Math Behind Leak Crackdown: 153 Cases, 4 Years, 0 Indictments,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2013, at A1 (reporting that a more aggressive approach to leak enforcement
“was driven by pressure from the intelligence agencies and members of Congress,” in particular
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and that a top counterintelligence official “was put
in charge of stanching leaks”); cf. DANIEL KLAIDMAN, KILL OR CAPTURE 121 (2012) (reporting
that President Obama, after being presented in late 2009 with “a CIA wish list of counterterrorist
requests,” declared: “The CIA gets what it wants” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As described throughout this Article, the IC has long been an executive branch outlier in its willingness
to support leak-law enforcement.
535 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 533 (attributing this view to Steven Aftergood).
536 See AMBINDER & GRADY, supra note 253, at 43 (arguing that the “Internet has moved the
power” away from journalists “to the leakers themselves,” as the latter “no longer need[] . . . the
Washington Post to alert the world”).
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On account of such exogenous shocks, the downside of lax enforcement may seem qualitatively scarier now. It is possible that the
personal and bureaucratic incentives favoring permissive neglect and
the functional imperatives of the national security state are increasingly diverging, with the consequence that senior officials will have to
sacrifice some of their own disclosure discretion to stop future Edward
Snowdens. Plants may need to be watered with leaks,537 but they are
unlikely to thrive in a downpour.
Most generally, the uptick in enforcement may respond to a deep
anxiety within some parts of the executive about the continued viability of secrecy as a strategic tool. To be an effective superpower in the
twenty-first century, the U.S. government must be increasingly wired,
networked, and distributed in its communications and operations.
Those same dynamics give rise to a greater risk of unwanted exposure
through observation by external actors or revelation by internal agents,
as spectacularly exemplified by Chelsea Manning’s and WikiLeaks’s
exploitation of vulnerabilities in the Defense Department’s SIPRNet
network.538 An estimated 854,000 individuals, including some 265,000
contractors, currently hold top-secret security clearances.539 The potential scope for uncooperative, unauthorized disclosure has swelled
correspondingly.
These hypotheses are all potentially meritorious and deserve careful consideration. The technological explanation strikes me as particularly plausible; if it becomes increasingly easy to catch criminals, it
may become increasingly difficult to justify the failure to do so. I
take it to be an important open question whether some of these factors
are putting the regulatory paradigm described in this Article under
unsustainable strain. Even small changes to complex ecologies can
have large consequences. It is conceivable that, in the fullness of time,
the Article’s elaboration of the permissive neglect model will come to
feel antiquated, more like a retrospective than a statement of current
reality.
Yet none of these hypotheses is testable in the near term. New
technologies that become available to sources and journalists may help
to foil rather than facilitate investigations. Media leaks may become
less, not more, threatening to national security as the informational
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See supra section II.B.1, pp. 559–65.
Julian Assange was out to exploit this conundrum. His fundamental goal with regard to the
U.S. government, as I understand him, was not so much to reveal and deter discrete abuses as to
induce sufficient paranoia about the prospect of revelation that the government would stanch internal information flows, thereby destroying from within its capacity to project power. See generally Julian Assange, Conspiracy as Governance (Dec. 3, 2006), available at http://cryptome
.org/0002/ja-conspiracies.pdf (developing this theme); Fenster, supra note 165, at 774–81 (identifying and assessing the “disclosure as radical resistance” strain in WikiLeaks’s self-conception).
539 DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA 158, 179–80 (2011).
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environment becomes more volatile and secrets become more difficult
to keep generally. And this Article’s positive analysis gives reason to
doubt that most senior officials would quietly accept any major shift in
enforcement, reaching into the upper echelons of government. This is
not the first time the secrecy system has been challenged. Notably, in
the aftermath of the Pentagon Papers case, many voiced concerns that
technology would “make[] document copying ever more simple,”540
while “the growth of underground newspapers and the educational experience of Vietnam” would corrode “voluntary restraint by the
press.”541 Those concerns were borne out, and the enforcement rate
barely moved.
Moreover, the single most important driver of the Obama enforcement uptick may be a dynamic that has gone unnoted — not White
House meddling with prosecutorial decisionmaking, as some have
speculated,542 but rather the absence thereof. Interviews and news reports suggest that, in reaction to what many Democrats saw as the excessive politicization of DOJ by the Bush II Administration, the
Obama White House has insulated itself from leak cases to an exceptional degree.543 On this account, the Administration abetted the increase in enforcement not by encouraging DOJ to crack down on media leakers, but by failing to send the normal cautionary signals (and
thereby allowing the IC to fill the void). To the extent this “politicalsto-prosecutors” signaling explanation is correct, it is a variable that can
be adjusted with ease. To the extent this Article is correct that disrupting the flow of leaks is more harmful to the presidency than has
been realized, it is a variable to which future administrations will want
to attend carefully.
In fact, there is already some anecdotal evidence to suggest that
key Obama officials have started to do so. The New York Times
recently reported that Attorney General Eric Holder “told associates
that he has no desire for leak prosecutions to be his legacy.”544 Which
is to say, through his own strategic use of the press, the Attorney Gen–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 37, at 1078.
WISE, supra note 98, at 161 (internal punctuation omitted).
See Harris, supra note 530 (noting the view of some journalists that “President Obama’s
historic leaker hunt [is attributable] to some kind of personal disgust he has for the spilling of
state secrets”).
543 See supra note 365; see also Shane & Savage, supra note 124 (reporting that “[President]
Obama and [Attorney General] Holder, who are social friends, have avoided discussing investigations and prosecutions to avoid any appearance of improper White House influence, a charge
Democrats lodged against the Bush administration”).
544 Shane & Savage, supra note 124. The Times subsequently reported that Attorney General
Holder, under pressure from the IC, had helped to develop a more aggressive enforcement strategy early in his tenure. See LaFraniere, supra note 534.
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eral has now signaled to the law enforcement bureaucracy to slow
down.545
For all the reasons given in Parts II and III, there is a strong basis
for predicting that the current “leak panic”546 will fade and that prosecutorial excess in this area ought to be self-correcting. Unless external
developments really have made today’s leaks qualitatively more
threatening to the national defense or to the White House agenda than
their Cold War precursors, or have otherwise ushered in an epochal
shift in the structure of executive branch policymaking, it should prove
too costly for the President and his team to maintain any substantial
rate of enforcement, any widespread perception that unauthorized disclosures are being stamped out. There is room to debate what qualifies as substantial enforcement, and it is impossible to forecast with
any confidence where a new equilibrium would settle. Technological
innovation, in particular, has unanticipatable disruptive potential.
The Snowden affair dramatically recast the secrecy debate even as this
Article was heading toward press. But history as well as theory is on
the side of the leaker. Permissive neglect has proven a remarkably resilient model over many decades in the face of great social, technological, journalistic, and bureaucratic change.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1975, Michel Foucault famously asked why, after more than a
century, the Western world’s efforts to rehabilitate prisoners had proven utterly unsuccessful.547 The failure to transform criminals into lawabiding citizens was routinely denounced by public officials, in a “monotonous critique,”548 and yet neither the practices of punishment nor
the rate of recidivism seemed to budge. The answer to this question,
Foucault theorized, lay in the motivations and dispositions of those
individuals and institutions who ran the carceral state: these groups,
these social structures, these patterns of thought — at some fundamental level they did not want to rehabilitate prisoners. They preferred
delinquency.549
It is time to ask a similar question about the persistence of massive leaking of government information. There is no need to accept
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
545 Cf. supra section II.B.4, pp. 577–79 (discussing the intragovernmental communicative economy of leaks, pleaks, and plants).
546 Keller, supra note 4.
547 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d
ed. 1995) (1977).
548 Id. at 268.
549 Id. at 264–92. For a succinct restatement, see MICHEL FOUCAULT, Prison Talk, in POWER/
KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS 1972–1977, at 37, 40 (Colin
Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
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Foucault’s methodology or worldview to embrace his revisionist instincts in this case. The literature on leaks has largely taken it for
granted that the authorities would like to escalate enforcement, if
only they had the capacity to punish more offenders. Relax this assumption — which Part II demonstrated to be untenable in any strong
form — and a different set of variables, a new way of looking at leaks,
comes into focus. This Article has unearthed the executive branch’s
varied interests in maintaining a regime of widespread classified information disclosures to the press, as well as the various tools the executive has developed to manage this regime. Considered in light of
these dynamics, the longstanding failure of leak-law enforcement can
be seen as something else entirely. It can be seen as a strategic response facilitated by Presidents and their appointees to a set of profound challenges confronting the modern administrative state. Even if
we bracket all of the standard arguments about leaks’ value for transparency, public debate, and the like, the counterintuitive yet inescapable conclusion is that some substantial amount of leaking is deeply
valuable for the executive itself. Foucault told a story about the disciplinary impulses that lay beneath the Enlightenment rhetoric of the
early welfare state. This is a story about the permissive (though still
power-serving) impulses that lie beneath the disciplinary rhetoric of
the postwar national security state.
It is easy to find fault with the equilibrium that has emerged. Indeed, from virtually any first-best normative standpoint, it is difficult
to justify such high levels of classification and clandestineness and
such low levels of legal accountability. That this regulatory regime has
proven workable hardly means that it is attractive, or that new
approaches to secretive executive branch activities — from strengthening congressional and judicial oversight, to reducing classification,
to enhancing whistleblower protections — could not improve on the
status quo. Any effort to recalibrate the practice of leaking itself, however, would have to take into account the tangle of factors that has historically generated so many disclosures, curbed so many disciplinarians, served so many interlocking agendas, frustrated so many formal
designs.
This Article has tried to detail the interaction of these factors within the larger ecosystem of presidential information control, and thereby
to deepen our understanding of government secrecy and executive
power. The Article offers mainly positive theory in the middle range,
out of a conviction that this is the kind of scholarly work most needed
in this field at this time — that many higher-level normative accounts
of the information state and the national security state cannot get off
the ground without a fuller understanding of how this ecosystem has
actually worked. The Article devotes less attention to cases and statutes because they have mattered less in this area, far less than the legal
literature’s fixation on them would suggest. It explores intentional, or-
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ganizational, and functional considerations because each of these conceptual frameworks enables valuable, and largely compatible, explanatory insights.550 It offers no sweeping prescriptions because the complexity and difficulty of the subject render them inapposite. Some
well-known policy problems cannot be solved. Some are not even
problems.
The great secret about the U.S. government’s notorious leakiness is
that it is a highly adaptive mechanism of information control, which
has been refined through a nuanced system of social norms. The great
secret about the laws against leaking is that they have never been used
in a manner designed to stop leaking — and that their implementation
threatens not just gauzy democratic ideals but practical bureaucratic
imperatives, not just individual whistleblowers but the institution of
the presidency. A delicate web of constraints has accommodated the
competing objectives of many powerful actors with respect to leaks. If
unauthorized disclosures were ever to be systematically suppressed, it
would jeopardize so much more, and so much less, than First
Amendment principles. And thus we may find that the “war” against
leaking yields once again to monotonous and ineffectual critique.
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550 Cf. GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION 401 (2d ed. 1999)
(concluding, in light of their definitive study of the Cuban missile crisis, that “[m]ultiple, overlapping, competing conceptual models are the best that the current understanding of foreign policy
provides”).

